The last few weeks have thrown up some interesting US ops stories.

We’ve looked at new FAA guidance on when pilots can exceed 250kts below 10,000ft, dug into a tricky question about the 200kt restriction beneath Class B airspace, followed reports of a curious transponder issue around Denver, and heard about the NTSB’s call for a review of runway condition reporting.

Here’s a quick round-up of what you may have missed in our ops alerts recently.

Going fast below ten

On June 12, the FAA published a new Information Note on exceeding 250kts below 10,000ft.

This wasn’t a rule change. It was really the FAA clarifying how an existing exception should be applied.

We know the basic rule: no more than 250kts below 10,000ft. But there’s an exception when an aircraft’s minimum safe airspeed exceeds 250kts.

Some heavy aircraft do require speeds above 250kts in certain situations. But if the aircraft can be safely configured to comply with the speed limit, then that’s what the FAA expects operators to do.

In short: the exception applies when the aircraft genuinely cannot safely operate at or below 250kts – not as a way around the speed limit.

200kts below Class B

While we’re on the topic of speed, here’s an interesting question that came in from an Opsgroup member flying the HURCN 4 SID at KOPF/Opa Locka.

The issue involves the 200kt speed limit that applies beneath shelves of Class B airspace. The SID contains a chart note instructing aircraft to accelerate to 250kts until leaving 10,000ft. So which speed wins?

Our reading is that the chart note does not override the regulatory speed limit. In this case, 200kts would apply until entering the Class B at 3,000ft, after which an acceleration to 250kts would be allowed.

A similar question came up at KSJC/San Jose on the LOUPE1 SID, where part of the procedure runs beneath a Class B shelf even though the SID itself contains a charted speed of 230kts.

It’s not just departures either. Another member asked about descents into KTEB/Teterboro, where aircraft are often kept at 250kts until relatively low altitude while being vectored for the RNAV 19 approach.

A highly-experienced Opsgroup expert and local operator told us this had come up before. While ATC may want aircraft to keep their speed up, controllers are generally careful not to assign speeds that would require pilots to exceed 200kts below the Class B.

One practical tip is to keep ATC informed. For example, if assigned a descent to 2,000ft where the Class B floor is 3,000ft, consider adding “slowing to 200 below the Class Bravo” to your read back.

If you’re an ATC controller and have experience with this issue, we’d love to hear from you at blog@ops.group.

Weird transponder issue at Denver

This one’s still a mystery!

Last week an Opsgroup member pinged us on WhatsApp, saying that ATC had advised a G550 crew of reports that some aircraft were unexpectedly reverting to transponder code 1200 and STBY without any pilot action. The issue had reportedly been observed on aircraft equipped with both Honeywell and Collins avionics, suggesting it wasn’t limited to just one type.

Sure enough, on departure from KBJC/Rocky Mountain the next day, the crew experienced exactly that. The transponder reverted to 1200 STBY without any associated CAS message.

We reported this to the group, and we’ve since received reports from other operators, including a Falcon 2000 LXS that experienced the issue on two separate transponders, along with an Embraer 175. All reports so far have one thing in common: the Denver area.

We still don’t know what’s causing it.

One possibility is an avionics or software issue. The fact that both the transponder code and mode appear to change points towards something system-related.

There is some precedence for this type of behaviour. Eurocontrol previously documented a Honeywell Primus/Mode S interface issue that could result in a transponder unexpectedly reverting to standby. But this was associated with code entry, not these specific circumstances.

Another possibility is some kind of GPS-related disruption. The Denver area has a well documented history of military GPS and interference testing. Work carried out by the Opsgroup GPS Spoofing Work Group in 2024 illustrated how closely interwoven a transponder is with ADS-B Out, GPS position and FMS.

A GPS failure should not cause a transponder to select standby by itself, but weird system interactions can’t be ruled out. We know that some systems can enter fault modes or stop transmitting ADS-B when position is lost.

A ground-based issue seems less likely. ATC sometimes see transponder anomalies that the crew may not, but this doesn’t really explain a change in both mode and code.

Then there is a remote possibility of electromagnetic interference or some other malicious cause. While not impossible, there is currently no evidence that points in that direction.

If you’ve experienced this issue yourself, especially in the Denver area, please reach out to us on blog@ops.group.

The NTSB say runways may be more slippery than reported

Last one for this update.

The NTSB is pushing for changes to runway condition reporting after determining that the current RCAM system may underestimate the loss of braking action experienced during extreme rain.

The issue is that today’s system can still classify a runway as “wet/good” even when rainfall intensity is high enough to significantly reduce braking performance.

The NTSB reviewed eleven runway overruns between 2008 and 2022 involving wet runways. In nine of them, investigators found that moderate-to-heavy rainfall likely reduced braking more than the RCAM model would predict.

In other words, not all wet runways are equal. Crews may be using perfectly valid wet-runway landing calculations based on friction values that are too optimistic. The practical takeaway – when the rain gets heavy, be conservative!

Have something to add?

Let us know! Most of our content comes from you – our members and readers. If you’ve spotted something unusual, we’d love to hear about it. We’d welcome additions to this article or ideas for future updates. Email us at blog@ops.group.

Mali’s security situation has taken a sharp turn for the worse in recent months, prompting several states to issue new airspace warnings and revisit existing guidance.

We’ve written about Mali before, particularly following the military coups of 2020 and 2021. What’s different now is that the conflict is no longer confined to remote areas. Since April, armed groups have shown an ability to coordinate attacks across multiple cities at the same time, including near Bamako.

The biggest flashpoint came on April 25, when militants launched coordinated attacks across much of the country. Military bases, government facilities and GABS/Bamako airport were among the reported targets. The attacks highlighted a level of coordination not seen in Mali for more than a decade and raised fresh concerns about the government’s ability to contain the threat.

Although Bamako remains under government control and things have settled down since then, armed groups remain active across large parts of Mali, attacks continue regularly, and there’s a real possibility of further coordinated offensives in the months ahead.

The April 25 attacks were the largest coordinated militant attacks Mali has seen since 2012.

The Airspace Picture

From an ATS perspective, Mali is split between two FIRs. Eastern Mali sits in the DRRR/Niamey FIR, and Western Mali in the GOOO/Dakar FIR. The danger exists in portions of this airspace that lie above Malian territory.

Here’s what this all looks like on a map:

Airspace Warnings

Several states have issued new or updated airspace warnings for Mali in recent weeks, most of which remain in effect

Italy

LIRR Notam E0557/26

ITALIAN AIR CARRIERS AND CAPTAINS OF AIRCRAFT IN CHARGE OF AIR SERVICES OPERATED BY CARRIERS HOLDING AN OPERATING LICENSE ISSUED BY ITALY, WHETHER THEY ARE CONTRACTUAL CARRIERS AND/OR OPERATING CARRIERS, OR PERFORMING AIR SERVICES THROUGH A WET LEASE OR A CODESHARE AGREEMENT AS WELL AS FOR ANY FLIGHT MADE WITH AN AIRCRAFT REGISTERED IN ITALY ARE RECOMMENDED TO AVOID PORTIONS OF DAKAR FIR (GOOO) AND NIAMEY FIR (DRRR) WITHIN TERRITORY AND AIRSPACE OF MALI BELOW HEIGHT 25000FT AGL AND ACCORDING TO EASA SAFETY DIRECTIVES.

Plain English: Italian operators should avoid the airspace of Mali below 25000ft AGL.

United Kingdom

EGTT Notam V0019/26

SECURITY – HAZARDOUS SITUATION IN MALI. UK CIVIL AIR OPERATORS ARE RECOMMENDED NOT TO ENTER FIR NIAMEY (DRRR) AND FIR DAKAR (GOOO) WITHIN THE TERRITORY AND AIRSPACE OF MALI BELOW 25,000 FT ABOVE GROUND LEVEL (AGL). POTENTIAL RISK FROM ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONRY AND HEIGHTENED MILITARY ACTIVITY. THIS SUPERSEDES THE ADVICE IN THE CURRENT UK AIP ENR 1.1. AR-2026-3729/01.

Plain English: Operators should not enter the portions of the GOOO/Dakar and DRRR/Niamey FIRs over Mali below 25,000 ft AGL due to risks posed by anti-aircraft fire and military activity.

Canada

CZUL Notam H2442/26

AIRSPACE SECURITY WARNING ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT IN RESPONSE TO THE SECURITY SITUATION IN MALI. CANADIAN AIR OPERATORS AND OWNERS OF AIRCRAFT REGISTERED IN CANADA ARE RECOMMENDED TO MAINTAIN A FLIGHT LEVEL EQUAL TO OR ABOVE FL320 IN THE PORTIONS OF FIR DAKAR (GOOO) AND FIR NIAMEY (DRRR) LOCATED IN THE TERRITORY OF MALI DUE TO THE POTENTIAL RISK FROM MILITANT ACTIVITY AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONRY.

Plain English: Canadian operators are recommended to remain at or above FL320 while in portions of the GOOO/Dakar and DRRR/Niamey FIRs overhead Mali due to risk of anti-aircraft fire and military activity.

France

LFBB Notam F1114/26

DUE TO SECURITY SITUATION IN MALI, FRENCH AIR CARRIERS AND CAPTAINS OF AIRCRAFT IN CHARGE OF AIR SERVICES OPERATED BY CARRIERS HOLDING AN OPERATING LICENSE ISSUED BY FRANCE, WHETHER THEY ARE CONTRACTUAL CARRIERS AND/OR OPERATING CARRIERS, OR PERFORMING AIR SERVICES THROUGH A WET LEASE OR A CODESHARE AGREEMENT AS WELL AS FOR ANY FLIGHT MADE WITH AN AIRCRAFT REGISTERED IN FRANCE ARE REQUESTED TO MAINTAIN AT ALL TIMES A FLIGHT LEVEL ABOVE OR EQUAL TO FL320 IN THE PART OF FIR DAKAR (GOOO) AND IN THE PART OF FIR NIAMEY (DRRR) LOCATED ABOVE THE MALIAN TERRITORY AND NOT TO SERVE OR IDENTIFY AS ALTERNATE BAMAKO MODIBO – KEITA AERODROME (GABS). THIS NOTAM SUPERSEDES THE RESTRICTIONS CONCERNING MALI ISSUED IN PARAGRAPH 3.11 MALI OF THE AIC NR A02/26 CURRENTLY IN EFFECT.

Plain English: French operators are advised to remain at or above FL320 in the portions of the GOOO/Dakar and DRRR/Niamey FIRs overhead Mali. GABS/Bamako should not be used at this time (including as an alternate) due to a deteriorating security situation.

What about the US FAA?

The FAA had already previously upgraded its airspace warning for Mali, since re-issued as (very lengthy) KICZ Notam A0023/26.

The warning expanded the scope of the threat. Previous guidance from 2022 focused mainly on risks below FL260. The concern then was mostly insurgent activity, indirect fire and possible MANPAD threats around airports in Northern Mali.

Then in 2025, several changes were made. The current advisory now warns US operators to exercise caution at all altitudes citing expanding foreign private military presence, and the introduction of an advanced air defence system.

The FAA later expanded on this in a background notice published in March this year.

The FAA says Mali now hosts a state-run paramilitary force operating anti-aircraft weapons, helicopters, fighter aircraft, drones and electronic warfare equipment. That’s a notable shift from earlier guidance which focused mainly on low-level threats such as indirect fire and MANPADS.

Alternatives

Mali, and especially GABS/Bamako, used to be a fairly common BizAv tech stop. However in the past decade, many operators have become increasingly cautious about Mali because of terrorism, political instability, military coups and general risk.

The events of April have reinforced this – stops in Mali are currently dangerous.

If you’re looking for alternatives, Senegal (GOBD/Dakar) has become probably the most common option in West Africa for biz jets. It has sound infrastructure, is generally stable and relatively safe.

Other options include Cape Verde (GVAC/Sal) which is especially popular for Atlantic crossings, and Ghana (DGAA/Accra).

Safeairspace

Visit safeairspace.net for a full list of active airspace state-issued warnings for Mali, and all other countries.

It has been a busy year of change for Greenland’s airports. Here is the current operational picture for the main NAT alternates as of June 2026.

BGQO/Qaqortoq

BGQO/Qaqortoq is now operational and has replaced BGBW/Narsarsuaq as the main airport in southern Greenland. After some early teething issues, security approval for international flights has been granted and the Notam restricting GA/BizAv traffic has been cancelled.

Basic info:

• Runway: 1501 x 30m (asphalt, Code 3C)
• Approaches: RNP LNAV/VNAV only (no precision)
• Airspace: AFIS, Class G with 20NM RMZ
• Fire cover: up to CAT 7 (with prior notice for larger aircraft)
• Fuel: Jet A1 and AvGas available

You can find full info on BGQO in the AIP here.

All non-scheduled flights require PPR at least 12 hours before arrival. A local agent advises that slots may be limited initially as the airport ramps up operations. This is not the usual Greenland “call ahead and hope” setup. Expect to provide accurate ETAs and obtain approval in advance, including for alternate use. Published hours are Mon-Sat 0900-1800z, closed Sundays and holidays. If you operate there, we’d appreciate an Airport Spy report!

