Recently, the FAA has been doing some spring cleaning. You might have missed them, but recent changes to the FAA’s advisory circulars and charting notices are quite important.

This article covers two of them:

• Effective June 2025, the FAA officially shifted the responsibility for evaluating and approving foreign instrument procedures to aircraft operators themselves.

• From October 2, instrument approach charts will be decluttered by removing unnecessary comms data.

Let’s take a look at each of these in more detail.

Removing approvals for specific foreign procedures

Recently, the FAA advised those operating under Part 91(K), 121, 125 and 135 of changes to foreign instrument procedure authorizations.

It has removed outdated references to specific foreign instrument procedures by title from operator authorizations (OpSpec C058, C358 and H107).

Others were simplified (C059, C060, and C384) to remove references to specific foreign airports and procedures.

The end result? Operators are no longer required to obtain FAA approval for specific foreign instrument procedures listed by name — but they must still hold the required FAA authorization (OpSpec, MSpec, or LOA) to conduct the type of procedure (e.g., RNP AR, CAT II/III), regardless of where it’s flown.

So, does this mean I can now fly any foreign procedure without FAA involvement?

Not quite. While you no longer need FAA approval for each individual foreign procedure, you still need FAA authorization for the procedure type and must comply with host country requirements.

For instance, if Germany requires local authorisation for an RNP (AR) approach into EDDM/Munich, you must obtain it without FAA involvement.

ICAO (Annex 6) says operators are still required to obtain approvals when the host state mandates it, and crews must comply with any local procedures or limitations.

Why the change?

Without delving too much into the specifics, there are a few reasons:

• Less paperwork – foreign procedural reviews are cumbersome and labor intensive, and lead to delays in approval.

• Less workload – inspectors no longer have to approve each foreign procedure individually.

• Improved design – there has been significant improvement in procedural design around the world thanks to the proliferation of ICAO PANS OPS.

• Empowerment – operators can perform their own risk assessments and use globally standardised instrument procedures without the extra weight of FAA approvals.

So the onus is now on the operator – what next?

That’s where AC 120-105B comes into play. It provides guidance for US operators on reviewing and accepting foreign instrument procedures outside the US.

This includes a list of your areas of responsibility, recommended tools and checklists to help with your review, and advice on incorporating a review process into your company’s manuals, SOPs and pilot training.

If you operate abroad, it’s important you’re familiar with this revised AC. We’ve also put together the following checklist based on its advice to help get you started:

Click to download PDF.

De-cluttering Approach Charts

On July 3, the FAA issued a new charting notice (advance notification of significant changes to charts and publications).

The news is that from October 2, the FAA will begin removing redundant comms data from instrument approach charts. This includes departure ATIS, CLNC DEL and the availability of CPDLC if all of this is shown on the corresponding airport diagram.

Listing it again on instrument approach charts is unnecessary and can reduce readability during critical phases of flight while critical frequencies remain prominent (don’t worry, tower and ground ain’t going anywhere).

While we have you, a couple more FAA-related tidbits to brush off the table.

• Notams. Big changes are coming to the US system. By September, it will be completely overhauled. The new system will be a fast, cloud-based, and (hopefully) rock-solid stable. A renewed focus on improved safety throughout the US NAS has escalated the project, and the targets are ambitious – user testing is expected to start later this month.

• FAA-license holders abroad. This is our last reminder! July 7 has come and gone, which means anyone holding US licences/ratings and living outside of the US must have provided a US based address for service to the FAA via the USAS portal. If you haven’t yet, your license is effectively now invalid until you do – whatever you do, don’t operate an aircraft while un-licensed.

Have we missed a spot?

Please get in touch with us around the clock via blog@ops.group

The risk of lithium-ion battery fires on aircraft is on the rise, with vapes, power banks, and laptops identified as the main culprits.

The FAA has reported a sharp rise in incidents, with some sources noting two thermal runaway events per week. EASA also raised concerns, issuing a new Safety Bulletin on May 27.

While rules are strict for Parts 121 and 135, private flights under Part 91 face fewer restrictions. Arguably, private jets are more at risk, and we’re doing less to protect ourselves.

• Business jets are smaller. A lithium-ion battery fire can quickly fill the cabin with thick, toxic smoke – up to 10 cubic meters from a single laptop battery in just two minutes. History has shown that smoke inhalation often causes the loss of an aircraft in a fire before the fire itself.
• Fewer crew members.With only one or two pilots and often no cabin crew, response capability is limited.
• The passengers we carry. Biz jet passengers often carry multiple personal electronic devices which increases fire risk. Some passengers may disregard or not correctly follow safety rules.
• Less safety equipment.Compared to airliners, biz jets typically have fewer fire suppression tools and less protective gear on board.

Lithium battery fire smoke contains an unbreathable mix of chemicals including corrosive irritants like phosphorous oxide and hydrogen fluoride.

It seems clear that for the few rules that exist for Part 91 operations, we must be aware of them, and stick to them. And it may come as a surprise to some operators that these rules are more strict when you fly internationally – even privately.

So here’s a rundown of what you need to know.

A word about lithium-ion batteries

If you’re already familiar with a Wh rating, feel free to skip to the next section. But to understand the rules properly, it helps if you’re familiar with it first.

Watt on earth is a watt-hour (Wh)?

When we talk about how dangerous a lithium-ion battery could potentially be, we talk watt-hours. It is a measure of how much energy a battery can store and use. Think of it like the amount of fuel in a tank – it simply tells us how much power (watts) it produces over time (hours).

It also directly proportional to fire risk. If something goes wrong, all that energy can be released as heat and gas. The more in the tank, the bigger the fire.

The higher the Wh, the hotter the flames, the thicker the smoke, and critically – the harder it is to put out.

Check the battery label for its Wh rating.

Righto, onto the rules for US Part 91.

Part 91

For domestic flying in the US under Part 91, the rules for lithium-ion batteries are pretty simple.

If the batteries are being carried for personal use, Part 91 operators are (almost) entirely exempt from the US D.O.T. HAZMAT regulations that apply to commercial flights. But it’s not a free-for-all.

The PIC is still prohibited by law from carrying hazardous items onboard an aircraft in a way that might endanger people or things. This includes knowingly carrying defective batteries or packing them in a way that is dangerous or irresponsible.

Baseline safety guidelines still apply, including FAA Advisory Circulars (AC 91-78, AC 120-76D) -along with relevant Safety Alerts for Operators (SAFOs). Deviation from these can expose the operator/PIC to legal liability in the case that something bad happens.

Here’s a summary of those:

Installed batteries (in devices):

Carry these without restriction if they’re properly secured within the equipment, show no visible damage (like swelling or leakage) and are turned off.

Spare batteries:

These must be carry-on.

•  Little ones (100Wh or less): There’s no limit on the number carried, but each one should be protected from short-circuits (case, sleeve, taped terminals or original packaging).
• Bigger ones (101 – 160Wh): FAA guidelines say no more than two per person. These must be individually protected using the same precautions above.
• Biggest ones (161Wh+): Not allowed without full HAZMAT compliance and operator approval. Requires UN spec packaging, shipping papers, training etc. BE CAREFUL – some higher end power banks exceed this limit.

Power banks are treated as spare batteries – this unit is equipped with a battery that exceeds 290Wh.

International operators beware!

Here’s where things get a little tricky.

Once you leave the US, some authorities no longer recognize the distinction between Part 91 (private) and other commercial flights.

Foreign authorities may enforce local rules for the batteries you carry – regardless of your Part 91 status. These are usually based upon IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations. Reportedly, this includes China, Thailand, Korea, India and the UAE.

In other words, what was acceptable in the US may not be once you’re abroad.

Foreign handlers may refuse to load spare batteries that don’t comply with IATA standards, while customs and ramp safety officers may demand battery specs and proper packaging – especially for devices like power banks, drones, camera gear and e-bikes. Devices may be confiscated if they do not comply with local guidelines.

The best solution? Just comply with IATA standards from the outset.

Where do I find these regs?

If you want to get technical – they’re defined in ICAO Doc 9284 (ICAO Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air), and further refined under the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations.