BGBW/Narsarsuaq

Narsarsuaq closed to fixed-wing traffic on 17 Apr 2026 (when BGQO/Qaqortoq was supposed to become operational). So arrivals and departures are no longer accepted and the airport has transitioned to heliport-only ops for the local community.

Operationally, nothing has changed:

• Runway: 1800m
• Approaches: non-precision only
• Frequent poor weather and terrain constraints

BGSF/Sondrestrom

Plans to downgrade Sondrestrom from ATC to AFIS have been cancelled. In one of the shortest AICs we’ve ever seen, Naviair confirmed that BGSF would remain fully controlled until further notice.

Word from behind the scenes is that it was recently evaluated that ongoing demand for BGSF was solid enough to warrant full ATC.

Operationally, this is still the most reliable Greenland alternate:

• Runway: 2800m
• Fewer terrain issues than coastal airports
• Generally more stable weather

If you want something predictable in central Greenland, this is still the go-to.

BGGH/Nuuk

Nuuk is now fully established as a jet-capable airport with a 2200m runway, ILS approaches at both ends, and regular airline traffic. On paper, it is now a very capable NAT alternate.

The only current Notam limitation is that parking on all aprons is limited to a maximum of 72 hours (PERM Notam).

The bigger thing to watch now is a coming airspace change, from 14 May 2026:

• A TMA (Class C) when Nuuk Approach is active (roughly 08-23 local)
• ADS-B required for all flights in the TMA up to FL195 during those hours
• Outside those hours, airspace reverts to Class G
• At night, ADS-B not required, but prior coordination with Nuuk ATC is required

See AIC 1-26 for full details of all that.

So the picture at BGGH/Nuuk is much better than it was a few months ago – but it’s still not totally straightforward. It is usable again, but with tighter airspace rules and some practical limits like the 72-hour parking cap.

Nuuk has been significantly expanded to accommodate large jet aircraft.

BGJN/Ilulissat

The new 2200m runway at BGJN/Ilulissat is still due to open in Fall 2026. Once open, this will give northern Greenland another serious jet-capable airport, broadly similar to BGGH/Nuuk.

A reminder about after-hours fees

Look out for surprise fees if you use BGBW/Narsarsuaq or BGSF/Sondrestrom as alternates after hours (overnight 20-11z or anytime on Sundays). You will be charged the better part of $3000 USD to keep standby equipment on watch, and runways clear of snow.

Some insider advice – advance notice reduces the cost. If you need one of these cheaper outside of normal operating hours, provide at least 24 hours’ notice.

Bottom line

Greenland is mid-transition right now, but with a bigger gap than expected:

• BGQO has opened
• BGBW has closed
• BGGH is now the main southern option and generally dependable, but with some airspace and parking limitations
• BGSF remains the most reliable and predictable option overall

A special thanks to our agent in the field

Spare a thought for the unsung hero of this article. Apparently, high quality jackets for the Greenland winters are no joke – as evidenced below. Thank you for your help assembling this article!

Eurocontrol has put out a new two-page CPDLC cheat sheet for European operations. It’s short, non-technical and really useful – especially if you don’t use CPDLC everyday.

You can download the PDF on the Eurocontrol site here (best place to go in case they update it again), or if that doesn’t work, here’s one we downloaded earlier!

The interesting part isn’t the basics though. Most crew already know that CPDLC is mandatory in much of Europe. What’s more juicy is the human factors stuff – the small misunderstandings and bad habits that are still creating problems out there.

This guidance serves as a reminder of some persistent errors. Here is a brief summary of those.

CLEARED TO vs. PROCEED DIRECT TO

Make sure you follow the clearance correctly.

EUROCONTROL points out that a CPDLC uplink saying “CLEARED TO [WAYPOINT D] VIA [A B C] is a route clearance, not a direct-to shortcut.

Those are issued by the phrase “PROCEED DIRECT TO.” Apparently enough of us are still getting this wrong to be specifically mentioned in the bulletin.

Assigned speeds don’t just disappear

The guide warns crew not to assume a CPDLC speed restriction quietly disappears just because the aircraft later gets another route or level clearance. It’s no different to a voice clearance, an assigned speed sticks unless you are told otherwise.

Why would this be happening? A few suggestions.

It’s possible that pilots load the route amendment but miss the associated speed. Mixed voice and CPDLC environments can also create ambiguity about which clearance is ‘current’ – more on that in moment.

Then there’s workload – especially in dense European airspace. When we get busy, it can be easy to overlook an old datalink clearance sitting in the message stack.

Don’t deliberately log-off

This is a biggie.

EUROCONTROL reminds us that a CPDLC clearance holds the same value as a voice clearance. Deliberately disconnecting or turning off CPDLC is akin to turning off your radios. Just don’t do it. Why would crew be doing this? We don’t know – but reverting yourself to voice is no-bueno.

Why do we still get voice clearances, even when fully logged on?

Some clearances are too urgent – voice is just quicker, especially in the case of level changes. Switching to voice rather than waiting for a CPDLC message to be sent and received can avoid an unnecessary level-off.

Then there’s network performance – no technology is perfect 100% all of the time, and things can slow down.

And simple practicality for the controller. It may just be easier to hop on voice.

Failed Log Ons

We’ve all been there – a logon simply refuses to work without explanation. It’s extremely frustrating!

In many cases the problem comes down to small setup errors – the wrong logon code, an outdated flight plan after an aircraft swap, or trying to connect to a sector that’s not included in your filed route.

Even something as simple as the wrong callsign format or VHF3 not being set to DATA can stop the connection. The fall back is to immediately revert to voice, but this adds workload for all concerned.

It’s not complicated, just human

There’s nothing terribly difficult or technical in Eurocontrol’s new guidance, but it does highlight how CPDLC introduces its own traps – especially in busy, unfamiliar airspace where crews may switch between voice and CPDLC several times in just one flight.

The guide is a useful reminder that getting the basics right with CPDLC is just as important as good radio discipline.

One extra point (especially for US operators)

Europe is a little different when it comes to CPDLC. Much of the network uses the ATN system over VHF datalink rather than the FANS over SATCOM/HF more commonly associated with oceanic ops. So in practical terms, losing the aircraft’s VHF datalink capability will often mean losing European ATN CPDLC capability as well.

The transition from oceanic to European airspace can also be a little confusing! In many cases, ATC systems handle the transfer between oceanic FANS services and European ATN CPDLC automatically, and crews should avoid manually logging off unless instructed by ATC or unless the handover has clearly failed.

NATS has told us that unnecessary crew logoffs near FIR boundaries can create additional ATC workload and may interfere with automatic handovers between current and next data authorities.

That said, datalink issues during the oceanic-to-European transition still generate plenty of pilot reports – particularly among operators less familiar with European ATN operations. Different avionics setups can also behave differently during the transition, which can occasionally catch crews out.

Bottom line – monitor the aircraft’s CPDLC status during the transition into Europe, and follow ATC instructions before manually disconnecting or attempting a new logon.

EASA has issued a new Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) warning operators about the potential introduction of Jet A fuel at European airports that have historically supplied only Jet A-1.

As supply chain pressure builds from the ongoing crisis in the Middle East, suppliers and airports may increasingly begin to consider the wider use of Jet A to help bridge the gap.

It’s not that Jet A is any more dangerous. Far from it – it’s the standard offering throughout North America. But for European ops, this matters because most procedures, assumptions and fuel handling systems have been built around Jet A-1 for decades. And EASA are concerned that this may introduce new risk for operators.

Jet A vs Jet A-1

It helps to frame a little context here, – I mean jet fuel is just jet fuel, right?

Well, not really. And this is where the danger lies.

But for starters, it isn’t about quality. There’s very little difference in the actual refining process. Jet A and Jet A-1 both come from the same level of refinement, known as a ‘kerosene fraction.’

The key operational difference is freezing point – how cold than can get before they start to wax up and stop flowing properly.

Jet A begins to freeze at -40°C, compared with -47°C for Jet A-1.

Jet A-1 has a lower freezing point, typically favoured for high-latitude, long haul operations.

Jet A-1 is refined to handle colder temperatures than Jet A, which is why it became the standard for international and long haul flying – especially on routes through very cold airspace.

There are a couple of other smaller differences too. Jet A-1 normally includes an anti-static additive, and the two fuels are certified under slightly different standards in the US versus the rest of the world.

But let’s cut to the chase. Operationally, pilots and dispatchers mainly care about freezing point, availability and whether an aircraft is approved for one or both fuels.

Right, onto the EASA bulletin…

What are EASA worried about?

Essentially, the risk of ‘fuel grade confusion’ between suppliers, operators, dispatchers and flight crew.

One example in the bulletin is especially concerning: an aircraft may receive Jet A, but the electronic fuel ticket incorrectly identifies it as Jet A-1. In that case, crews could unknowingly operate outside safe fuel temp margins.

There’s also a broader operational issue. If some airports in a region switch to Jet A, while others remain Jet A-1 only, crews and dispatchers may have to start tracking fuel grade availability as part of normal flight planning. EASA says this may affect route planning, alternate selection, fuel contingency margins, cold weather ops and overall crew workload – ie. it has potential to become a fuel-induced can of worms.

Then there’s the issue of commingling, and it’s sadly not as fun as it sounds! EASA are concerned about mixing of the two fuels. If they are combined in airport systems, operators may need to apply more conservative operating assumptions unless aircraft manufacturers provide clearer guidance. In other words, assume the more restrictive limitations apply.

If the two fuels are mixed, it’s important to use the more restrictive limitation: a -40 degree freezing point.

As we touched upon before, EASA is also warning against the dangerous assumption that ‘jet fuel is jet fuel.’ For crew, the practical takeaway is that fuel grade can no longer be treated as background information.

Operators should expect greater emphasis on checking Notams and AIPs carefully for fuel grade info, verifying what fuel was actually uplifted, and paying closer attention to fuel temperature margins on long/cold sectors.

And to connect all the dots – dispatch, fuel providers and flight crew all need to make sure they’re all working off the same page.

So is this all just plain dangerous?

No. The bulletin stops short of calling this an unsafe condition, or issuing mandatory action. What they are saying that Jet A can be used safely in Europe if the transition is properly managed.

EASA has essentially issued a warning that Europe and other traditionally Jet A-1 regions are entering unfamiliar territory operationally. The biggest risk is not the fuel itself – it’s confusion, assumptions and mismatched procedures during the transition.

The NTSB has released its final report into the crash of a Bombardier CL-600 that lost both engines on approach to KAPF/Naples on Feb 9, 2024. The trigger was corrosion in the engines’ airflow control system caused by long-term exposure to salt.

This wasn’t a freak chain of events. It was a pretty familiar BizAv setup: coastal operations, recurring maintenance snags, and two identical engines exposed to the same environment – both failing within seconds during a critical phase of flight.

A lot of US bizjets spend their lives operating around salt air on the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific coasts – and over time, that can become a real maintenance issue.

And it’s not just about salt. The report also highlights how important it is to pay attention to early warning signs, and what can happen when recurring symptoms are treated as isolated problems instead of part of a bigger picture.

The Accident Aircraft

The CL-600 involved in the accident had spent its life operating near the ocean.

Built in 2004, it was based in Bridgetown in Barbados until 2020, before moving to a new owner in the Fort Lauderdale area.

The aircraft was maintained under an FAA-approved airworthiness maintenance program. Its engines were operated on an ‘on-condition’ basis, meaning they stayed in service as long as inspections and performance monitoring showed no issues – rather than being removed at fixed overhaul intervals.

Early Warning Signs

Twenty-five days before the accident, the pilots reported intermittent hung starts on both engines. A review of the aircraft’s history later found at least seven similar events over the previous ten years.

Maintenance troubleshooting focused on fuel and ignition issues using a flow chart with nearly thirty YES/NO steps. The following day, both engines started normally, which met the criteria to stop troubleshooting.

Critically, the check that would have identified the real issue (that salt corrosion was preventing the compressor vanes from moving freely) was never reached.

On Feb 9, both engines would later fail on approach leading to the loss of the aircraft.

Important to note from the report that it doesn’t point to pilot error as the primary cause, but it does highlight a few other things worth knowing…

Salt Exposure

For aircraft spending years operating near the ocean, salt exposure can quietly become a real maintenance problem. Corrosion inside the engine may not show up during routine inspections until something else starts going wrong.

Engines frequently exposed to high salt environments may require more thorough inspections including borescopes.

Start faults aren’t normal. Modern turbine engines are extremely reliable, so recurring hung starts should be treated as a warning sign – not just a minor fuel or ignition issue.

In this case, the abnormal starts were one of the few early clues that something deeper was wrong with the engine airflow system.

Catastrophic failures are rare – even in this case, both engines were still rotating on impact. Minor or sporadic indications may be the only warning we get, so don’t just write them off.

Abnormal starts can be an indicator of something more sinister than just fuel and ignition.

Maintenance Trap

Troubleshooting doesn’t always lead to the right answer. One important note from this accident is that an ‘approved’ maintenance program doesn’t mean ‘fail-safe.’

In this case, the variable geometry pressure test sat so late in the troubleshooting flow chart that it was missed when the engines were successfully started.

In business aviation especially, limited maintenance support and pressure to get the aircraft flying again can make it tempting to stop troubleshooting as soon as the manual allows.

Vulnerable on Approach

This happened on approach at low power, where compressor stability margins are already tighter.

On approach, at low power and close to the ground, there isn’t much margin for airflow problems.

The accident is a reminder that salt-related corrosion can stay hidden until it shows up at the worst possible moment.

Updated Guidance

In its report, the NTSB described the troubleshooting guidance as “inadequate.” Since the accident, the engine manufacturer has already revised its procedures.

The FAA has also proposed mandatory inspections of GE CF34-3 engines fitted to over a thousand US-registered aircraft (including the Challenger 600 family). Comments on this are open until June, with an official AD likely to follow.

For smaller BizAv operators especially, it’s another example of why recurring ‘minor’ faults probably deserve a closer look – particularly on aircraft spending their lives around salt air.

The FAA is investigating a serious runway incursion at KLAX/Los Angeles on April 8.

A Boeing 777 rejected its take-off roll on Runway 24L at low speed when a Gulfstream G650 crossed the runway after being instructed to hold short following landing on the parallel Runway 24R.

This was a high-risk event, with very little margin. Runway warning lights reportedly alerted the 777 crew to the incursion. The key point is this wasn’t just a one-off. It was a known LAX trap that had already been flagged.

Buried in a long list of nearly 100 airport Notams is LTA-LAX-21 – a Letter to Airmen titled ‘Runway Incursions on LAX’s North Complex.’ It describes exactly this scenario, almost step by step.

If you operate in the US and don’t routinely check LTAs, this is a timely example of why they matter.

The Actual Trap at LAX

If you land on Runway 24R and exit via one of the common high-speed turnoffs like V, W or Y, you’re typically only 1,000 to 2,000 ft from the hold short for Runway 24L.

That distance disappears fast. You’re still decelerating and just getting into the post-landing flow when the hold short line is already there. You’re effectively still in the landing phase when you’re already at the next runway. And it’s easy to assume you’re clear once off the landing runway.

That’s where crews are getting caught out – by rolling past the stop bars and onto the parallel active runway.

The FAA’s Letter to Airmen (LTA)

On May 22 last year, LTA-LAX-21 was issued to highlight this exact risk.

It’s short, but the message is clear – this is happening repeatedly and it’s a safety issue. It directs crew to review runway holding position markings in the AIM and includes a diagram showing the layout.

What to do

If you’re heading into LAX, and landing on 24R, expect a very quick hold short. Brief it properly before you get there.

After landing, don’t go heads-down too early. Consider delaying non-essential tasks like cleanup until you’re clear of both runways. The priority is spotting the hold short markings, the stop bars, and confirming your clearance.

More on LTAs

The FAA regularly issues Letters to Airmen, but they’re easy to miss.

They often contain important operational detail that doesn’t fit in standard Notams – often explaining the why behind them, and sometimes safety-critical information like this.

You’ll find them on the FAA Notam site for your airport or FIR – look under the Class column for ‘LTA.’

ForeFlight users can also find them under the airport procedures page – just scroll down.

April 2026 Update:

It’s been three years since we originally published this article on the inherent dangers of circling approaches. New data from the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing program (ASIAS) – a big US aviation data-sharing system run by the FAA and industry partners – shows that we’re still getting these approaches dangerously wrong.

The report links circling to loss of control and CFIT accidents among Part 91 and 135 operators, with 17 fatalities between 2008 and 2023.

Here’s what they found, and why it still matters.

The ASIAS report.

The study used real-world accident data along with FOQA reports to analyse circling-to-land accidents and incidents, not just theory. The bottom line is that circling approaches are still catching crew out. They keep showing up in loss-of-control, CFIT, and unstable approach events. And the pattern is consistent.

What’s actually going wrong.

The big one – leaving circling area. Crews are ending up outside of the protected areas by either flying too wide, too far or too fast. Once you’re outside, there’s no more obstacle clearance. It’s safety critical that you know your approach category, and the circling area that applies i.e. PANS OPS or TERPS. If you’re not familiar with these terms, we cover them in detail in the original article below.

The unstable approach ‘chain’ rarely starts with just one mistake. A typical sequence might include being high or fast, leading to a rushed visual segment and unstable approach. From there, continuation bias can take the controls leading to attempt to salvage a landing, rather than go-around.

Ever heard of ‘the six P’s?’ Chances are we’ve all grappled with it at one stage or another in our careers: ‘Prior Preparation Prevents P*** Poor Performance.’ It’s crude way of saying we fly better when we are prepared. The ASIAS report identifies that poor set up before circling is leading to accidents. This includes inadequate briefing, no clear plan for the manoeuvre and no defined escape/go-around point. In other words, crew are ‘figuring it out’ while already low.

Our eyes play tricks on us. Circling at night or in reduced visibility, sloping terrain, black hole effect and even workload at low levels makes it easy for us to misjudge distance, height and turn radius.

Worryingly, this isn’t just about accidents. The data also shows numerous unstable circling events that didn’t end a crash. So the risk is bigger than accident stats suggest.

Practical Takeaways

Circling isn’t routine, treat it as high risk. If there’s a straight-in option, take it. If you do need to circle, it’s essential to plan it properly before you start, stay within the circling area and if’s not working, go around. At night or in marginal VMC the risk increases dramatically.

Original Article:

Here’s a startling statistic – according to the Flight Safety Foundation, straight-in approaches are twenty-five times safer than circling ones. Twenty-five times!

It’s no wonder then that the NTSB are concerned. In fact, they identified that there were ten major accidents involving Part 91 and 135 operators between 2008 and 2023 while flying a circling approach.

We smell risk, and so does the NTSB. Which is why in March 2023 they issued a new safety alert. Asides from the obvious risks of operating a high-performance aircraft at low speed and altitude in poor visibility, there appears to be another threat too – key differences between ICAO PANS-OPS and US TERPS.

Let’s take a closer look…

The NTSB Alert

The NTSB’s key takeaway seems to be this: you don’t need to circle. You can also request a runway aligned approach, or if that isn’t practical, a diversion.

Of course, if a straight-in approach isn’t available, a diversion for a commercial operator would likely be a tough sell when there is a legal and procedural approach to the runway in front you.

But if you do, it implores you to understand and thoroughly brief the risks.

The reality is that circling approaches are far riskier. They involve manoeuvring an aircraft low to ground, and low in energy in marginal conditions. This opens the door to two major dangers – loss of control, and collision with the hard stuff.

They’re also not particularly conducive to a stabilised approach, which typically involves being runway aligned by 500’ off the deck in VMC conditions, or higher in the soup.

Then there is the elephant in the room – our own limitations. As pilots we are responsible for setting our own personal limits. More often than not, these rest within the ones defined by law. Familiarity, experience and conditions all come into play when assessing our appetite for risk.

In other words, just because a procedure is legal doesn’t mean we should fly it.

The NTSB also identifies that training (or lack of) is an issue. When was the last time you circled in the simulator? To fly circling approaches safely, we need to be practicing them in our re-currents regularly and in different conditions.

This is where the NTSB alert ends, but there may also be more to it than that – the way circling procedures are designed may also be partially to blame…

The PANS-OPS versus TERPS Conundrum

It will likely be no surprise that instrument approach and departure procedures are designed to keep aircraft safely away from terrain and obstacles to internationally accepted standards.

To make this happen, there are two main sets of procedures:

1. ICAO Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS-OPS) used throughout Europe and in many other parts of the world. You can these in ICAO Doc 8168.
2. United States Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS) used throughout the US, Canada and in some other countries such as Korea and Taiwan. Those details are in FAA Order 8260.3D1.

When we circle, we need to understand how the procedure was designed (PANS-OPS or TERPS) and what the differences are, which can be significant.

The reality is that under TERPS, in some cases aircraft are required to fly slower, with higher angles of bank in more restrictive circling areas despite improvements made back in 2013. And all of this can happen in lower visibility than in PANS-OPS procedures.

Could this be one of the contributing factors to circling accidents in the US and Canada? Possibly.

What are the differences?

In both systems, a radius is drawn from the centre of the threshold for a particular runway inside of which obstacle clearance has been assessed. It’s known as a circling area, or domain.

Protected areas are drawn from arcs from the center of each threshold. Courtesy: Boldmethod

The size of this area increases with aircraft category – essentially if you’re heavier, you need to fly faster which means your turn radius increases, and you need more room to circle. This is taken into account using TAS and bank angle when the procedure is designed – along with a healthy dose of mathematical wizardry.

But herein lies an essential difference.

PANS-OPS bases TAS on altitude and circling IAS. TERPS on the other hand bases this on altitude and IAS at threshold. The result is a much smaller circling area, and in some cases higher bank angles.

The maths behind circling approaches is complicated, but the key difference between PANS-OPS and TERPS is IAS.

Take a Category C aircraft for instance (threshold speed 121 – 141 kts). Under PANS-OPS the circling area for an approach would extend to 4.2nm, while under TERPS (with an MDA of less than 1000’) the same area would extend only as far as 2.7 nm. For lower category aircraft, this also increases minimum bank angle beyond 20 degrees. Things can start to get tight.

In a nutshell, because ICAO uses higher IAS for its TAS calculations, and assumes a lesser angle of bank, its circling areas are far roomier.

International operators in particular may be at risk of straying outside of the circling area if they are not familiar with the more restrictive TERPS procedures. To make matters worse, some countries may not be 100% one way or the other. A straight-in approach may be designed to PANS OPS, while the circling approach is designed to keep you within a TERPS assessed area – Mexico and Chile being examples.

And in some cases, all of this can happen down to a minimum visibility of just 1.5 miles (2.4km) under TERPS, versus 2.3 miles (3.7km) under PANS-OPS.

How do I know what kind of procedure I’m flying?

Get your magnifying glass out. It will be written in the margin of your chart. If you’re using Jeppesen, have a look at the bottom left-hand side, written vertically. It’s far from obvious.

Once you’ve established what type of approach you’ll be flying, you’ll need to think about speed, your circling area, and whether the visibility is appropriate. We’ve put together a little cheat sheet that may help…

OPSGROUP members: Click to download PDF.

The Stats Don’t Lie

We’re getting circling approaches tragically wrong. What the industry is currently teaching pilots doesn’t seem to be cutting the mustard – and the Flight Safety Foundation agrees. Pilots need to be more aware of the design criteria used for circling approaches, and the limitations that places on their aircraft. This also needs to be made far clearer on approach charts if we’re to reduce risk on these challenging manoeuvres.

On March 31, the FAA announced an important update for ops at KSFO/San Francisco.

The big news is that once work is complete on Runway 01R/19L, side-by-side parallel visual approaches will be permanently banned due to concerns over separation.

In fair weather conditions, this will effectively almost halve arrival rates. If you’re used to carrying a little less fuel to the Golden City when the sun is out, now is the time consider more.

Here is the background to this significant change to NORCAL ops.

FAA warning.

A new statement issued by the FAA warns operators of airborne delays.  The first reason is straight forward – Runway 01R/19L is currently closed until October due to repaving work.

But this isn’t temporary.

When re-opened, the FAA will introduce a new safety measure which will prohibit side-by-side approaches to the parallel east-west runways in clear weather. Even if pilots acknowledge having each other in sight.

From October, visual approaches to parallel runways will be staggered.

Instead, approaches will be staggered, with one aircraft offset from the aircraft on the parallel runway.

This will essentially reduce arrival rates in VMC conditions to those typically experienced in IMC – from approx. 54 to 36 per hour.  It’s an issue the FAA concedes will persist, at least until safer solutions are found.

But why the change?

A spokesman for the FAA confirmed that the change of rule came about from a regular quarterly quality-assurance review.

The core issue is that the runway spacing is too tight.

The parallel runways are only 750 ft apart. That’s too close for independent parallel approaches under current FAA/ICAO standards.

So that leaves three options – space the runways out more (not practical), run precision monitoring systems (such as PRM) or, in the case of SFO, employ a workaround – the ol’ visual pairing trick – dependent visual approaches.

In other words, pilots maintain visual separation from the aircraft ahead and adjacent.

In good weather, ATC have historically run these side-by side. This boosts capacity but pushes separation responsibility onto pilots rather than ATC systems.

With its announcement, the FAA is finally saying that the workaround doesn’t meet modern safety standards anymore.

More broadly, the FAA’s safety philosophy is shifting away from ‘see-and-avoid’ in high-density terminal airspace towards more reliance on automatic ATC-based separation.

It seems that a human-dependent workaround to help mitigate struggling infrastructure is no longer an acceptable answer.

Under the new rule, VMC arrival rates will be akin to IMC rates.

What is the practical impact?

Essentially, this is the end of SFO’s visual ‘capacity boost.’

In good weather, expect things to slow down much more than you’re used to. This includes longer finals, lengthier vectors, speed control and a greater chance of holding.

These impacts won’t be evenly spread. Expect the biggest delays during peak arrival periods, late afternoons/evenings or adjacent to weather related disruptions as it will be harder for ATC to play catch up when the weather improves.

For planning purposes, the main takeaways are to carry more fuel in fair weather conditions, and not to underestimate potential for delays. This is especially relevant for BizAv ops that have historically relied on visual arrivals to ‘keep things tight.’

Where to from here?

In its statement, the FAA confirmed that it is actively seeking new ways to boost arrival flows safely – we’ll need to wait a little longer for those.

We recently received a report from an OPSGROUP member of a surprise ramp check at LFPB/Le Bourget.