These include packing instructions, required documents, limits of watt hour ratings, the quantity of batteries, labelling and distinctions between passenger and cargo aircraft.

Three million pages of DG-related dread building? Worry not. We’ve put together a quick checklist of requirements/suggestions for Part 91 operators to help them stay out of trouble when carrying batteries outside of the US:

Click to download PDF.

Fire containment

You might already have fire containment bags onboard, but there are other types of containment devices worth considering.

Some of the newer hard-sided designs offer features like hands-free collection, blast protection for the user, and the ability to inject water to help interrupt thermal runaway. Check out this one!

These boxes aim to reduce the risk to crew during an incident and address some limitations of soft bags, which can be difficult to use safely without two people – a challenge on smaller aircraft operating under Part 91 or 135. With recent incidents showing how violent lithium battery fires can be, having an effective containment method onboard is increasingly important.

Don’t forget to report

For Part 91 private flights, the US FAA requires operators to report any case of battery fire, smoke, overheating or thermal runaway aboard an aircraft within 72 hours. The form for this is DOT 5800.1.

ICAO may also require a report if the event qualifies as a serious incident or accident. You are not required to report directly to IATA – it’s only voluntary.

June 10 update – look out for imminent medical renewals!

If you’re due for a medical soon, you might already need a US address in the USAS portal. Although the official FAA deadline to add a US agent for service is July 7, an OPSGROUP member recently discovered that MedXpress would not let him complete the pre-exam form without it. Since MedXpress and the USAS portal now talk to each other, the system checks for that US address before allowing you to proceed. Without it, you will not get the confirmation number needed for your medical.

Key Points

• The FAA has published a new rule that will require certificate holders abroad to nominate a physical US address for service.
• This is required from April 2 for any new applications; and July 7 for anyone who already holds FAA certificates, ratings or authorizations.
• Anyone who ignores the new rule will be unable to exercise the privileges of their documents.

What’s Changing?

115,000 (give or take) FAA certificate holders currently live outside of the US.

Back in Oct 2024, the FAA issued a new rule requiring anyone with no US physical address on file to nominate a US Agent For Service.

This agent will be responsible for receiving all documents from the FAA on the certificate holder’s behalf – including legal and safety-critical stuff.

It’s already been postponed once, but there are now two deadlines for individuals with a foreign address and no physical US one on file:

• April 2 for new applications.
• July 7 for existing certificate holders.

The FAA is having problems serving documents to the large number of FAA certificate holders living abroad.

By using US-based agents, this process will be a lot faster and easier. Especially in the case of larger overseas-based flight departments.

Who will this apply too?

Anyone with a foreign address (and no US address on file) who holds or applies for FAA certificates, ratings or authorizations under the following parts of 14 CFR  – 47, 61, 63, 65, 67, 107.

Who can be a ‘US Agent For Service’?

It’s not as complicated as it sounds.

The new rule (CFR 14 3.302) says this can be any entity or adult (18yo+) with a US-based postal address.

One big gotcha though: this must be a physical address – PO boxes and mail drops are no-good.

It’s important you nominate someone you trust. They will be responsible for promptly forwarding you any FAA documents and must fully understand the importance of this task.

You’ll also need to provide the FAA with their full name, phone number and a working email address.

If there isn’t already someone in the US you know and trust, it may be worth engaging a professional service to be your agent instead.

What if I just ignore this rule?

Don’t! If a certificate holder fails to designate a US postal address or Agent of Service by the above dates, you will no longer be able to exercise the privileges of that document. You will effectively become unlicensed.

Another big scary rule – the FAA Enforcement and Compliance Order 2150.3 – says other enforcement actions can be taken including fines and jail time.

How will I designate my agent of service?

Via a new portal called the US Agent for Service System (USAS).

This will allow you to nominate your agent and provide all required contact details via the online prompts.

Don’t forget you will also need to keep the system updated with any changes.

I live in the US, does this affect me?

Long story short, no. As long as the FAA has your physical address on file you’re good to go!

Key Points

• If you’re flying out of the New York area, expect delays. ATC staffing and tech issues, along with heavy traffic, are causing slowdowns.
• But there are three lesser-known routing options (SERMN, Deep Water, TEC) that can get you airborne faster – if you’re willing to fly lower, carry extra fuel, and meet a few added requirements.

In the middle of last year, the FAA transferred control of Newark’s airspace from New York TRACON (N90) to Philadelphia TRACON’s Area C due to a shortage of staff.

And it hasn’t been smooth sailing. Philly itself is understaffed, and has reported several failures recently with data sent from New York via aging copper lines affecting both radar and communication equipment.

Recent murmurings from OPSGROUP members indicate EDCT delays are rife – even at outlier airports. We’re talking hours here, not minutes.

And in the short term at least, it looks like things will get worse before they get better.

The Memorial Day Weekend set records for US air travel, and the Summer peak is nearly upon us.

A couple of weeks back some clever folk from the NBAA, FAA and the Teterboro Users Group (TUG) got together to talk about the recent disruptions in the Northeast and what to do about it. You can view a replay of their excellent session here.

Some of the juiciest intel was the use of not-so-secret ATC routes to significantly reduce departure delays and get you clear of New York’s airspace post-haste.

In fact, three less conventional route options were discussed to help you escape the Big Apple.

A Quick Word on Fuel

A recurring theme here is ‘operational flexibility.’ None of these options will save you fuel, only time.

To use these routes, you will need to carry more. In some cases enough to operate at low level (less than 10,000’) for up to 100nm. But letting ATC know you are willing and capable of flying them may well see you jump an extremely long queue for conventional routes.

Escape Plan #1: SERMN Routes

When weather gets in the way of things, the FAA has a literal playbook of strategic options to help manage high volumes of traffic. You can find it here.

Within this playbook, is something called SERMN Routes. SERMN stands for SWAP Escape Routes – Metro New York. SWAP stands for severe weather avoidance plan. With me so far?

They comprise a low-level game plan to help ATC manage traffic out of the NY Metro area when the regular routes are not available due to nasty build-ups.

When this happens, ATC has three plays available (depending on the direction you’re headed):

🏈 SERMN North (BUF, ROC, SYR, YYZ etc). Example routing ex KTEB: COATE → LAAYK → STUBN →BENEE → BUF→ KROC. Jets capped at 10,000′ until exiting NY  Center’s airspace.

🏈  SERMN South (DCA, CLT, ATL etc). Example routing ex KTEB: ELVAE → COL → DIXIE → T303 → LEEAH → T315→ TAPPA→ THHMP→ CAVLR6→ KIAD Jets capped at 8,000′.

🏈  SERMN East – (BOS, North Eastern Corridor). Example routing ex KTEB: BREZY → V39 → CMK → V3 → WOONS → KBOS. Jets capped at 9,000.’

Their aim is to get you under weather and away from traffic.

Click for the SERMN routes in the FAA’s National Severe Weather Playbook.

But here’s the kicker (football pun intended). You don’t necessarily need bad weather to fly em.’ If hit with a departure delay, communicate with Clearance Delivery that you’re fuelled and willing to accept a SERMN route. Or any of the other routes below (TEC and Deep Water) for that matter.

If you can get it, it may be good option to beat the crowds.

Hey, what about SERMN West?

It doesn’t actually exist, for a few reasons. Predominantly because western departures from the NY Metro area are heavily managed by other established routes such as J80 and J6.

Westbound traffic is also not as typically constrained by adjacent airspace as those aircraft headed in the other directions – and in any case there are other plays in the play book available for westbound traffic, they just don’t carry the title SERMN.

Escape Plan #2: Deep Water Routes

Another option to consider are Deep Water routes which run north and south off the coast between the Northeast and Florida.

If you have the right gear on board, don’t be afraid to get your feet wet.

The FAA advises they can be useful routes out of the area by getting you out of the way of traffic and restricted airspace along the coast.

But before you dive on in, it’s important you are familiar with the requirements of these routes to fly them.

For instance, in NY Oceanic airspace if you are not RNP 4 or 10 capable you need to let ATC know so that they can apply additional separation. If you do have RNP 4/10, you need to comply with those requirements which includes holding the appropriate Opspec/LOA and having the right equipment on board (such as two independent long range navigation systems).