Police attended the aircraft after boarding and requested fuel receipts and questioned if the passenger was also the aircraft owner.

This did not appear to be a routine SAFA check, so we reached out to the group for more info and it turns out this isn’t uncommon.

France has always been strict with its enforcement of charter rules, but subsequent reports from members indicate an uptick in active enforcement lately – not just a random one-off.

The responses we received confused us a little, until we realised there are two independent and distinct issues authorities are checking:

🔍 Illegal charter flights disguised as private flights.

🔍 False declarations to reduce fuel tax.

Here is a closer look at both of these issues, so you can have your paperwork in order when next les forces de l’ordre come a knockin at your jet.

Is this really a private flight?

This one has to do with the charter pax levy.

In France, if you are operating a charter, air taxi or any other commercial flight departing the country under Part 135, it is treated the same as an airline flight.

Three taxes are applied to these flights per passenger.

The first is the Civil Aviation Tax (TAC). This varies between €4-9 depending on whether you flight is short haul or long haul. Think of this like a standard departure tax.

The second is Airport Tax (Taxe d’Aéroport). The charge is between €10 – 18 depending on the airport class. Big Class 1 airports (like Le Bourget) are the most expensive. This is used to find things like RFF, security and airport infrastructure.

Lastly, there’s Solidarity Tax (the big one). This is what most people mean when they refer to ‘Charter Tax.’ This increased massively in 2025. A typical BizAv charter flight would incur a charge of €420 per passenger for flights within Europe, or up to €2100 per passenger for longer-haul flights.

No wonder authorities are checking you’ve paid it, and it’s the one causing all the noise.

Bottom line (and try saying this quickly three times over) – when departing France under Part 135, expect a per-pax tax stack.

On rare occasions, charter operators have declared their flights as private to avoid these charges. It seems authorities are clamping down on these ‘fake’ private flights.

For this issue, authorities are checking who actually owns or controls the aircraft. The red flags they’re looking for include passengers who are not registered owners or share holders, complex ownership structures (such as trusts) with no clear links, passengers who appear to be ‘clients,’ and empty legs that aren’t truly private repositioning.

Hence why the passenger in the report was asked if he was the owner of the aircraft.

VAT on Fuel

It’s an entirely separate issue.

In France, VAT is paid on fuel as you buy it – but whether you can re-claim it depends on your operation. Because of this, France is one of the more expensive countries to uplift.

Flights operated under an AOC (charter, airline etc) are exempt and can seek reimbursement later.

Private and non-commercial flights aren’t, meaning VAT becomes a real cost (typically around 20%).

The gap is significant, and so there is an incentive to mis-declare a private flight as commercial.

In France, flights operated under an AOC (charter, airline etc) are exempt from VAT.

When authorities board your aircraft, they want to check your fuel uplift receipts and other docs.

Red flags include using an AOC number that doesn’t match the actual flight, inconsistencies in your flight plan (G vs N), AOC status or a paper trail that leads to an invalid AOC.

Penalties can include back payment of VAT and fines.

So why are they sniffing around so much at Le Bourget?

These issues aren’t new, but it appears the frequency of enforcement is.

LFPB/Le Bourget is Europe’s busiest business aviation airport. It receives a huge volume of private aircraft, with very little airline traffic to dilute the numbers.

Recent tax increases (especially the solidarity tax) have unashamedly targeted premium travel, private jets and high-emission-per-passenger ops.

Le Bourget fits the profile perfectly for active enforcement. It isn’t being singled out by name in the rules, it’s just the biggest, most concentrated, and most unavoidable BizAv hub in the country.

If you operate there, the safest approach is to assume you will be checked.

Honeywell shared an interesting stat with us from the NBAA IOC held in San Diego the other week.

Most operators know about Guided Visual Approaches in the US. But when Honeywell asked crew about the European equivalent, more than 80% said they had never heard of them.

They’re called VPT approaches – Visual Manoeuvring with Prescribed Track.

You’ll find them at several European airports where terrain, noise restrictions or complex airspace make a straight-in approach impractical. Instead of flying a normal visual circuit, you follow a published visual track with defined waypoints and altitudes.

They’re relatively straightforward once you understand them, but can catch crew out if they show up un-prepared.

Let’s take a closer look.

What a VPT actually is

Traditional visual manoeuvring (especially circling) relies heavily on what we can see. That becomes challenging near hills, in poor weather or when unfamiliar with the airport.

VPT procedures aim to make this more structured.

Typically (but not always), you fly an instrument approach first. At a defined point, ATC will then clear you for VPT and you continue visually along a published track to the runway. The track can include visual reporting points, RNAV fixes or both.

If visual reference is lost at any point, you must go-around.

Because the track is defined, many operators load the waypoints into the FMS for extra guidance during the visual segment.

How are these different to guided visual approaches in the US?

At first glance they look similar. But operationally, they’re quite different.

In the US, visual approaches are usually flown from radar vectors. For a standard FAA visual approach, there’s no published procedure and no protected track. ATC simply vectors you into position, and clears you for a visual approach.

To help reduce workload, avionics providers like Honeywell and Garmin offer proprietary ‘Guided Visual’ procedures that can be selected and flown using FMS guidance.

But they are still just visual aids. Guided visuals are not published procedures, not part of the AIP, and ATC will usually not refer to them. Terrain and obstacles remain entirely the crew’s responsibility. More on this in our recent article.

But in Europe, VPT procedures are published in the AIP alongside instrument approaches.

More importantly, they are designed under ICAO PANS-OPS criteria. That means the procedure includes obstacle protection – but only if you follow the prescribed track accurately.

This leads into one of the most important differences:

VPT is not circling

Many pilots assume VPT works like circling, but it doesn’t.

Obstacle protection only exists along the defined visual track (as opposed to a circling area). If you drift away from that track, terrain clearance may no longer be guaranteed.

Therefore accuracy becomes more important than normal circling. Hence why many operators prefer to fly the VPT using FMS guidance where possible.

Beware the missed approach!

One detail that often catches foreign crews out is the missed approach.

Even though final segment is visual and may leave you offset from the runway, the missed approach normally follows the instrument procedure you were cleared for earlier.

This can mean an immediate turn or climb away from your visual track. It’s worth briefing this carefully before starting a VPT manoeuvre.

VPT vs RNP Visual – what’s the difference?

They can look similar on the chart, but they’re not the same thing. A VPT is a visual manoeuvre – you fly an instrument approach first, then continue visually along a prescribed track. You must remain visual throughout, and if you lose it, you go around.

An RNP Visual (like at LPMA/Madeira) is actually an instrument approach. Despite the name, you can fly it in IMC using FMS guidance all the way down to minima, with full obstacle protection. The visual part only comes at the very end for landing.

So although both involve curved paths and can feel similar, VPT relies on visual reference, while RNP Visual relies on navigation performance.

Some guidance on how to brief a VPT approach

If you’re not familiar with VPT approaches, here are the main things you want to talk about:

✅ Where does the VPT actually start? Some kick-off at a specific fix on the instrument procedure, others after a visual reporting point. Either way, clearly define when you are going head’s up.

✅ Is the path coded? Some VPTs include RNAV fixes that can be loaded into the FMS. Others rely purely on visual reporting points. If you can, use your FMS for guidance.

✅ Are there any altitude constraints along the visual segment? These are often included for terrain or noise abatement.

✅ What do we do if we miss? You might be following the instrument missed approach procedure, or there may be a special one. Check the chart for notes!

Want to see the approach in action?

Check out the handy video below:

Jet fuel is becoming more expensive across the US as the crisis in the Middle East continues to push up global oil prices.

On March 6 we reported that retail prices at some FBOs had reached $10 per gallon, particularly in the Northeast.

The good news is that this isn’t being driven by shortages. But if supply isn’t the problem, what is pushing prices higher, and what can operators expect moving forward?

Why prices are rising

The main driver is crude oil.

Whenever tensions increase in the Middle East, global oil markets react quickly because a large proportion of the world’s energy supply moves through that region.

In recent days the situation has been amplified by political rhetoric around the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most important oil chokepoint.

Roughly 20% of global oil supply moves through the Strait every day. Even the threat of disruption can push prices higher, because traders immediately start pricing in the possibility that shipments may be affected.

That risk premium is now showing up in jet fuel.

Roughly twenty percent of the world’s supply moves through the Strait of Hormuz every day. Even the threat of the route being disrupted will have a direct impact on oil prices. This is because traders immediately start pricing in the possibility that shipments may be disrupted.

That risk premium is now showing up in jet fuel.

Shortages not expected

Despite the sudden surge in prices, actual fuel shortages in the US are unlikely.

Domestic refinery capacity remains strong and the US produces large amounts of crude oil. What we’re seeing is price volatility rather than a lack of supply.

Unfortunately, this doesn’t help with our smouldering wallets. Operators will likely continue to see wide price differences between airports as FBOs adjust their inventory and contract pricing.

How to compare prices

In the current environment, it has become more important than usual to check fuel prices when filing a flight plan.

There are a few ways to make this easier:

AirNav is a useful free resource that shows posted retail fuel prices at many US airports. It pulls data from a database of more than 3,000 FBOs nationwide.

Courtesy of AirNav

If you have contract fuel through the likes of Shell, World Fuel or Colt check whether they have an app. These often show contract prices at nearby airports.

Lastly, call ahead to the FBO and avoid nasty surprises. The posted prices don’t always reflect discounts or contract rates.

How long will this all last?

Like the rest of the world, we simply don’t know.

Oil prices can rise quickly, but they can also fall just as fast. Fuel markets react rapidly to geopolitical risk and often normalise once the situation stabilises.

If tensions in the Middle East ease, prices could settle within days, weeks or months. If the conflict escalates and disrupts major oil infrastructure or shipping routes, higher prices may persist for longer.

Key Points

• Read to the end for an OPSGROUP Team report from a recent flight over Afghanistan.
• With the central Middle East corridor currently closed, a lot of Europe-Asia traffic is rerouting north via the Caucasus and Afghanistan. As a result, the OAKX/Kabul FIR is seeing significantly more overflight traffic than usual.
• Afghanistan has recently re-issued several procedural Notams for overflights. These confirm that the entire FIR remains uncontrolled (Class G) with no ATS service available.
• Aircraft are responsible for separation using TIBA procedures, on fixed high-level overflight contingency routes.
• The US FAA warning still allows US operators to overfly OAKX at FL320 or above, and to use P500/G500 in the far east as low as FL300.
• Given the current increase in traffic through the FIR, here’s a refresher on how Afghanistan overflights work and what risks you’re taking if you use it.

A Little Background

Afghanistan has been used as a transit corridor for several years now, but it’s suddenly become much busier as aircraft avoid the closed airspace between Israel and Iran. Many Europe-Asia flights are currently routing north via the Caucasus and then across Afghanistan before rejoining the normal routes toward South Asia.

The basic situation inside the Kabul FIR has not changed. The entire airspace is uncontrolled Class G with no ATC service available. Aircraft are responsible for their own separation and must follow procedural traffic broadcasts.

Afghanistan has recently re-issued several procedural Notams confirming these arrangements. They include requirements for aircraft to maintain 15-minute longitudinal spacing from preceding traffic at the same flight level and to make regular TIBA broadcasts while inside the FIR.

Separately, there has been renewed fighting between Pakistan and Afghanistan along their shared border. Cross-border strikes and increased military activity have been reported since late February.

There is no indication that civil aircraft are being targeted and airlines are continuing to operate over central Afghan airspace, but the border region with Pakistan should currently be treated as a higher-risk area.

On March 2 the UK issued an airspace warning for the OAKX/Kabul FIR related to these clashes. This appears unrelated to the Iran crisis but reinforces the long-standing point: while Afghanistan can be a useful transit corridor, it is not risk-free.

Before You Go

Before planning an Afghanistan overflight, check a few things:

• PPR: All operators must obtain prior permission to enter the Kabul FIR. Plan for at least 72 hours. Requests are submitted to flightpermissions.acaa@gmail.com.
• State guidance: Check airspace warnings at safeairspace.net.
• Insurance: Confirm that your policy covers operations in uncontrolled or conflict-adjacent airspace.
• Routing awareness: If you’re planning to use the eastern corridor near the Pakistan border (including P500/G500), note that recent clashes between Pakistan and Afghanistan mean this area carries slightly higher risk at the moment.

Overflights

The procedures to overfly the Kabul FIR have not changed – they’re found in a series of Notams recently republished and extended.

For the purposes of this article, these are the basics:

• File only via one of the published high-level contingency routes as per the map above.
• Expect entry spacing. Adjacent FIRs may delay entry to maintain 15-minute separation from preceding traffic at the same level.
• Use TIBA procedures. Broadcast position and intentions on 125.2 MHz.
• Make broadcasts regularly (including before entering the FIR and periodically while inside it).
• Maintain your filed flight level and speed unless required for traffic avoidance or an emergency.
• Contact the next FIR at least 15 minutes before the boundary point.
• Keep lights and transponder on at all times.

Unplanned Landings

If you plan to overfly Afghanistan, treat a diversion there as an absolute last resort! According to all the state airspace warnings there’s a seemingly endless list of surface-to-air weaponry they might start shooting at you if you fly too low, and if you have to divert then good luck with the Taliban.

Plan fuel and ETPs so you can remain airborne and exit Afghan airspace before landing wherever possible.

If a diversion becomes unavoidable, OAKB/Kabul is the most likely option, but don’t expect much help when you get there – security and services are uncertain, and most governments advise their citizens not to travel to Afghanistan. For most operators, landing at an Afghan airport would be akin to ditching in oceanic airspace.

Our Pilot Report – here’s what we did …

There is a hefty dose of ‘at your own risk’ about all of this. The choice to overfly is not an easy one. To give you a much better idea of what to expect, here’s an OPSGROUP Team report from a recent flight over Afghanistan:

We operated through OAKX FIR on a EHAM/Amsterdam-WMSA/Kuala Lumpur flight

Overflight Permit: Getting the permit was relatively easy. We emailed flightpermissions.acaa@gmail.com (cc to flightpermission.atm@mota.gov.af) and received a response within 24 hours. They replied to us saying that to cross the airspace is charged a flat fee of $700 USD. You will need to fill out the form provided (this Excel document) and then forward that, plus copies of your Insurance, Airworthiness Certificate, and Aircraft Reg. If you are operating commercially, they also want your AOC. They ask for a minimum of 48 hours’ notice, although we put our application in a week in advance.

Insurance: Our insurance (like most) doesn’t allow operations within certain countries; however, they permit overflights on ATC-approved airways, and if you end up diverting due to an emergency, you are covered. We checked, and L750 was considered OK. Several air routes are “open.”

Routing: We had planned on L750, which runs from UTAV (Turkmenabat) to OPLR (Lahore). They also sent us the Kabul FIR Contingency Procedure document. The most important thing to read is the broadcast procedures since there is NO ATC service. The flight was very straightforward, and this route saved us a fair chunk of time and fuel.

ATC Comms: About 5 minutes before Kabul’s boundary, the UTAV controller asked us to “report ATC established with Kabul.” We tried calling Kabul on 125.2, knowing full well there was no ATC service. We told UTAV that we were going to continue TIBA procedures in Kabul FIR, and they told us, “Radar services terminated, frequency change approved. Good night.” All our external lights were switched on. We used Comm 2 as our TIBA box (125.2), Comm 1 stayed with the UTAV frequency, and Comm 3 (our data link was set to SAT) to monitor 121.5. Revise your TIBA calls; they suggest you broadcast them every 5 minutes. We used each fix, and it worked at about the right time.

Over Afghanistan: There was one aircraft departing OAKB/Kabul airport, a commercial jet on its way to Dubai, and aside from that, there was no one else. Up at FL450, we had a great view of the terrain – the word is “inhospitable.”

We could continue to hear UTAV on Comm 1 until about 15 minutes into Kabul when we switched to 124.1, the OPLR (Lahore) FIR frequency; about 15 minutes before we got to the boundary, we could hear calls from other aircraft. We had about 10 minutes of “dead” time on Comm 1.

I had an ETP using UTAV/Turkmenabat and OPIS/Islamabad and did not consider using any of the airports within Kabul FIR as available airports. This was treated just like a NOPAC or NAT crossing. There is nowhere to go, so if something eventful happens, you can keep going or turn back based on your ETP.

We checked in with Lahore about 10 minutes before reaching BIROS, and they told us to call overhead BIROS.

Key Points: It is relatively straightforward; brush up on the TIBA calls. There is more traffic nowadays as several airlines are using the routes for daytime flights, so it was a bit busier the last time I used it. However, at best, you will have a couple of airliners in the mid to high FL300s. There was no GPS Spoofing / Jamming or bad ATC, so I would use this route again, considering the other options in that region.

You experience is invaluable – if you are overflying Afghanistan and have some operational advice, please share it with the group. You can reach us on team@ops.group, or file an Airport Spy report anonymously here.

On Jan 27, the FAA published an Information Note for Operators (InFO) warning that crews have been responding to CPDLC route uplinks late or incorrectly when entering or while inside Gander’s oceanic airspace.

Aside from confusion, this has led to increased frequency congestion, controller workload, and interventions to prevent route deviations.

The InFO isn’t regulatory, but it highlights a persistent NAT issue that the FAA wants operators and training departments to address.

Here’s what’s going on.

The Backstory

It’s no surprise there’s confusion. Over the past few years, NAT oceanic procedures have changed significantly.

In 2023, the NAT began transitioning toward Oceanic Clearance Removal (OCR). Gander implemented this change, meaning crews submit a Request for Clearance (RCL) prior to the Oceanic Entry Point. If no change is required, they are considered cleared as filed. If a change is required, ATC issues a specific amended route or level.

In December 2024, Gander began issuing amended oceanic routes and levels via CPDLC following the RCL process. The goal was to standardise amendments via datalink rather than voice, and reduce readback/hearback error opportunities.

It didn’t go smoothly. Reports of confusion followed – especially around how amended routes were being issued and how they were being integrated into the FMS.

In May 2025, NAV CANADA temporarily reverted to issuing pre-oceanic entry amendments by VHF instead. However, Gander has indicated it intends to resume CPDLC route uplinks, potentially before summer 2026.

So this issue isn’t historical. It’s current – and likely to become more relevant again soon.

Crew Error

Gander has reported a significant number of uplinks that are not promptly or correctly actioned.

The typical sequence looks like this:

CPDLC route uplink sent → crew responds “WILCO” → about 5 minutes later ATC sends “CONFIRM ASSIGNED ROUTE” → crew replies with the route string (e.g. N47A RESNO 47N050W 48N040W 49N030W 49N020W MALOT GISTI).

ATC is verifying three things:

• You received the correct clearance.
• You loaded the correct route.
• Your FMS matches what they issued.

The problem arises when crews respond to “CONFIRM ASSIGNED ROUTE” before the new route has actually been loaded and verified in the FMS.

In that case, the system transmits the currently active route – not the newly assigned one. That mismatch generates an alert on the controller’s side.

There’s a second issue as well: misinterpreting certain CPDLC uplinks.

UM79 “CLEARED TO [point] VIA ROUTE CLEARANCE” is not a direct-to clearance. It is a new route to that point.

UM80 “CLEARED ROUTE CLEARANCE” is not “cleared as filed.” It is a new route that must be loaded and executed.

In either case, these errors trigger something called an ‘out-of-conformance alert’ to controllers. This is when small CPDLC errors turn into big ATC workload.

The scale of the issue is not trivial. The North Atlantic Central Monitoring Agency reported 475 lateral errors in 2025 – a 71% increase over the previous year. Total errors across all categories rose 29%, to 600.

Out-Of-Conformance Alerts

Behind the scenes, Gander’s system compares what you are expected to fly with what you are actually flying.

When ATC issues an amended oceanic route or level, this info is entered into their system as a ‘reference trajectory’. Your aircraft reports its actual position and intent via ADS-C, and the system continuously compares the two.

If there is a mismatch – whether because the wrong route was loaded or the wrong route was confirmed – an out-of-conformance alert is generated.

These take time for controllers to clear, cause distraction and add to frequency congestion. These aren’t necessarily a loss of sep, but they are a big deal in busy NAT airspace to prevent potential for traffic situations.

In other words, if you reply to “CONFIRM ASSIGNED ROUTE” before loading it, you’re sending ATC your old one.

So, what does the FAA suggest?

The key takeaway is simple: load the new route, verify it matches the clearance, then confirm it.

The info note lists a bunch of useful resources to help with this, that we have re-produced below:

• NAT Oceanic Clearance Removal Bulletin, 2023_001.
• NAT Oceanic Errors Safety Bulletin (OESB), 2017_002, CPDLC section.
• Advisory Circular (AC) 91-70D, Oceanic and Remote Continental Airspace Operations, paragraph 4.4.3 and Figure 4-1.
• AIP Canada, ENR 7 North Atlantic (NAT) Operations.
• ICAO Global Operational Data Link Document (GOLD) Reroute Procedures.

More Questions?

We’ll try and answer them. If we can’t, we’ll put you in touch with who can. You can reach us on blog@ops.group.

Several Opsgroup members have recently reported arrival holding and diversion risk at TNCM/St Maarten due to ramp congestion, despite having confirmed FBO reservations.

On Feb 18, a member reported being advised of likely holding and possible diversion while enroute. Additional reports followed from crews who operate there regularly.

Here’s what OPSGROUP members had to say:

‘On Feb 16, about two hours out were were advised by Miami that holding and possible diversion was likely due to ramp congestion. Then about 10 minutes later they changed their mind. We heard this happen to multiple aircraft on frequency with us…’

‘I flew in last week – absolutely true. There were five planes in a holding pattern when we arrived. We did four turns in a hold at GAB before being allowed to proceed to the airport. Multiple planes hit minimum fuel and had to divert to other airports. The problem is compounded when the winds shift to runway 10 and the commercial planes require runway 28. You have planes departing from both ends…’

‘We held for 45 minutes waiting for the airport to let GA aircraft land. We had everything booked for some time prior. We heard a couple GA aircraft divert to San Juan. I would strongly advise looking at the 121 schedule when planning an arrival time. There was simply no concrete left…’

‘For GA, it has been more difficult to arrive than during the Xmas/high season. We fly 2-3 times per week and have been told to land after 5pm…’

“This is common, even for airline ops. Single runway with backtracking, in addition to the limited ramp space that can seize up with a missed call or mistake, only exacerbates the compression on the field.  ATC is competent and familiar but extremely busy in these situations, so it’s advised to bring extra gas…”

“On arrival 50 miles out we were told no there was no ramp space…parking had been reserved for months. There was an AOG aircraft in our spot. We were told to divert to Anguilla, no parking after call to FBO .  Landed St.Kitts and waited until space opened in TNCM at 6 pm…”

Restriction on GA movements

A Notam issued Feb 14 may be contributing to the situation:

A0094/26 NOTAMN
Q) TJZS/QSLXX/IV/NBO//000/150/1802N06307W040
A) TNCM
B) 2602141100 C) 2603300359
E) GA IFR TFC RESTRICTED DLY TO
4 ACFT PER HOUR BTN 11:00 UTC AND 15:59 UTC
2 ACFT PER HOUR BTN 16:00 UTC AND 21:00 UTC
4 ACFT PER HOUR BTN 21:01 UTC AND 03:59 UTC
PRIOR APPROVAL REQUIRED FROM THE RESPECTIVE FIXED BASED
OPERATOR. FLIGHTS NOT APPROVED SHALL NOT BE ACCEPTED

But member reports suggest that even with PPR, arrival delays may still occur during peak periods.

Planning around peak traffic

Currently, the practical advice is simple: check the airline schedule and avoid arriving or departing when the airport is busy with Part 121 traffic.

This can be compounded when winds favour Runway 10 but heavier jets continue using Runway 28 for performance reasons.

As a starting point, there are typically two airline peaks each day at TNCM:

Peak 1 (main wave): Late morning through early evening. Arrivals surge roughly 1130-1500 LT, with departures from about 1430-1830 LT.

Peak 2 (smaller wave): A second departure push between approximately 1930-2100 LT.

So the best bet is to plan for an early morning arrival, or after about 1830 local.

Please keep reporting

Your reports are invaluable to the group – you can submit those (anonymously) via Airport Spy, or directly with the team on blog@ops.group.

On Jan 21, the FAA issued a new Information Note for Operators after identifying cases where incorrect runway length data was being used for performance planning.

The concern is straightforward. Using the wrong numbers can skew takeoff or landing calculations, which is why the FAA says performance planning should be based on declared distances from the Chart Supplement.

What exactly is the issue?

The FAA notes that many crews default to runway lengths taken from airport diagrams, charts, FMS databases or commercial planning tools.

The issue is that these sources may not include declared distances (TORA, TODA, ASDA and LDA) which are the figures used to meet regulatory performance requirements and can differ significantly from the physical runway length.

The FAA’s concern is that crews may misunderstand declared distances, omit them entirely, or rely on FMS or third-party data that has not been updated after changes.

So a quick clarification on how runway lengths are defined helps…

About runways

When we talk about default runway length, we are talking about the physical length of the runway surface. It’s what you see on charts, airport diagrams and other sources of info.

It represents exactly that – pavement from end to end. It may include unusable bits (such as displaced thresholds, closed portions etc) and is often a single number with no context.

It doesn’t tell you how much runway is legally available for takeoff or landing and can significantly overstate what you can actually use (more on that later).

Declared distances, on the other hand, are the official, performance-relevant runway lengths published by the airport authority via the FAA Chart Supplement and other validated sources.

A brief reminder of what these distances include (and critically, don’t):

Takeoff Run Available (TORA). Think of this as how much runway you can accelerate on. It includes useable pavement only, starting at the take-off threshold. It doesn’t include clearways or stopways.

Takeoff Distance Available (TODA). How much distance you have to get airborne (i.e. TORA) plus the distance required to clear obstacles in the initial climb segment (clearways). Crucially, it doesn’t include stopways (usable in a rejected takeoff).

Accelerate-Stop Distance Available (ASDA). Think of this of how much distance you have if you reject the takeoff. It includes TORA and stopways. It doesn’t include clearways.

Landing Distance Available (LDA). How much runway you actually have to stop after touchdown. This includes usable pavement from the landing threshold to the end of the runway. It doesn’t include pavement before a displaced threshold, stopways or clearways.

Here’s what this all looks like:

Under the FAA regs, these distances are the authoritative performance numbers. They override any single runway length shown elsewhere. That’s the key point.