And don’t forget your survival gear either – which can include lift vests, a raft, survival kits, an ELT and pyrotechnic signalling devices depending on what part of the law you’re operating under. You can find these under FARs 91.509, 135.167 and 121.339.

It’s also important you’re thoroughly familiar with the contingency procedures for oceanic airspace including what to do in the event of a navigation failure (especially loss of RNP capability).

Click for PDF.

Escape Plan #3: TEC Routes

If you’re not headed far from New York, consider the use of FAA TEC Routes (Tower Enroute Control).

These are low-altitude IFR routings (typically 5000 –  17,000’) used for short-distance flights (usually less than 500nm) and often link nearby metropolitan centres.

The idea behind them is to keep aircraft within TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach Control) without the need to hand them off to enroute centers. They are by design, simple and efficient.

These routes reduce controller workload, and keep you away from busier airways. They are typically used by turbo-prop aircraft, so let delivery know you have the fuel to fly them as they may not be immediately considered for jets.

You can find the NE TEC routes in the FAA Chart Supplement here.

Finally, stay clued in.

You can avoid delays by predicting when and where they are most likely. The FAA provides a head’s up via three useful sources – fly.faa.gov, nasstatus.faa.gov and X (formerly Twitter). This includes daily briefings on incoming weather, disruptions and the plans in place to mitigate against them.

There is a recent history in the US of serious incidents that have occurred during visual approaches – you don’t have to hunt long to find them. The reality is this: when we accept a visual approach, we accept more risk.

That isn’t to say that this risk cannot be effectively and safely managed. Visual approaches are still an important way to increase the efficiency of congested airspace. But we do have to give ourselves the room, the capacity, and the mitigations to fly them safely. And in my opinion, that’s where the true risk lies.

The FAA seems to agree. On April 2, it issued an eye-opening Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) regarding visual approaches. The lowdown is this: visual approaches can be riskier than they seem, especially in today’s busy airspace. Let’s take a closer look.

FAA SAFO on  Visual Approaches

The FAA’s SAFO is resolute in its message – the pilot-in-command has the ultimate responsibility (by law) to say no to clearances that excessively increase workload or erode safety margins. In other words, they don’t want us to hesitate to say ‘UNABLE’. Ultimately, it’s our decision as pilots, and no one else’s.

FAA Reg 14 CFR § 91.3 specifically says:

“…The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.”

This includes the full authority to refuse or decline any clearance or instruction that they deem unsafe or beyond the operational limits of the aircraft or crew. The SAFO then continues with another important message – ATC will support a PIC’s authority to declare ‘unable’ when a clearance may reduce safety margins.

This is where the SAFO falls short a little, at least on a real-world basis. What needs to be included is ‘with impunity.’

Recent Events

In a US NAS burdened by traffic volume, aging infrastructure and controller shortages we continue to hear reports of excessive delays and even confrontation when a clearance is declined.

Check out the recent diversion of a Lufthansa A350 at KSFO/San Francisco due to non-acceptance of visual separation at night.

Courtesy of VASAviation.

There appears to be a growing disconnect here between what the FAA wants in its SAFO, and what’s actually happening in the real world.

It’s seems clear that more needs to change amongst all stakeholders before we can begin to consistently practice ‘safety over sequence’ while accommodating all traffic.

FAA Mitigations

The FAA’s recent SAFO also provides some guidance for pilots on how to mitigate some of the risks of accepting visual approaches. We’ve summarized those in the following little Opsicle.

Click to download PDF.

A note about Business Aviation

In researching this article, several suggestions were also raised about the human factors involved with why pilots find it so hard to say no to challenging clearances. Attend any Human Factors course and you’ll be familiar with the common culprits – saying ‘unable’ can feel like a form of noncompliance, the need to be perceived as competent, an innate desire to ‘make it work’, or the struggle of time compression.

What’s more interesting to us on this occasion is the vulnerability (when compared to airline ops) of business aviation crew to accept challenging clearances despite the increased risk. In other words, are there unique factors? BizAv pilots are faced with a unique combination of industry culture, operational demands and perception of role.

Under Pressure:

BizAv pilots usually find no solace in the anonymity of a flight deck door, a staff number, or a large airline. They have direct contact with those who employ them (sometimes even in the cockpit). Whether we like it or not, this can have an insidious effect on our tolerance for risk. Saying ‘unable’ can feel like failing to deliver.

Professional Flexibility:

Travel by private jet can typically cost anywhere between ten to forty times more than flying commercial. Those who pay may have a certain expectation that we can land anywhere, anytime and circumvent the constraints of conventional airline travel.

No One’s Watching:

Unlike the airlines, there is no requirement for business jets operated under Part 91 to be equipped with Flight Data Recorders or even CVRs, or even under Part 135 (with less than ten seats). And it is hard to deny (even with the best intentions) that this doesn’t have some kind of impact in moments of unexpectedly high workload. Strict adherence to stabilized approach criteria for instance can become more flexible without fear of reprisal.

Safety Management Under Part 91:

The FAA SAFO also specifically mentions the use of safety management systems (SMS) to better mitigate the risks of conducting visual approaches. However a looming mandate will only apply to Part 135 operations – not Part 91, where they will remain voluntary. It’s therefore possible that some BizAv pilots will not be exposed sufficiently to the FAA’s advice.

Want to join the discussion?

We’d love to hear from you. You can reach us at: news@ops.group.

The summer peak is nearly upon us, and so too is the busiest season for BizAv at LFPB/Le Bourget.

Several upcoming events will see an influx of traffic to the airport including the French Open (May 19 – June 8), the Paris Air Show (June 16 – 22) and Paris Fashion Week (June 24 – 29).

While this isn’t a new change, if you’re heading into LFPB it’s a good time to remind yourself of the strict rules for APU usage lest you fall victim to some potentially large fines.

They’re not mucking around either – two groups are involved. The Air Transport Gendarmerie is responsible for monitoring APU usage at the airport and making sure operators follow the rules. If not, a group known (in English) as the Airport Nuisance Authority (ACNUSA) will get involved and issue fines.

In a recent year, ACNUSA imposed 334 fines for non-APU compliance across French airports. Their haul? €6.9 million – that’s an average of more than €20,000 per fine. This has been confirmed as accurate and current by a local handler. Both the operator and PIC can be held liable.

The French AIP (LFPB AD 2.21) has the full rules – but here’s what you need to know…

Know the time limits

Since 2023, the rules at Le Bourget have depended on whether your parking stands have ground facilities or not:

Departing Flights – APU use limited to 10 minutes prior to the EOBT if your stand is equipped with ground air and power, or 45 minutes on stands without these services.

Arriving Flights – APU use limited to 5 minutes after arrival if your stand is equipped with ground air and power, or 20 minutes on stands without these services.

There are limited exemptions to the rules, these include:

• Humanitarian and medical flights.
• Military aircraft.
• Aircraft carrying live animals, perishables, medical or cosmetic goods that require active air flow.
• The sake of flight safety (which specifically includes passenger, crew or handler health). For departing aircraft it’s worth noting it can take up to 30 mins to cool the cabin of a larger jet (such as a G650, or Falcon 8X) to comfortable temp when the ambient temp outside is more than 30 deg C (86 deg F).

You can enact limited exemptions for APU use, but make you have a solid case for it.

For BizAv flights, determining whether or not the FBO is “equipped with ground air and power” is a slightly tricky business. One FBO reported the following:

We have some mobile GPUs, but not for every space. That creates two interpretations:

The first one: if we have a mobile GPU available, so it is 5 minutes on arrival and 10 minutes on departure; and if we don’t have it available, it is 20 minutes on arrival and 45 minutes on departure.

The second one: they consider that as we are not able to provide one GPU to each aircraft, we are in the 20 minutes on arrival and 45 minutes on departure category by default.

But as the second way is not an “official” one, it is only a tolerance, that’s why you might get different replies from the different FBOs about how the rules work here.

I need an exemption

This is at the PIC’s discretion, but you need to be able to justify it using one of the conditions above.

To do so, you’ll need to provide your agent with a declaration for the Gendarmerie that you intend to break the APU rules, and most importantly why.