Real world example

But that’s enough theory. A good real-world example is KBUR/Burbank Runway 15, where the published runway length and the declared landing distance are not the same.

Many charts and planning tools show a runway length of 6,886 ft. But the FAA Chart Supplement lists an LDA of 5,976 ft due to a displaced threshold for obstacle clearance.

If crews plan landing performance using the longer figure, they may be overestimating available runway by about 900 ft. Add tailwind, a wet surface, or a performance-limiting MEL, and that margin can disappear quickly.

That’s exactly the scenario the FAA is trying to prevent.

So what’s the FAA’s advice?

For performance calcs, the FAA says crews should use published declared distances, not the physical runway length. Just because pavement exists doesn’t mean it’s legally usable.

That expectation needs to be reflected in procedures, training and day-to-day practice.

Crews also need to be clear on which runway lengths their performance tools are actually using.

Be aware that the FMS runway length is not LDA, ASDA or TODA.

Operators should also review FMS databases and third-party performance tools, understand their limitations, and check that the data is current.

Have you spotted something risky out there?

Share it (anonymously) with the group! You can reach us via blog@ops.group, Airport Spy or Report-A-Thing.

I remember the first time I tipped over on a visual approach to Runway 34 at the waypoint SHEED at YMML/Melbourne. The northerly was howling, we were heavy, and in continuous moderate turbulence. Things were busy, but under control.

At the commencement of the visual segment, we were level at 2500’ and partially configured to fly a normal decelerated, 3-degree approach. Local operators know you need closer to 4 to find ‘the groove’ by the stable call at 1000 feet. The trouble was, we weren’t local.

Instantly it became apparent 3 degrees would not be enough. The ‘bouncy ball’ (an Airbus acronym for vertical path indicator) immediately showed we were high.

And just like that, we were chasing.

Jet operators are accustomed to this ol’ chestnut: you can’t slow down and go down. Generally speaking, it’s one or the other. We were now trying to do both.

And then came the turn to final.

We disregarded Melbourne’s secondary airport to our right, with its name emblazoned brightly in white next to the runway so as to avoid any potential confusion (it has happened). As we struggled to configure and complete our landing checklist, workload soared. The final turn came late and required the maximum angle of bank our stabilised approach criteria allowed.

As we turned into 40kts of wind on the nose, our fate was sealed – the auto thrust (by design) applied a fist full of power to compensate for our falling groundspeed, and three whites on the PAPI quickly became four.

We were done. Out of altitude and out of time, we called unstable and commenced the go-around wandering how two competent pilots had let this get the best of us.

Moral of the story – visual approaches (when unfamiliar) aren’t easy. They’re supposed to be, but they’re not.

And business jet operators are the leaders in operating high-performance aircraft to unfamiliar airports.

Enter the guided visual.

Guided visuals make use of the FMS to provide guidance that keeps you on profile and track, reducing pilot workload and allowing you spare capacity to watch for other traffic, configure and all the other pilot-y things we need to do.

But it’s important you’re familiar with their limitations – and what responsibilities still lie with you.

Let’s take a closer look…

Guided Visual 101

It helps to frame what we’re talking about here.

Guided visual approaches are visual approaches flown with lateral and vertical guidance generated by the FMS. Think of it as an assisted visual approach, backed up by RNP-AR style vertical and lateral guidance.

Important point: you’re still flying a visual approach, in VMC, to a runway that’s in sight. But instead of eyeballing things, the box builds you a stabilised path to the threshold.

You can fly it like any other automated approach with full situational awareness. It’s computerised magic, but with some fairly strong caveats (more on that in a bit).

Why they’re so useful

Firstly because they’re so stable. Guided visuals reduce the need for ‘dive and drive’ visuals. You get a proper descent profile early, which enables you to manage energy with far fewer last minute flight path adjustments. They are smart and can take into account the various vertical profiles for different segments of the approach.

Take WSSL/Seletar Runway 03: the initial descent path from SETHI starts at 4.4 degrees until turning final at 410′ where the descent shallows out to match the PAPI at 3.2 degrees, and since there is a runway point in the FMS, the aircraft can remain coupled until it reaches its autopilot limitation altitude (200′ in a Gulfstream for instance).

Then there’s workload – the FMS empties your capacity bucket by managing your geometric flight path, leaving room to focus on things like spacing, configuration, checklists and monitoring. This is especially pertinent when cleared via a visual approach while still high, fast or under (shall we say) ‘less than optimal’ radar vectors.

Then there are visual illusions caused by flat light, water, sloping terrain or black hole effect. Our eyes are known to play tricks on us.

Finally, the elphant in the room – automation. Modern, complex aircraft are designed to be flown with high levels of automation. Whether or not this is a good thing is a can of worms that falls beyond the scope of this article. But automation is well and truly engrained in how we operate modern, complex aircraft.

It’s hard to argue that when managed well (and not used as a replacement for core piloting skills), autopilot and flight director coupling provides significant safety margins compared to simply flying by the seat our pants.

But, beware…

Rubbish in, rubbish out. The guidance an FMS provides is only as good as the data it uses, and so database accuracy matters. A displaced threshold for instance may not be captured. Always, always cross-check your approach against visual cues such as PAPI.

It’s also important to remember that obstacle clearance is on you. It’s still a visual approach. Your FMS doesn’t know about obstacles, cranes or even the ‘steel structures and silos’ that you must spot on approach to WSSL/Seletar, for instance.

Singapore’s Seletar Runway 03 RNAV-H

What’s the bottom line? Guided visual approaches do not replace good visual flying. But they do help make it safer, more stable and more consistent. For BizAv operators flying to diverse airports, they can be one of the most useful tools in the box – provided they are understood.

What about legalities?

In the US, a guided visual approach is still a visual approach under FAA rules. The FAA previously issued this Information for Operators (InFO) to that effect, and is an important read before flying any guided visual.

Don’t confuse them with instrument approaches – even if the charts appear similar. “Looks like an approach” doesn’t equal “is an approach.”

In other words, the presence of flight director and autopilot guidance does not change anything.

There is no such thing as an ‘instrument visual approach.’

Visual approaches have no published minima. There is no FAA obstacle clearance protection, no TERPS validation or any other underlying regulatory protections. The same applies in the ICAO world, whilst you might have access to the visual guided approach, it is still legally a visual approach, don’t let the chart fool you into thinking otherwise.

You must:

• Maintain continuous visual reference with the runway or traffic.
• Be able to land using normal manoeuvres.

The FAA doesn’t specify whether you need to be head’s up or down – just as long as you remember that these remain your responsibility.

Another important clarification is that most guided visual approaches are proprietary, in other words not published via AIP. Avoid potential confusion by not using using weird naming conventions (such as “RNP-H”) that might not be immediately evident to the controller that has cleared you for a visual approach.

If you are specifically asked by ATC if you will be tracking via a procedure however, it is okay to say so. At several US airports ATC have been actively involved in procedural design. This highlights the benefits of these types of approaches, not just for pilots but for controllers too. They can help remove the “some fly wide, some fly close” factor which is common in a visual approaches.

And finally there is this important caveat. Flying one of these RNAV H or RNAV G procedures does not relieve the pilot of their responsibilities of right-of-rule rules – especially at uncontrolled airports where pattern rules still apply (see CFR § 91.113). The NBAA report that they are receiving increasing reports of turbine aircraft using instrument approaches to complete visual arrivals and (either intentionally or unintentionally) disregarding right-of-way rules with other aircraft. It’s important to understand that using these procedures does not grant any extra priority. 

Where do you find them?

In the US, guided visual approaches are not usually published procedures.

Instead third party vendors produce ARINC-424 coded procedures that can be used in your jet’s FMS. Just like an RNP-AR, you should not modify waypoints on the approach, since this could affect the jets trajectory.

When loaded, they usually appear in your FMS as ‘RNAV-H RWY XX’  or ‘RNAV-G RWY XX’ depending on which avionics package you are flying with.

Honeywell appears to be leading the charge. They have designed a number of them which, at the moment, are only available to aircraft with Honeywell avionics. Although we have been told that the data may soon be licensed to other avionic manufacturers the likes of Collins etc. Watch this space.

Garmin has also recently started to add some Visual Guided procedures to their products as well. While the number of airports served is less than the Honeywell offering, their offering is growing quickly

Have more to add?

Let us know! You can reach the team via blog@ops.group.

Key Points:

• Iran remains highly unstable, with elevated risk to civil aviation.
• Severe internet disruption has been in place since Jan 8, with broader communications affected.
• The OIIX/Tehran FIR was closed at short notice for several hours on Jan 14, with no public explanation.
• EASA recommends avoiding Iranian airspace at all levels due to misidentification risk.

Situation in Iran

Beginning in late December, large-scale political protests spread across major cities due to a worsening economic crisis.

These escalated in recent weeks, with many demanding a change of political leadership. The Government has responded with a violent crack-down. Large numbers of casualties have been reported amid arbitrary arrests and severe internet disruption since Jan 8, with wider communications also affected.

Several countries (including the US) have urged their citizens to leave the country immediately.

Potential for US Military Intervention

In response to humanitarian concerns, the US Government has implied military intervention remains a possibility should violence against protesters continues.

If this were to occur, Iran has repeatedly warned it will retaliate by targeting US military bases and other assets throughout the region.

Some effects of this threat have already been felt, including the partial removal of personnel as a precautionary measure at Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar – the largest US military base in the Middle East. Although the threat level has reportedly been downgraded in the past few days.

Airspace Risk

The current crisis has further increased risk to aircraft operating in or near Iranian airspace (the OIIX/Tehran FIR).

On Jan 14, the following Notam was issued unexpectedly closing the OIIX/Tehran FIR for several hours overnight, with no public explanation from Iranian authorities:

Previous events have shown that these types of closures can occur when security or military activity is taking place including a risk of missile launches or air defence operations.

Then on Jan 16, EASA upgraded its warning for Iranian airspace by publishing a new Conflict Zone Information Bulletin (CZIB) for Iran and neighbouring airspace. It suggests that recent events (including the possibility of foreign intervention) have likely placed air defence systems at a heightened sense of alert. Civil aircraft are at increased risk of misidentification.

It’s worth noting that most operators already avoid Iranian airspace. Several states (including the US, UK, France, Canada and Germany) either actively prohibit or at least strongly advise against entering. At safeairspace.net, we maintain a ‘Level 1 – Do Not Fly’ warning.

However, when referencing adjacent airspace, things become a little more ambiguous. EASA’s CZIB advises caution when overflying neighbouring countries where US military assets are present. This notably includes Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Syria and Turkey.

Special care should be used on the major air corridor that skirts the western boundary of Iran via Iraqi airspace (airways UL602, UM860 and UM688) where GPS interference (including the more insidious spoofing) is prevalent.

We know of at least one incident in the past where an aircraft almost inadvertently strayed into Iranian airspace without a clearance while suffering from navigation error.

From a broader perspective, EASA are also alluding to the possibility of regional escalation should the situation deteriorate – especially in the event of retaliatory strikes against military targets.

Continue to monitor the situation

Iran sits alongside the main Europe-Middle East transit corridor via Iraq/Kuwait/Bahrain, and the June 2025 Israel-Iran missile exchange showed how quickly events inside Iran can trigger widespread airspace closures and warnings across the region.

If further military activity involving Iran escalates, expect little warning – for Europe-Middle East flights, the longer routing via Egypt/Saudi has been the more stable option and keeps you further clear of Iranian airspace.

We’ll continue to issue any updates via Opsgroup and Safeairspace.net. You can also reach us at blog@ops.group if you have any info to share.

India’s DGCA has issued new pilot reporting rules after a week of GPS interference in the Delhi area.

In early November, crews approaching VIDP/Delhi saw navigation anomalies including false EGPWS warnings, incorrect position data and altitude errors – consistent with GPS spoofing.

Image the work of GPSwise and SkAI Data Services.

Hundreds of flights were affected. ADS-B integrity in the Delhi TMA briefly dropped to zero, leaving ATC unable to rely on GPS-based surveillance.

The timing coincided with the temporary withdrawal of ILS for runway 10/28, which increased reliance on RNAV procedures.

The paperwork trail

DGCA first outlined its GNSS-interference reporting process in a 2023 Advisory Circular.

On 10 Nov 2025, they followed up with a new SOP on GNSS Spoofing – which included the “report within 10 minutes” requirement.

Crews flagged parts of it as unclear, so on Nov 17, DGCA issued an Addendum to clarify exactly what pilots and operators must do!

What pilots need to do

If interference is detected before top of descent:

1. Tell ATC as soon as possible.
2. Notify your operator’s post holder (responsible manager) by any available means.
3. The post holder must then notify DGCA immediately using the form below.

If interference is detected after top of descent, or only discovered after landing:

1. Report it to the post holder as part of normal post-flight duties.
2. The post holder must then notify DGCA using the same form.

DGCA emphasises that the goal is timely reporting, not enforcement!

Click for PDF.

What to expect

A reminder that GPSwise (powered by the experts at SkAI Data Services) provides a real time GPS Spoofing and Jamming map spanning the globe. You can access it here.

Their current data shows a steady interference patch northwest of Delhi. It isn’t constant, but it’s there often enough that crews should expect occasional GNSS issues when routing through that area and be ready to cross-check and revert to conventional procedures.

Key Points

• Following a military coup in April 2023, Sudan airspace remains closed to all civilian flights.
• An Il-76 was reportedly shot down by a surface-to-air missile near Babanusa on Nov 4.
• Multiple conflict-zone warnings exist due to the risk of anti-aircraft fire. The country should be considered dangerous at all levels.
• A Contingency Plan provides limited overflight options via HSPN/Port Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and South Sudan (where ATC remains suspended above FL245).

Sudan’s airspace (the HSSS/Khartoum FIR) has been largely shut since 2023 and the risk profile has only worsened. Fighting around Khartoum continues, and the reported shootdown near Babanusa shows that overflights remain exposed. A US-backed truce has not reduced the threat environment.

Most operators are now avoiding Sudan entirely, routing through the published contingency corridors or staying in neighbouring FIRs. The lack of ATC above FL245 in South Sudan adds another layer of complexity for anyone trying to cross the region.

Here’s the updated risk briefing…

Context

Sudan remains in a state of civil war between two major powers that used to rule together – the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) who control Port Sudan, and a paramilitary group called the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) who control most of Khartoum. You can read more about the background here.

Sudan, a country divided. Image courtesy of the BBC. 

The US Government (along with Saudi Arabia, UAE and several other states ) has been actively pursuing a truce that aims to stop the fighting, open humanitarian corridors and rebuild political stability.

Both SAF and RSF have said yes in principle, but not it seems in practice.

And that means risk to civil aviation will persist. There are several sticking points – SAF wants RSF withdrawn from major cities before anything starts. RSF wants overflight guarantees without any kind of intereference. Any neither is willing to budge yet.

Aircraft Shot Down

On Nov 4, 2025 an Il-76 transport plane of the Sudanese Armed Forces was reportedly shot down in West Kordofan state, southern Sudan by the RSF.

While the armed forces have indicated a structural failure of the aircraft’s wing was to blame, video footage appears to support the RSF’s claim that it was shot down using a short range air defence system of foreign origin.

If proven true, the incident underpins the presence of anti-aircraft weaponry in Sudanese contested airspace, and that even large transport aircraft are not immune to the risks of mistaken identity. Some intelligence suggests that this includes missile systems capable of reaching aircraft as high as FL500.

Conflicting claims about the incident show how unclear the situation is. Based on what we know, the highest risk is during daylight and in areas close to active fighting.

Recent Drone Strikes

On Nov 7, 2025 the RSF launched coordinated drone attacks against at least four cities: Atbara (River Nile State), El-Obeid, Al-Dailang and Omdurman (west Khartoum). Anti-aircraft fire was also reported.

This indicates that flight operations, especially arrivals and departures near the Khartoum region, face an elevated risk of indirect fire and missile activity. Secondary effects such as air-defence responses and unexpected diversions are also possible, particularly at low levels.

Bottom line: treat Khartoum/Omdurman and nearby airports as high-threat airspace. Even if an airport is “open” for domestic traffic, risk in the surrounding airspace remains dynamic.

Contingency Routes

Following the military coup in April 2023, Sudan remains almost entirely closed to all civilian flights.

Sudan has declared its entire sovereign airspace a single restricted area called “HSR5”, and published contingency procedures for civil traffic. It contains three main options for overflights:

1. One north-south overflight route in the far east of the country down over HSPN/Port Sudan airport.
2. Some north-south diversionary corridors available via Egypt and Saudi over the Red Sea.
3. Some east-west routes over South Sudan.

#1: North-South overflight route over HSPN/Port Sudan airport

They call this route ‘CR6’ – and it’s the only published track through Sudan’s restricted area HSR5.

It links the Addis and Cairo FIRs via ALRAP-KSL-PSD-P751-ALEBA. Levels are fixed for safety, FL320 northbound and FL330 southbound. There is no ATC separation, and prior permission is required.

Think of this as a narrow humanitarian corridor – it’s available but not intended to carry normal traffic.

The contingency plan points you to the Sudan AIP (GEN 1.2) for how to get permission, but the short version is this: operators must secure diplomatic clearance before the flight, and you can’t ask airborne. If you are allowed in, make sure you stick to CR6 like glue.

While technically possible, we advise extreme caution. What we don’t know are the safety margins applied to the contingency route or what may be unfolding beneath it.

#2 Red Sea Diversionary Corridors

These allow north-south traffic to move between the HECC/Cairo and OEJD/Jeddah FIRs without touching Sudan at all. They are the safest and cleanest option right now because you stay entirely within Egyptian and Saudi Arabian airspace, skirting the Sudanese coastline.

#3 South Sudan (KFOSS Routes)

KFOSS stands for ‘Khartoum FIR Over South Sudan’ and apply above FL245.

These routes allow for a safe(-ish) east-west crossing of South Sudan without entering Sudan itself. They’re RNAV 5, and mostly bi-directional. You report regularly, keep ADS-B and your transponder on and maintain 15-minute spacing.

One big caveat though – KFOSS routes are uncontrolled. Juba provides traffic advisories only.

Airspace Warnings

Several states (including the UK, France, Canada and Germany) maintain active airspace warnings that advise against entering the HSSS/Khartoum FIR at all levels due to risk of anti-aircraft fire and military activity.

For some reason, US operators technically have no legal restrictions as at the time of writing the FAA has issued no airspace advisories (Notams or SFARs) for Sudanese airspace.

Stay Updated

We will continue to report on any changes to the situation in Sudan as it develops. This includes our Safe Airspace website where you can view all active airspace warnings, along with those that exist in adjacent airspace. Our team keeps this updated around-the-clock.

It’s the end of an era. After nearly a century of keeping pilots flipping, folding and cursing in cramped cockpits, Jeppesen is calling it a day on its paper chart service.

It will be retired by 31 Oct 2026, closing a chapter that began when Elrey Jeppesen first sold his little black book of hand-drawn airfield notes in the 1930s.

For many, it’s like losing an old friend. One that was heavy, expensive and always due an update. But it never froze, crashed or ran out of battery.

If you still like the feel of paper in hand, Jeppesen says a few options will remain…

Why end a good thing?

Essentially, cost. Paper chart operations aren’t cheap – printing, shipping, updates and physical inventory are all expensive. Something that Jeppesen itself refers to as the ‘growing costs of managing paper.’

The industry has overwhelmingly transitioned to digital charts thanks to the proliferation of EFBs, tablets and integrated avionics. And all good things must come to an end.

Jeppesen’s legacy paper chart service will end Oct next year.

But what is the operational impact of this change? And how will you be affected if still using paper in the flight deck?

Operational Impact

If your operation still relies on paper Jepps, now is the time to plan ahead. The exact impact depends on what part of the law you operate under.

Part 91:

With the exception of Part 91K, Part 91 operators can switch from paper to digital charts without FAA authorisation.

But there are a few caveats:

• The PIC must ensure that the electronic charts being used are current and accurate.
• You’ll also need a backup (a second device or app). Printed charts also count (but obviously, you’ll soon need to print them yourself).

In other words, you can switch at your own discretion as long as you cover the basics above.

Parts 91K, 125, and 135:

The ‘pathway to paperless’ is a little more complicated.

All require OpSpec A061 that authorises EFB use. You’ll need to adequately show that there are procedures and training in place for crew, and that there is a backup plan for failures.

There will also need to be procedures in place for device mounting, power compliance and the update process.

For Part 91K operators, the lead time is typically 1-3 months. In the case of Part 135, this is longer. Most go through a ‘paperless transition’ period – operating with both paper and electronic charts until fully approved.

Part 121:

Most (if not all) are likely already approved for EFB use.

If there are any outliers still out there, a full formal approval is required. This typically takes 3-6 months.

This involves the airline submitting a detailed EFB program to the FAA’s Principal Operations Inspector.

The process is structured and lengthy and includes factors like power/heat analysis, training and other risk assessments. So much so that airlines have entire manuals dedicated to their EFB operations.

Only (most) Part 91 operators can avoid regulatory approval to transition to digital charts.

Jeppesen itself also provides solid guidance on this process.

I still want paper!

Fear not – it can still be done, just with a little more elbow grease.

Jeppesen will continue to sell it’s (blank) 7 hole-punch paper via its online store here.

Most popular EFB services (including ForeFlight and FD Pro) support user printing.

The big man himself, Elrey Jeppesen.

Two years have passed since we published our original piece on QNH errors, and the issue hasn’t gone away. In fact, there have been more serious incidents linked to incorrect altimeter settings below transition. Here’s what’s happened since then.

The Paris Near Miss

The final report is out on a serious incident at LFPG/Paris Charles de Gaulle in May 2022. An A320 was flying an RNP approach (LNAV/VNAV minima) in IMC when ATC passed the wrong QNH – 1011 instead of 1001, a 10 hPa difference.

That mistake meant the aircraft flew the approach about 280 feet lower than it should have. A ground proximity alert went off in the tower, but the controller got no reply from the crew.

At minima, with no runway in sight, the crew went around. The aircraft’s radio altimeter later showed a minimum height of just six feet – one mile short of the threshold.

The crew never realised. The wrong QNH made their instruments show they were higher than they actually were, so everything looked normal. The heights matched the chart, and EGPWS didn’t trigger.

They tried again, still with the wrong QNH set. This time they broke out and landed safely, again passing within a few feet of the surface before the threshold.

The aircraft reached a minimum height of just 6 feet, almost a mile from the threshold.

You can read the full report and safety recommendations here.

Updated EASA Guidance

On October 22, EASA reissued its Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) on incorrect barometric altimeter settings. You can download it here. It warns that QNH errors can not only lead to CFIT but also reduce separation from other aircraft, increasing the risk of midair collision.

This applies to all phases of an instrument approach, including the missed approach.

The SIB points out that QNH errors can creep in at several points – from how meteorologists determine it, to how ATC passes it, to what the crew actually sets.

The SIB contains some valuable recommendations for operators:

• Develop SOPs to make sure pilots cross-check QNH from at least two independent sources (for example, ATIS and ATC). Don’t rely on handwriting or word-of-mouth!!
• Assess these procedures, and hunt for ways in which errors may still occur. Then continue to refine them.
• Use FDM or FOQA data to flag and investigate any altimeter mis-sets and learn from them.

Our Original Article

If you fly any baro-based approach (that’s most of them except ILS, GLS, or RNP to LPV) you need to know how a simple QNH mistake can put you below profile without you realising it.

Back in 2023, ICAO put out a warning about this. Here’s the quick version:

Key Points

• QNH errors have led to several serious approach incidents.
• Affected approaches: VOR, NDB, LOC, RNP, and RNP AR.
• Main causes: bad data, misheard ATC calls, and cockpit workload.
• Fix: raise minima, stick to SOPs, cross-check QNH from two sources, and speak up if it sounds wrong.

A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing

An innocuous QNH error can easily place your aircraft hundreds of feet below profile in the final approach segment of a non-precision approach. And there may be very few signs – save for our eyeballs, our radio altimeter, or ultimately our EGPWS.

And perhaps the approaches most vulnerable to this threat are those which use BARO-VNAV – in other words, the use of our aircraft’s barometric altitude information to compute the aircraft’s vertical guidance.

The problem is that to fly these approaches safely, our altimeters must be accurate. That entirely depends on pilots setting the correct QNH. It is a simple task riddled with potential for insidious errors – something that no pilot (or controller) is immune to.

Which is why ICAO recently published a new Ops Bulletin on this very problem. They can’t fix it, but they can help mitigate it. Here’s a run-down on what they had to say.

Risky Business

If you’re reading this, chances are you have a reasonable idea about how an altimeter works. In the most basic sense, we calibrate these pressure-sensitive devices to provide an altitude above whatever datum we need them for – in most cases, sea level.

This essentially creates potential for two errors:

1. Temperature: although this is less of an issue, because we can anticipate and correct for it.
2. A mis-set: or in other words, rubbish in rubbish out. The altimeter doesn’t know if it’s telling you lies. In the same sense that a conventional clock doesn’t know that it’s wrong – it just runs from whatever time you set it to. The consequences of this type of error are far worse.

Final Approach

ICAO’s Bulletin focuses on the final approach (inside the FAF) simply because this is where altimeter errors become most critical.

In this segment, ICAO-compliant procedures only guarantee a smidge less than 300 feet of obstacle clearance (ICAO Doc 8168 Vol II if you’re feeling bold). Interestingly, this almost perfectly correlates to an altimeter error of 10hPa…

Are you sure that 1023 QNH you just heard on that scratchy ATIS wasn’t actually 1013?

…it’s easy to see how critical errors can become. Like the example below:

Which approaches are affected?

It can be easy to get lost in the sea of acronyms out there. So let’s keep it simple:

Not vulnerable: ILS, GLS, and RNP to LPV minima. In other words, approaches that do not rely on barometric altitude to fly the correct profile. One gotcha tho – DA is still based on your altimeter. You may therefore go around early or late with an incorrect QNH but the profile itself will still be correct.

Vulnerable: Everything else – including VOR, NDB, LOC, RNP, and RNP (AR).

Why are QNH errors happening?

ICAO has some ideas:

Bogus Data: This may be incorrect information supplied by a met service provider, corrupt hardware on the ground or even by assuming area QNH will be close enough to airport QNH.