Feedback from local agents

Here’s what handlers at Le Bourget had to say when we reached out to them directly.

• “…the airport authorities are very strict with the use of APU’s here. The authorities may fine you for failure to comply – we are able to provide a GPU at the request of the crew…”
• “…there are some unexpected and random inspections by the authorities, after which they write a report and impose a fine…”
• “…the use of the APUs is randomly controlled by the Gendarmerie here in LFPB. The maximum amount of the fine for APU infractions is 20,000€…”
• “…the Captain may only deviate from APU rules for safety reasons. Violation is heavily penalized by the ACNUSA agency, with fines generally exceeding €10,000!…”

Why the fuss anyway?

Two things – noise and pollution.

APU’s are noisy things – a typical one produces 113 decibels, an equivalent noise range to a power saw, jackhammer or even a rock concert. Le Bourget is noise sensitive and located in close proximity to residential areas.

Then there’s the dinosaurs we’re burning – carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides and other nasties are ejected from our APU exhaust. Reducing runtime helps lower emissions and improves air quality near the field. In fact, here is a surprising statistic – approx. 30% of an airport’s carbon emissions come from aircraft on the ground (with APU use being a significant factor).

This is all in line with global and EU climate goals (such as Fit for 55 or the Paris Agreement). Agree or not, we have to play by the rules – or find ourselves paying a hefty price.

Have a report to share?

Have you been stung or know someone who has? Please share your story with us (as always, our reports are always de-identified). There are several thousand crew out there who will owe you a beer. You can reach us around the clock on news@ops.group.

Key Points

• Hotspot focus: The FAA is targeting KDCA, KLAS, LA area, and Gulf Coast airports due to helicopter/fixed-wing traffic risks.

• Immediate changes: KDCA closed one heli route; KLAS saw 30% drop in proximity events after ATC changes.

• More to come: The FAA is using AI and forming new rules; safety report due by Sept 2025.

April 22 was an important day for the safety of aircraft operating at major airports across the US.

The FAA held a Safety Roundtable to discuss how to best manage risks associated with intensive helicopter operations near fixed wing traffic in busy, controlled airspace.

This follows the tragic mid-air collision of a Black Hawk helicopter and CRJ700 airliner at KDCA/Washington on January 29.

The Table featured a collective of FAA leadership, ATC representatives, helicopter operators and industry safety experts.

Their purpose was to identify the specific hazards of mixed helicopter and fixed-wing operations – especially in congested airspace – and how to better protect us from them.

While the FAA has yet to release a comprehensive public report, they have been providing updates and preliminary findings via their online newsroom.

Here’s what’s being discussed.

The Targets

The Round Table’s approach to the dangers of mixed traffic identified three core issues:

• Airspace – better strategies to segregate helicopter and fixed wing traffic are sorely needed, especially at congested and controlled airports.
• Communication – communication protocols between pilots and ATC needs to be improved.
• AI – using AI technology to learn from existing data (such as incident and accident reports) and identify patterns of risk. It then becomes easier to effectively mitigate these dangers quickly, and with limited resources.

Hot Spots

The Group went on to identify the US airports of primary concern…

Washington

The swiftest action took place at KDCA/Washington itself in the aftermath of the Potomac disaster. The airport is situated in close proximity to the locally known helicopter alley – an area of dense rotorcraft traffic used by essential services such as the military, law enforcement and medevac.

In response to the accident, the FAA closed the low-level helicopter route in use at the time and has restricted non-essential helicopter ops. Only those engaged in ‘special missions’ will be allowed. ADS-B Out has also been mandated for all but the most secure of flights.

The FAA has permanently closed helicopter Route 4 since the accident in January.

Las Vegas

The Safety Round Table identified KLAS/Las Vegas next as perhaps the airport of highest safety concern for mixed traffic, where air tours are frequent.

Concern was raised by the group that helicopter routes used in agreements with local operators lacked effective guidance on vertical and lateral boundaries. And in many cases, tower controllers were not issuing traffic advisories to arriving and departing fixed wing traffic.

In what seems to be a case of procedural ‘slip’, normalization of deviance or even perhaps complacency the FAA has reported routine lack of compliance with Class B separation rules.

Either way, it is a potentially dangerous mix.

Immediate changes have been put in place – essentially more proactive separation by ATC and better traffic info for pilots. We’re pleased to report that according to the FAA, these efforts reduced ‘proximity events’ by 30% in just three weeks – circumstances that FAA believe might elevate collision risk (even if legal separation has been applied).

Other changes are coming in Las Vegas, but these have yet to be announced.

The FAA has identified KLAS/Las Vegas as being at high risk from mixed traffic.

Los Angeles

LA’s airports are another area of concern – KBUR/Burbank and KVNY/Van Nuys were specifically mentioned. Here airspace is complex, and hosts substantial helicopter ops including news, medical and air tours close to commercial flight paths.

The FAA is actively looking at operations near these airports but as yet, there are no major changes to report.

The Gulf Coast

The FAA has begun looking at busy airports along the US Gulf Coast which include offshore helicopter operations.

It is not going to be an easy fix, but they advise that AI technology mentioned above will be put to good use to figure out where the greatest risks lie and what can be done about them in the near future.

The FAA has identified Gulf Coast airports as another hot spot for fixed and rotary wing mixed traffic.

Better Rules

In response to these dangers among others, the FAA has also launched another safety initiative – they’ve formed a rule making committee to improve the safety of commercial helicopter tours.

Some elements of this group’s focus will have an important impact on the safety of mixed traffic operations – including potential changes to regulations.

There will also be a renewed focus flight data to ensure helicopters do not stray from established operating areas and other measures to better separate them from fixed wing traffic in busy airspace (including further ADS mandates).

A report of their safety recommendations is due by 22 September 2025.

Have Something to Add?

Please get in touch with us! You can reach the team via news@ops.group

Key Points

• Effective April 10, all US, Canadian and Australian citizens entering Brazil now need a valid visa.
• The visa waiver which has been in place since 2019 is no more.
• April’s news may come as a surprise to passengers who might not be aware of the new requirement – and there is no option to obtain one on arrival.
• Operating crew are exempt (with some gotchas).

Why the change?

 Back in 2019, visa requirements were dropped for the US, Canada and Australia. The previous President did so to boost tourism and trade.

However, it was a one-way move as Brazilian citizens still needed a visa to enter those countries.

Brazil has long since had a diplomatic policy of reciprocity. The new visa rules signify a return to this principle.

For operators, it’s simply a new rule we need to navigate.

New visa requirements may catch passengers off guard – especially for tourist attractions like Carnival.

How to get a visa.

 Citizens of the US, Canada and Australia now need to apply for an electronic visa to enter Brazil.

It’s strongly recommended to do this at least 15 days’ prior as it can take some time to process.

Once issued, it will be valid for multiple entries for the next ten years.

Make sure your pax carry at least two printed copies for authorities.

Be careful, because they can’t get one on arrival.

You can access the e-visa system via the link above.

What about crew?

 Great question. We reached out to several local agents for a clarification on the rules for crew.

 While some advice was conflicting, the general consensus was that operating crew are exempt from the visa requirement and usually granted entry for up to ten days (regardless of nationality).

Universal Aviation Brazil has confirmed that to qualify, they must meet the following conditions:

• Are on active duty;
• Are listed as operating crew on the GENDEC;
• Are in uniform on arrival;
• Present a pilots’ license;
• And (obviously) have a valid passport.

Some trouble has been reported for flight engineers and flight attendants who are not explicitly covered by this exemption policy (even if they are listed on the GENDEC).

In some cases, they have been allowed entry but this is not guaranteed.

To avoid trouble, we recommend that a visa is obtained for these staff beforehand to avoid the problem entirely – cost is approx. $80USD per person.

Another chestnut to look out for is crew who are positioning to Brazil either with you, or on an airline service. They will need a visa to enter.

Engineers are one example of crew who may not be covered by the crew exemption – we advise a visa in advance.

Have you just been to Brazil?

 If things were different than we’ve described, we’d love to hear from you. You can reach us around the clock on news@ops.group.

Special thanks to the team at Universal Brazil for their help clarifying the new rules!

April 10 marks an important date for operations in South Africa — it was the original deadline for the expiry of extensions granted to a large number of instrument procedures in urgent need of re-validation.

Then just yesterday, news broke that the South African Aviation Authority (SACAA) has re-approved procedures at major airports FACT/Cape Town, FAOR/Johannesburg, FALE/Durban and FAPE/Port Elizabeth.

Others weren’t so lucky – IFR procedures at FABL/Bloemfontein, FARB/Richards Bay and FAUP/Upington will remain restricted until further notice.

The issue appears to be both a safety concern and a politically sensitive matter — the country currently faces what is being described as a looming ‘air navigation crisis.’

The Transport Minister is under growing pressure to provide answers, a process that has already led to the suspension of the CEO of Air Traffic and Navigation Services (ATNS). It’s clear that all is not well within the ranks.

The CEO of ATNS has been placed on precautionary suspension.

So what exactly is going on there, and why do these procedures need revalidation anyway?

Unapproachable Approaches

Three months ago an investigation was launched into why the revalidation of over three hundred instrument procedures had lapsed leading to delays, and unnecessary headaches for pilots and flight planners.

The primary cause was identified as a critical staffing shortage.

IFR procedures aren’t just set-and-forget. Dig into the ICAO SARPs (more specifically Docs 9906 and 8168) and you’ll see that instrument flight procedures should be periodically revalidated (usually every 3 – 5 years) to make sure they remain safe and operationally relevant.

They must remain adequately clear of obstacles for instance, especially when terrain or construction has changed since a procedure was designed.

They must also comply with updated ICAO PANS-OPS or local regulations and keep up with changes to navigational standards (such as PBN). Not to mention, the charts themselves must remain correct and accurate.

It is a skill in demand, and there are comparatively few aircraft and crew in South Africa certified for this work – so much so that accusations have emerged of ‘poaching’ of staff between competing service providers.

In the case of South Africa, procedures due for revalidation are being pushed back months, especially at smaller lower priority fields. The result is a major backlog of unvalidated procedures.

It just isn’t a simple process.

Revalidations are a complicated business requiring both desk-based assessments and flight validation by specially calibrated check aircraft.

IFR procedural design is a complicated business.

Aside from shooting an approach for instance, a full procedural design check is required by qualified designers which includes an analysis of updated obstacle and terrain data along with a cross check against changes in airspace structure and traffic flows.

‘Accelerated’ efforts are now underway to urgently recruit and train a bunch more of them, but this takes time.

Who is liable to pay for it?

While costs are circumstantial to the complexity of each procedure, it is not unreasonable to see bills for revalidations (including design, consultation and flight testing) to exceed $40,000 USD each.

In the case of smaller or regional airports this can fall on airport authorities or operators. At larger airports it is hard to know which entity is responsible for footing the bill.

A lack of consensus leads to delays, and the withdrawal of procedures.

What is the operational impact?

In a nutshell, pilots can show up expecting IFR access only to find that procedures are ‘not available until further notice.’

ATC can’t (and won’t) clear you for an IFR procedure that isn’t validated – even if it’s charted and in your nav database.

Ultimately, the onus will continue to fall upon operators to search for IFR alternates to keep their flight plan legal.

And if you’re unfamiliar with flight planning in South Africa, this can be a challenge. South Africa’s Daily Airspace Plan can provide some guidance on airports where procedures have been suspended – but it is important to consider the Notams carefully.

Look out at smaller airports.

It seems clear that there is no immediate fix to South Africa’s Air Navigation crisis.

News this week is consistent with plans to prioritise procedures at larger airports first – which will continue to be to the detriment of smaller ones. Therefore operators to South Africa’s regional airports will likely be grappling with this issue for some time yet.

Work continues between ATNS, SACAA and the Department of Transport on how best to future-proof the currency of South Africa’s IFR infrastructure. But at time of writing, a conclusive answer has yet to emerge.

Key Points

• FAA Enhances Aircraft Privacy: The FAA now allows private aircraft owners to request the removal of personal details from public FAA websites, enhancing privacy.
• US Address Required Abroad: FAA certificate holders abroad must nominate a physical US address by April 2 (for new applicants) or July 7 (for existing holders) to retain their privileges, with professional services available for those without a US address.
• REAL ID Deadline Looms: From May 7, all adult passengers on US commercial flights (including Part 135 charters) must present a REAL ID-compliant ID or other accepted identification, with private Part 91 flights exempt.
• Notam System Fails Again: The US Notam system suffered another outage on March 22, raising concerns about its reliability.
• FAA Tightens KDCA Helicopter Rules: After the Jan 29 mid-air collision, the FAA has closed a KDCA helicopter route, restricted non-essential ops, mandated ADS-B Out, and launched a broader safety review.
• KDCA Drone Tests Trigger Alerts: On March 1, military counter-drone testing near KDCA triggered erroneous TCAS alerts, raising concerns over improper testing and its impact on civil aviation.

In Cognito

On March 28, the FAA began accepting requests from private aircraft owners to withhold personal details (such as name and address) from public access across all FAA websites.

It’s good news for business aviation, as it potentially makes it more difficult for members of the public to track the movement of privately owned aircraft for nefarious purposes.

Aircraft owners can now submit their request via the Civil Aviation Registry (CARES) here.

Address for Service

Attention all FAA License holders abroad – this one’s for you!

The FAA has written a new rule that will require certificate holders abroad to nominate a physical US address for service. We’ve written about it in detail here, but there are essentially two looming deadlines to be aware of:

April 2 for new applications, and July 7 for anyone who already holds FAA certificates, ratings or authorizations. You’ll need to submit this via the USAS website that is about to go live.

Whatever you do – don’t ignore this. If you don’t nominate a US based address by the applicable date, you won’t be able to exercise the privileges of your document. i.e. say sayonara to your license until you submit the right info.

If you don’t have an address to nominate in the US, don’t despair. You can use a professional service like FAA Mail Agent. These guys can take care of all it for less than 50 bucks a year. Use the code ‘Opsgroup’ and get a discount.

Passenger ID Requirements

From May 7, all adult passengers (18+) using commercial air transport within the US (including Part 135 charters) must show an ID that complies with the new Real ID Act.

The big change is that anyone who wants to use a state-issued ID or drivers licence to meet this requirement must make sure that it is REAL ID compliant –  look for one of the following symbols:

There is also a list of other IDs (such as US and Foreign Passports) that continue to be acceptable.

Operators need to take note because if they allow a passenger to board an aircraft without the appropriate ID they are effectively breaching TSA requirements and become liable for hefty penalties

Important note – private flights operated under Part 91 are exempt.

The Notam system went kaput (again).

The US Notam system was down (again) for several hours on March 22 due to a hardware failure. It was the second time since early February.

The cause of the latest outage was a hardware failure.

Once again we collectively flinched – a system crash in January 2023 lead to the first US ground stop since 2001, disrupting over 10,000 flights.

Questions are being asked about the reliability of the system, and its lack of redundancy.

The FAA previously announced plans to discontinue the legacy US Notam system by mid-2025, with further changes slated for the next five years.

There appears now renewed public and political concern for a faster resolution.

Mixed Traffic and The Potomac Tragedy

The FAA has responded to several recommendations made by the NTSB in its preliminary report from the mid-air collision over the Potomac River on January 29.

The immediate changes will be felt at KDCA/Washington itself. The FAA has permanently closed the low level helicopter route involved in the accident. Non-essential helicopter ops will also be banned, with increased ATC separation applied to those on ‘urgent missions.’

ADS-B out is now mandated for all helicopters, with only very limited exemptions for presidential missions.

Further afield, the FAA is also looking closely into ops at airports in other major cities with high volumes of mixed traffic (including NY, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Houston and LA) with corrective actions looming for any risks identified.

The FAA has announced it will permanently shutter the low level helicopter Route 4.

TCAS wasn’t spoofed in Washington.

On March 1, several aircraft on approach to KDCA/Washington responded to erroneous TCAS alerts, including RAs. While recent research has indicated malicious interference of TCAS is a credible security concern, a Senate hearing last week revealed this was not the case.