Chinese Whispers:Don’t underestimate the power of what you think you heard. This can happen anytime we are relying on voice to communicate safety critical information. It’s not just pilots either – ATC may not pick up that your read-back was incorrect. If you fly internationally, the language barrier can also be a challenge. Even domestically we form habits of talking at speed on the radio. If there is any doubt, use the phrase “Say Again Slowly.”

Workload: Have you ever been in this boat? You’re passing through transition, changing to an approach frequency, slowing to 250kts, securing the cabin and trying to run an approach checklist….all at the same time. Depending on where the transition level is (for example, FL110 in Australia) it can clash with your other flight deck duties. Crew confusion, miscommunication and even finger trouble can come into play here.

What can we do about it?

Consider other approaches: iI there’s an ILS or similar available and conditions are poor, consider using it instead.

Think about minimas: ICAO suggest raising your minima particularly if you are unfamiliar with an approach type.

Stick to the SOPs: and cross check. Treat QNH like that stove you think you left on every time you leave for a multi-day trip. Become paranoid and find that error. Cross-check the QNH across multiple sources – at least two independent ones for each and every approach.

Don’t forget to ask yourself – is it sensible? A good way to cross check this is by comparing the ATIS QNH to the TAF or METAR QNH. If there is any doubt, confirm it with ATC.

Be especially suspicious of anything hand-written: If you’ve obtained a QNH by voice, make sure you have both independently heard it.

Be careful with anything hand written. Is our arrival info Q 1014 or could it be O 1019?

Don’t forget other sensibility checks: Terrain permitting, your radio altimeter may give you an early clue that all is not right – especially if you’re over flat terrain or water.

ICAO also suggests that ATCOs and ANSPs have a role to play too: It’s little beyond the scope of this article, but you can find that info in the very same bulletin.

Have a story to tell?

Please share it with us in confidence. You can reach us on team@ops.group.

An OPSGROUP member on a recent westbound NAT flight from the Middle East received the following message via CPDLC:

The crew contacted Shanwick via HF, who requested their RNP capability and operational status.

The controller explained that due to their point of departure (OMAA/Abu Dhabi) they wanted to be certain the aircraft had not been contaminated by GPS jamming or spoofing before it entered oceanic airspace.

It’s been a while since we wrote about this procedure, and since then we’ve had this NAT Ops Bulletin published by ICAO telling operators what to do on the NAT if they’ve experienced jamming/spoofing, so we reached out to NATS directly for an update. Here’s what they had to say…

Defensive Measures

NATS reported they continue to receive a large number of flights every day that have been impacted by GPS interference prior to oceanic boundaries.

The issue is that once an aircraft’s navigation system has been ‘contaminated’ by bad GPS data, it may not be possible to recover full RNP capability in flight, even if the normal GPS signal is restored.

These aircraft may no longer meet RNP 4/10 accuracy required in the NAT HLA, even long after the trigger event occurred.

The NAT Ops Bulletin which was published back in Jan 2025 requires crew of NAT-bound aircraft that have encountered GPS interference to notify their first NAT ANSP via RCL. Even if your aircraft shows no lingering effects, ATC still want to know.

NATS advise that late notification by pilots of a RNP degradation (such as approaching an oceanic entry point) greatly increases controller workload. They often need to move other aircraft out of the way to provide increased separation (in some cases from 14nm to 10 minutes), it’s a big deal.

As a result, they are employing defensive controlling measures. Based on previously spoofed/jammed flights and regions of known risks, they may proactively contact flights assessed as higher risk to confirm status before entry – although the exact selection criteria isn’t public. Increased separation will be applied until normal navigation performance is confirmed by the pilots.

In a nutshell, this is why the OPSGROUP member received the message above.

A special thank you to NATS for their help in answering this question.

Jammed or spoofed? You need to let your NAT ANSP know

The NAT Ops Bulletin we keep mentioning – this provides the guidance for NAT traffic on how to manage GNSS interference. Here it is again, so you can’t miss it! ⬇️

Key takeaway from this: If you suspect or know that your aircraft has encountered any kind of GPS interference (both jamming or spoofing), NAT-bound traffic must let their first NAT ANSP know in the RCL – even if the aircraft appears to have recovered.

This is prefixed by ‘ATC REMARKS/GNSS INTERFERENCE’ and must include details of any system degradations.

A few messages to keep handy are:

‘ATC REMARKS/GNSS INTERFERENCE NO IMPACT.’

‘ATC REMARKS/GNSS INTERFERENCE NO CPDLC/ADS’

‘ATC REMARKS/GNSS INTERFERENCE RNP 10 ONLY’

‘ATC REMARKS/GNSS INTERFERENCE NON-RNP10

By including your status in the RCL, you are giving ATC a head’s up before you arrive.

In most cases, you will still be allowed in the NAT HLA. A loss of RNP 4 isn’t a deal breaker, as you can still enter under RNP 10. But your clearance may be less optimal (likely level changes) due to the increased separation from other traffic.

The big one to look for is a loss of RNP 10. You will not be cleared into the NAT HLA, and instead will need to remain below FL290 or above FL410. With an obvious fuel impact, this may lead to an unplanned diversion.

The Bulletin includes a handy flow chart that’s worth printing and keeping in your flight bag.

Click for PDF.

Latest ICAO Feedback

The latest three-yearly ICAO Assembly was held in Montreal from Sep 23 – Oct 3.

During the event, ICAO issued its strongest condemnation yet of both Russia and North Korea, directly blaming them for deliberate GNSS interference in violation of the Chicago Convention. Russia, in particular, has been blamed by ICAO for destabilising navigation across European airspace.

We continue to receive regular reports from OPSGROUP members of both jamming and spoofing. Interference is now a regular occurrence in the Baltic region, particularly around Kaliningrad, Eastern Finland, the Baltic Sea, and nearby airspace. Other reports have been received from Germany, Poland and Norway.

Recent airspace incursions, airstrikes and drone activity associated with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine have almost certainly escalated the use of GPS interference as a defensive measure. Civil aviation will continue to operationally grapple with this hazard. With no obvious solution in site, our best defence remains procedures like the one detailed above.

Key Points

• The last two weeks has seen a significant increase in Russian military activity near NATO borders, including several confirmed airspace violations involving both drones and aircraft.
• This has been reported in Poland, Romania and Estonia. While these kinds of airspace incidents are not new, the recent spike in frequency and intensity is cause for concern.
• NATO has responded in the region by scrambling jets, enhancing surveillance, and deploying additional defensive resources along its eastern borders.
• These events may have increased risks for civil aviation, including collision hazards, potential for escalation, activation of air defence systems and GPS interference.

Airspace violations have been reported by NATO members close to the border with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.

Major Incidents

September 9-10: Poland (EPWW/Warsaw FIR)

During a Russian missile and drone attack on Ukraine, multiple Russian drones violated Polish airspace.

They were detected across eastern, central and northern Poland with some reportedly entering via Belarus.

Polish and NATO fighters were scrambled, and several drones were shot down.

Poland described the event as a major provocation. It invoked Article 4 of the NATO treaty – a move that triggers emergency consultations with other member states.

This was an important political response. While Article 4 does not commit NATO to collective defence, it does require formal discussions when a member state feels its security is under direct threat.

Image courtesy of the Insititute For The Study of War and Critical Threats.

September 13: Romania (LRBB/Bucharest FIR)

A single Russian drone breached Romanian airspace  near the Danube River during strikes on nearby Ukrainian targets.

It reportedly loitered for around 50 minutes before exiting back towards Ukraine.

Romanian and NATO fighters responded, but no weapons were fired due to concerns about collateral damage in populated areas below.

September 19: Estonia (EETT/Tallinn FIR)

Three Russian MiG-31s allegedly entered Estonian airspace for about 12 minutes without authorization near Vaindloo Island in the Gulf of Finland, close to the boundary with Russian-controlled airspace.

The jets flew without flight plans, transponders or ATC contact for approx 12 minutes. NATO jets were dispatched to intercept them, before the Russian jets exited the area.

Estonia invoked Article 4 following the incursion.

Image Courtesy of the Republic of Estonia Defence Forces

NATO Response – Operation Eastern Sentry

On Sep 12, NATO launched Operation Eastern Sentry to bolster its posture along the eastern flank.

This mission involves ongoing fighter patrols, improved radar surveillance, and reinforced air defence systems along NATO’s eastern border.

The specifics of this deployment aren’t available, but the operation’s purpose is to detect and respond rapidly to any further violations.

NATO’s Operation Eastern Sentry has been underway since Sep 12.

Why Russia might be doing this

Analysts suggest there may be several possible motives:

• Testing NATO’s response – violations can be used to gather intel on detection and reaction times, radar coverage and interception procedures.
• Posturing – signalling strength and willingness to challenge NATO in a show of force.
• Distraction – Diverting NATO resources away from other interests (such as the conflict in Ukraine).
• Deniability – Maintaining ambiguity by blaming navigation errors, or claiming operations only occurred in neutral airspace.

What’s the bigger picture?

Tensions have risen along NATO’s eastern boundaries in recent weeks, raising safety and operational concerns for civil aviation. Even if an outright conflict is still unlikely, these violations complicate de-escalation and increase the frequency of spill-over risks.

Flight operations in this region need to monitor the situation closely for changes – history has shown that just because airspace is open, doesn’t mean it is safe.

Key risks for operators

Collision hazards – Military aircraft operating without transponders in high-density airspace can create serious risks for civil flights – especially in Baltic states and Poland where major routes between Western Europe and Scandinavia exist.

Airspace disruption – When interceptions occur, ATC may need to rapidly clear surrounding airspace causing re-routes and unexpected fuel burn to enroute aircraft.

Sudden Escalation – A full confrontation between NATO and Russia is unlikely in the near term. However, recent lessons in the Middle East have shown us that sudden closures of FIRs can be a realistic consequence of a deteriorating political situation. This can occur in hours, not days.

GPS Interference – Russian-origin jamming is frequently reported in the region, often traced to areas like Kaliningrad and St Petersburg. The team at SKAI Data Services kindly provided us with the following data map of recent jamming and spoofing recorded in the area -a special thanks to their team.

Courtesy of SKAI Data Services.

Stay Informed

We continually monitor global airspace for changes to risk and security at safeairspace.net. There, you can find up-to-date state-issued warnings for areas bordering Russian and Ukrainian FIRs. You can also reach the team directly via blog@ops.group.

We’ve had a few reports from OPSGROUP members lately about issues with how international aircraft trash is handled when arriving in the US.

In one case at KMIA/Miami, a handler said that CBP asked them to track the tail numbers of any aircraft that disposed of trash after leaving the customs ramp. If this happens, CBP may issue fines—and if handlers don’t report it, they could be held responsible instead.

While there’s no sign of any new rules, it’s a good reminder of how strict the existing requirements are and how expensive it can get if you don’t comply.

So, what exactly counts as regulated garbage, and how should it be handled?

What Counts as “Regulated Garbage”

Certain waste can carry animal diseases or pests into the US. The USDA and APHIS require this type of trash to be handled under strict rules (CFR Title 7 330.400 – 402, and CFR Title 9 94.5.).

Regulated garbage includes:

• Any food waste, fruits, vegetables, meats, or other plant/animal products.
• Anything that has touched those items—like packaging, napkins, or utensils.

Time limits matter:

• From any foreign country in the past 2 years.
• From Hawaii or US territories in the past 12 months.

You’ll need to pass this trash to a USDA-approved service so they can dispose of it.

What Isn’t Regulated

• Trash from Canada-only flights.
• Clean items like magazines or unused paper towels.
• Sealed, unopened US-origin food that hasn’t been contaminated.
• Empty cans or bottles for recycling only if they’ve never touched food waste.

Important: If clean trash gets mixed with food waste, it becomes regulated. So bag international food waste separately and don’t let it mix with clean trash!

Common Questions

Q: I’m arriving from Hawaii or a US territory. Does this apply?
Yes. USDA/APHIS rules apply to trash arriving from outside the Continental US – be careful if arriving from Hawaii or other US territories abroad (Guam, Virgin Islands etc). You may have taken off from American soil, but the rules still apply.

Q: What about Alaska?
Alaska is considered part of the continental US for this purpose, and so trash from Alaska flights isn’t regulated.

Q: My catering came from a pre-clearance airport like EINN/Shannon. Am I exempt?
No. Pre-clearance doesn’t simply let you bypass the disposal rules. Some exceptions do exist but these require certificates/inspector actions and strict conditions. In practice, pre-clearance alone will not free you from regulated garbage rules. Apparently diseases and pests care not for our paperwork!

Enforcement: Why Miami Came Up

While USDA and APHIS make the rules, CBP enforces them at ports of entry.

Enforcement can vary by location, and some airports take a “treat all trash as regulated” approach to keep things simple.

If you want to keep unregulated trash separate, you’ll need:

• Clear, documented segregation.
• Advance notification to the customs inspector.
• Records of who you coordinated with (including badge numbers).

Otherwise, CBP can assume non-compliance and issue fines.

Safest bet: Treat all international trash as regulated and dispose of it at the customs ramp.

More Questions?

Get in touch with us on blog@ops.group. For USDA/APHIS garbage and quarantine inquiries, email ppq.fsis.mail@usda.gov or AskUSDA@usda.gov. You can also find contact details for CBP at your intended arrival airport here.