The culprit was counter-drone testing by the military nearby which was operating on a similar spectrum to TCAS – a separate concern previously raised by the FAA.

Nevertheless, there are concerns that these tests were conducted improperly and caused unnecessary alarm to civil aircraft nearby. At the very least it was an unfortunate coincidence given recent events at the airport.

Other things you might have missed.

•  TFR Busts –  The FAA has reported several instances of civil aircraft busting TFRs in recent weeks. The hot spot appears to be Palm Beach, FL where the President has a residence at Mar-a-Lago nearby. A reminder that special procedures apply, including TSA Gateway screening when active for anyone headed in or out of KPBI/Palm Beach. More on that in our recent article, here.
• Laser Strikes – New guidance was published by the FAA on March 26. Turns out the number of laser strikes on aircraft continue to be dangerously high. There’s an online tool to see where the worst spots are here. Remember to report em!
• Drones – DJI, the main recreational drone producer in the US, has removed its built-in geo-fencing feature that physically protects airports from incursions. Instead, an FAA database will simply warn the user when close to a no-fly zone. The issue is that this can now be maliciously ignored. DJI has said that its geo-fencing is about education, not enforcement. We’re not convinced – continue to report any illegal sightings to the FAA.

Anything we missed?

Let us know via news@ops.group, and we’ll add it to this article. As always the team is also available to help answer any questions, or put you in touch with the person who can.

On March 1, several aircraft reported erroneous TCAS TA and RA alerts while on approach to Runway 19 at KDCA/Washington. All aircraft correctly followed avoidance procedures, and no loss of separation occurred. Six of the incidents occurred within eleven minutes of each other.

⬆️ shared with permission, courtesy of VASAviation.

What has followed is speculation – who, or what, was responsible? It is an answer the FAA is actively seeking.

TCAS interference is rare but can occur. There are several plausible explanations including ground clutter and reflections, software issues and unintentional radio interference.

However, it would be hard to deny that these alerts came at a sensitive time both for operations at the airport following the mid-air collision over the Potomac River, and across a broader tapestry of concern for aviation safety across the US NAS given recent events.

Which begs an important question – can TCAS actually be tampered with? Is it possible these events were an act of criminal mischief or other mis-intent? While remote, a little-known alert issued just weeks ago by CISA  (the part of Homeland Security responsible for US cyber and infrastructure security) suggests it is indeed possible.

Published on January 21, CISA discussed two flaws in TCAS design that leave the system vulnerable to malicious cyber-attacks – one of which they deem a high, almost critical vulnerability.

In event that such an attack occurs, criminal interference could generate fake targets on an aircraft’s TCAS display and even disable resolution advisories.

The problem is that bulletin is quite technical. So here is a break-down of what it says in plain, simple language.

The Bulletin

There were essentially two risks identified for TCAS II Versions 7.1 or older.

1. Fake Position Signals

It is theoretically possible to broadcast a spoofed aircraft location to another target.

This could be achieved using specialised radio equipment where potential attackers could send fake signals to aircraft, causing the appearance of non-existent targets on TCAS displays, along with the associated warnings.

In other words, crews would effectively be chasing shadows.

As TCAS II systems rely on transponders that may not be able to adequately validate the data received, they remain vulnerable to unauthorised signals. The bulletin describes this risk as a reliance on ‘untrusted inputs’.

Read the report and you’ll see something called a ‘CVSS score.’

CVSS stands for Common Vulnerability Scoring System, and it is basically a danger rating for flaws in computer security. It is a measure of how serious a vulnerability is. Factors include the method of attack, the access required and the potential impact.

It is represented on a scale of 0 (non-existent) to 10 (critical).

The issue of fake position signals has been given a CVSS score of 6.1.

Perhaps more concerning is that the report advises there is no way to actively mitigate this threat with existing TCAS technology. The equipment required is accessible to the public. Therefore this threat is the most likely suspect of any erroneous TCAS interference occurring today.

2. No TCAS RA

This affects some older TCAS II systems using transponders with outdated technical standards.

It is theoretically possible for an attacker to impersonate a ground station and send a special request that lowers a system’s sensitivity settings. A TCAS sensitivity level command does exist, envisaged to reduce nuisance alerts at some airports.

This could be used to maliciously adjust sensitivities to the lowest setting and even disable a resolution advisory completely.

The threat has a concerning CVSS score of 8.1 – highly vulnerable to exploitation, but would require a high level of expertise and technology to carry out.

Fortunately, in this case there is a way to mitigate the problem – by switching to ACAS X, or upgrading your associated transponder to more recent technical standards.

There is no indication that this has vulnerability has ever been exploited.

While unlikely, the CISA bulletin proves that TCAS could be vulnerable to malicious interference.

So, could the aircraft at KDCA have been hacked?

It’s unlikely, but CISA’s report indicates it’s possible. And a new expert analysis of events at KDCA by Aireon seems to agree. In their published report they found that ‘it is possible the intruder was airborne or related to a ground-based transmitter used for testing or spoofing.’

Why does this matter?

The industry must remain responsive to security threats that are becoming increasingly sophisticated and designed to exploit vulnerabilities in safety critical systems.

The recent industry-wide interest in GPS interference spanning from the inconvenient, to major degradations including the loss of EGPWS protection, ADS-B tracking and navigational accuracy is a startling testament to this fact. This is all possible because of existing system design.

Since the events of September 11, passenger screening and security protocols have undergone a revolution, and it’s now much harder for bad actors to carry out conventional attacks. But there are still risks associated with malicious attacks that could potentially be achieved remotely – and cyber-interference seems an obvious choice.

Spring is upon us, and so is Spring Break. Traffic volumes into Florida and the Caribbean typically surge in the coming weeks.

Up in New York, this is causing a traffic jam over the WHITE departure fix for southbound GA traffic departing KTEB/Teterboro and KHPN/Westchester .

The FAA has issued a request to operators to consider filing via alternative ‘offload’ routes instead during peak times – specifically, Thursday to Saturday.

This will help expedite departures from FBO ramps and reduce mile-in-trail delays over WHITE.

Here’s a quick look at those alternative options.

Departing for West Coast Florida:

File via: PARKE.J6.HVQ or LANNA.J48

Departing for South Florida and the Caribbean (*must be deep water capable):

KTEB/Teterboro – File via: ELVAE.COL.DIXIE.Y481

KHPN/Westchester – File via: JFK.SHIPP.Y488

And here’s what that looks like on a map:

One other route to consider.

If departing KHPN/Westchester between 1000 and 2000z for any Florida destination, the FAA also suggests considering filing via HPN.JFK.WAVEY.EMJAY.Q167.ZJAAY.KALDA. We asked the FAA about the timings, and they were advised this is due to peak flow in and out of KJFK/New York.

It’s just an ask.

You can still plan via WHITE if you’d like too, but expect extra delays.

The best place to keep an eye on operational disruptions (including any ground delays) is the FAA NAS Status website, which you can find here.

Key Points

• Santorini and neighboring islands are currently experiencing what is described as a ‘seismic swarm’ of earthquakes.
• Nearly thirteen thousand have been recorded in the past twelve days.
• A state of emergency has been in effect since the largest tremor of 5.1 struck the island on Feb 6. Large numbers of people have evacuated.
• Experts suggest this may be a precursor a larger event, including a possible volcanic eruption.
• The US Embassy has issued a new warning advising extreme caution before travelling there.
• At time of writing, local agents report no damage to the airport.

An Active Earthquake Zone

Greece is one of the most seismically active regions of Europe.

It occupies part of something known as the ‘Hellenic Subduction Zone.’ Not dissimilar to the Pacific’s notorious ‘Ring of Fire,’ here shifting tectonic plates create numerous weaknesses in the earth’s crust.

The source of the current trouble is found near Anydros – just 16nm northeast of Santorini. The earthquakes began on Jan 31 and have progressively worsened which may be cause for concern.

The largest yet occurred on Feb 6 and was felt as far away as Athens, Crete and Türkiye.

State of Emergency

Following the events of Feb 6, a state of emergency was declared and will remain in effect until at least March 3. This includes an instruction to immediately evacuate coastal areas in the event of stronger earthquakes due to a tsunami risk.

A state of emergency is in effect until at least March 3.

On Feb 7 the US Embassy issued a new warning for Santorini and the surrounding islands. They advise extreme caution if travelling there.

Airports

The seismic events are occurring in a relatively constrained area of the Aegean Sea between Santorini itself, and the island of Amorgos.

As such, LGSR/Santorini is the primary airport to be impacted. At time of writing, several local agents have advised the airport is open and operating normally.

However, the situation is inherently unpredictable. If a larger quake occurs, a sudden closure of the airport is possible.

This may be preventative due to the evacuation of staff (including ATC), or more severe in the case of damaged infrastructure including instrument approach equipment, movement areas and the runway itself.

At time of writing, LGSR/Santorini is open and not reporting damage.

For inbound aircraft a solid contingency plan right now would be to carry healthy alternates such as LGMK/Mykonos, LGIR/Heraklion, LGSA/Chania or even LGAV/Athens.

If you must go to Santorini, we recommend stop and goes only to minimize time on the ground.

Should the airport close, damage assessments can take hours or days to complete. Any aircraft on the ground may be stuck there for an extended period of time. Crew recovery options may also be limited during rescue efforts.

What will happen next?

Experts are undecided. A typical seismic pattern usually consists of larger earthquakes (mainshocks) followed by smaller ones (aftershocks).

The pattern in Santorini is different. Some seismic events don’t consist of one single major event. Instead, a region can experience a wave of smaller quakes over a period of weeks or months. This is phenomenon is known as ‘swarms.’

Santorini may be experiencing a different kind of sesimic event called a ‘swarm.’

On the other hand, other scientists believe recent events may be a precursor to something larger – the figure being widely thrown around is a ‘six’, defined on the Richter Scale as a strong quake with potential to damage well-built structures with strong to violent shaking near the epicenter.

We will continue to monitor the situation in Santorini and report any changes to aircraft operations as they become apparent.

On January 31, EASA withdrew its CZIBs for both Israel and Iran.

But the question remains – what does that actually mean for the safety of civil aviation there?

A word on EASA CZIBs.

A little context here helps.

• CZIB stands for ‘Conflict Zone Information Bulletin’ which EASA puts out when required using a combination of publications issued by worldwide states, and risk assessments performed by their own team called the Integrated EU Aviation Security Group.
• EASA shares information on conflict zones to help operators and member states make an informed decision whether to enter risky airspace or not.
• Unlike some state-issued airspace warnings, CZIBs are not legally binding. They are just recommendations. You can find a list of them here.
• On January 31, EASA made some changes to this list – namely, they cancelled the CZIBs for both Israel and Iran.

Why the change?

EASA has published a brief explanation here, but it doesn’t give much away.

Ultimately, they cite an improving risk environment due to ceasefire agreements between Israel, Hamas and Hezbollah along with a reduction in short-term regional tensions.

The CZIBs were originally published in November 2024 in response to unprecedented regional hostilities. It now seems EASA believes the situation has sufficiently come back off the boil.

Those in the know

While quick to re-affirm that some risks to aviation in the region are still present, the CZIBs have been replaced by Information Notes distributed to those on a ‘need-to-know’ basis – their words, not ours.

Existing State Warnings

EASA CZIBs (and their removal) have no direct effect on existing state-issued airspace warnings. This falls into the hands of policy makers who may wish to follow their advice.

With that in mind, you can find a full list of current state-issued airspace warnings still in effect for Iran here, and Israel here.

We still think Iran is potentially risky

Five years have passed since PS752 was misidentified and shot down by an air defense system near OIIE/Tehran airport. The country still possesses the same arsenal of advanced anti-aircraft weaponry today.

The sudden closure of the entire OIIX/Tehran FIR last year is proof of how quickly the risk picture can change for overflights.

While there may not be an intent to target civil aviation itself, agencies such as the US FAA continue to warn of the danger posed by unannounced military activity and mistaken identity – so much so that its existing airspace prohibition (by SFAR) has been extended all the way to 2027.

Five years have passed since the shootdown of PS752 over Tehran.

Operate to Israel with caution

In line with EASA’s advice, we have seen improving airspace safety in the LLLL/Tel Aviv FIR. Just recently we reduced our SafeAirspace.net risk rating for Israel from ‘Do Not Fly’ to ‘Danger Exists.’

This was in response to the same ceasefire agreements and a proven track record of maintaining airspace safety in close proximity to active conflict zones. This also reflected the decision of several major carriers to resume scheduled flights there.

The return of major carriers to Israeli airspace reflects improving airspace safety.

However, the long-term outcome of these agreements remains unpredictable – along with potential for rapid escalation in risk to previous levels should the agreements fail. Recent events have proven they remain fragile.

For that reason, we advise operators to heed existing warnings and prepare for short notice airspace closures or reroutes in Israeli airspace.

What about Lebanon?

There was another change to EASA’s list of CZIBs that was easily overlooked.

Rather than withdraw it, EASA has extended its existing guidance for the OLBB/Beirut FIR until end of March 2025.

EASA explains that the country has not sufficiently proven capability to address existing risks – including the potential for renewed escalation between Hezbollah and Israel.

EASA doesn’t believe Lebanon has sufficient procedures in place to mitigate airspace risk in event of another major escalation between Israel and Hezbollah.

Without appropriate mitigating procedures to fall back on, the airspace should still be considered dangerous. Interestingly, EASA expressed similar concerns in its recent airspace warning for Western Russia following the downing of Azerbaijan Airlines 8243 on approach in Grozny.

As such, EASA continues to advise aircraft not to enter Lebanese airspace at all levels. Over at SafeAirspace.net, we also maintain a ‘Do Not Fly’ warning for the same skies.

Need more info?

We maintain a full database of state issued airspace warnings at SafeAirspace.net, where a full global briefing is available with a single click. You can also reach us on team@ops.group around the clock.

Key Points

• During President Trump’s second term, TFRs will periodically be activated over KPBI/Palm Beach.
• Two rings will apply – a 10nm inner ring, and a 10-30nm outer ring.
• Aircraft wishing to operate inside the inner ring (all KPBI departures and arrivals) will require TSA pre-screening. Inbound aircraft must depart one of five gateway airports.
• The 10 – 30nm ring will only be available to aircraft operating in and out of local airports but will not require pre-screening.
• These restrictions will only apply when activated by NOTAM.
• A local TFR request form is only required for utility aircraft required to ‘loiter’ in the TFR such as aerial survey, banner and ag-aircraft. 

Home-sweet-home

The start of President Trump’s second term in the White House also means a return of a TFRs over KPBI/Palm Beach and Southern Florida.

The Mar-a-Lago Estate has been his primary residence since 2019 – a little over 5nm east of the field. Which means that whenever he comes and goes, operations will be heavily disrupted at the airport.

The FAA has published a reminder of procedures for when the presidential TFRs are active. Here is a brief summary of what you need to know.

The Mar-a-Lago residence, not far from KPBI.

Flight Restrictions

The Presidential TFR is comprised of two rings, centered on KPBI airport. 

The FAA has warned operators that TFR activation will be unpredictable in frequency and duration, so make sure you continue to check the current NOTAMs.

The Inner Ring (Most Restrictive)

A 10nm radius applies and extends from surface to 17,999’ MSL.

When active, all aircraft in and out of KPBI/Palm Beach will require TSA pre-screening. Once complete, aircraft details will be broadcast over the FAA Domestic Events Network – which includes all ARTCCs and various other Federal agencies.

For departures, this is available at the following FBOs between 0800 and 1700 local: Atlantic, Jet, Net Jets and Signature.

For arrivals, you will need to depart from one of the following five gateway airports:

• KHPN/White Plains 
• KTEB/Teterboro
• KIAD/Washington Dulles
• KMCO/Orlando
• KFLL/Fort Lauderdale

Once pre-screened, intermediate stops are not allowed unless you have a bona-fide emergency.

In both cases you’ll need to register for screening at least 24 hours before your departure. Reservations are available by calling 561-616-9650.

Air Force One Inbound

If you happen to be on the field when the President arrives, a ramp freeze will be enforced starting from seven minutes (or so) prior to his arrival.

A security inspection will be carried out on the runway after which it will be kept clear.

Once he (or any other VIP) has left the airport, the freeze will be…well, defrosted, and normal ops will resume – albeit Air Force 1 itself will remain under heavy security.

An important note from the FAA that’s easy to miss! If a pre-screened aircraft is holding for this process and reaches minimum or divert fuel, let ATC know. They may be able to get you special permission to land, but it’s not a guarantee.

Consider extra holding fuel if arriving during an active TFR. For obvious reasons, his precise arrival and departure times will not be made publicly available.

A ramp freeze will apply during the President’s arrival/departure during the TFR window. Expect some holding!

Outer Ring (less restrictive)

The outer ring extends from 10 to 30nm from PBI airport, from surface to 17,999’ MSL.

TSA pre-screening is not required, however only aircraft arriving or departing local airfields will be allowed. If things are really quiet, a transit clearance may be granted by ATC. However, any ‘loitering’ or other such tomfoolery is not allowed.

Discrete Squawks 🦆

All aircraft inside either ring will be required to squawk a discrete code and maintain constant contact with ATC on VHF.

The friendly folk at PBI ATC have clarified the following:

• Departing PBI – code will be allocated by clearance delivery.
• Departing a satellite airport – call TRACON prior to departing on 561-684-9047 to request a squawk and departure frequency.
• Arriving at a satellite airport – call ATC prior to entering the 30nm ring to obtain a code and get radar identified.

Or better yet, avoid the TFRs completely.

All sounds too hard?

Presidential TFRs will only be activated when the president is in town. At all other times it will be ops-normal at PBI and nearby airfields.

If you’re planning a trip here, it’s important you monitor the NOTAMs closely. The FAA endeavors to provide at least 72 hours’ notice. You can also check the TFR website here.

Asking for a friend, what do you do if intercepted?

Don’t panic. Talk to them in plain English on 121.5 and follow their instructions.

Notify ATC that you have been intercepted – expect a number to call when you’re back on terra firma.

Key Points

• EASA has issued a new airspace warning for Russian airspace following the likely shoot down of Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 on approach to URMG/Grozny Airport on December 25 by a surface-to-air missile.
• Operators are advised not to enter Russian airspace west of longitude 60 degree east (the entirety of Western Russia) at all levels due to the risk of being unintentionally targeted by air defence systems, and extensive GPS interference.
• Previous state-issued airspace warnings have been confined to areas in close proximity to the Ukrainian border. The new EASA warning suggests a significant escalation in airspace risk.

What’s changed?

Ukraine has strengthened the frequency and intensity of missile and drone attacks on targets well within Russian territory.

The latest occurred this week on January 14 – a combination of cruise and ballistic missiles and the largest drone strike yet (over one hundred and forty devices) against infrastructure across Western and Southern Russia, as far as 680 miles from the border. Russian air defences reportedly shot down a number of them.

The war with Ukraine has entered a new phase which no longer limits airspace risk to the primary conflict zone.

Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243

EASA’s new airspace warning appears to be in direct response to the downing of an Embraer passenger jet on December 25 at URMG/Grozny airport, Southern Russia.

The crew were on approach when the aircraft suffered sudden damage which was initially misidentified as a bird strike.

The aircraft later crash landed following a diversion to UATE/Aktau airport in Kazakhstan.

Limited analysis of the wreckage appears to indicate shrapnel damage consistent with a surface-to-air missile. The most likely culprit was a Pantsir air defence system – a radar guided medium range SAM not dissimilar to the Buk system used to shoot down MH17 over Eastern Ukraine in 2014.

Photos of AZ8243 seems consistent with shrapnel damage likely caused by the impact of a surface-to-air missile.

It was later confirmed that air defence systems were responding to a Ukrainian drone strike in the area at the time.

While not official, it is almost certain AZ 8243 was mistakenly targeted. In any event we will have more answers soon – ICAO Annex 13 requires a preliminary report to be issued within thirty days of the accident (of which Russia is a member state).

No one’s overflying Russia anyway, right?

This simply isn’t the case. It’s true the Russia has imposed reciprocal airspace bans on aircraft registered to a large number of countries (including the US, Canada and the EU). This is in response to political sanctions, not risk.

It may keep us away, but this is a sanction – not an airspace warning.

Those from China, Turkey, the Gulf States and others are still allowed. And until now, they have been overflying airspace with no active warnings in place.

Russian airspace was (and still is) receiving international air traffic.

The EASA warning

EASA issued its new warning on January 9 via a Conflict Zone Information Bulletin (CZIB).

A note about EASA. Its advice isn’t binding – it is provided for the consideration of its member states and does not represent an actual flight prohibition.

However, history has shown it does have a strong bearing on the rules imposed – as a result, we are likely to see to number of new state-issued warnings for Russia in the coming weeks.

The CZIB recommends operators do not enter Russian airspace (west of longitude 60 degrees east) at all levels. This affects the Moscow, Rostov, Saint Petersburg, Yekaterinburg and Samara FIRs.

EASA advises that the deployment of Russian air defence systems to these areas in response to Ukrainian drone and missile attacks could directly threaten the safety of overflying aircraft.

It argues Russia does not have adequate protections and procedures in place to ensure the safety of civil aviation. The apparent downing of AZ8243 is testament to that fact.

Beyond the risk of misidentification, the warning also cites dangers related to GPS interference (including spoofing) being used to deter aerial threats with little regard to the effect on civil aircraft in the area.

Safe Airspace

At safeairspace.net, our team faces a conundrum.

Russia oversees well over 6.6 million square miles of sky and is transcontinental in scale.

Towards its south-eastern borders with China and Mongolia the risks associated with the conflict in Ukraine are low to non-existent.

To the west, the risk is high which is why EASA’s new warning makes a distinction based on a line of longitude that divides the country in two.

The same applies to our level of warning for Russia at safeairspace.net – where a Level 2 (Danger Exists) remains in place. But in light of recent events, we would advise against overflights of Western and Southern Russia at this time.

Get in touch with us

Our team is available around the clock. You can reach us at blog@ops.group – we’d be happy to help with any questions you may have.

Key Points

• July 2024: We wrote about some strange happenings reported by OPSGROUP members at German airports – random security checks performed by LBA staff (Germany’s Civil Aviation Authority) to ensure the proper protocols were being followed by crew.
• These are not ramp checks, they are sneaky checks to see whether crew follow the right security procedures. They basically try to enter the aircraft, and your job is to make sure you stop them.
• Jan 2025: We’re now hearing that the LBA have started charging operators for these checks! One member reported receiving a 330 Euro invoice for a check that took place at EDDM/Munich. Another reported the same thing at EDDV/Hannover and EDDS/Stuttgart. It seems that opting-out of these checks is not possible!

Surprise invoices

In December and we received a fresh report from an OPSGROUP member. During a recent stop at EDDM/Munich, they were the unwitting recipients of one these surprise security checks.

Later, they received an invoice from the LBA for 330 Euros – despite having no ability to opt out. Here’s an excerpt:

What the LBA had to say

It was the first we had heard of crew being involuntarily invoiced for these random security inspections and so reached out to the LBA directly.

Apparently, a legal document called the Aviation Security Fees Ordinance (or Luftsicherheitsgebührenverordnung for short) was amended in February 2024 to enable LBA to collect fees to cover the costs of ‘surveillance measures’ which includes the surprise security checks in question.

Fair or not, it looks as though this practice will continue at German airports indefinitely.

The checks themselves

We previously enquired as to the legality of these checks and were referred by the LBA to another document – the EU Implementing Regulation 2015/1998 which is all about basic standards on aviation security.

We read it so you don’t have to – and couldn’t find anything in it warning crew to look out for weird notes or unwelcome visitors in high-viz vests entering your aircraft with no ID.

The legal framework is there, but from an operational perspective but we still have the following concerns:

• Crew are being tricked into compliance.
• These invasive checks have now been incentivized.
• There is no ability for crew to opt out of being charged.

Aviation security is a team effort, not a commercial enterprise. And for that reason, we feel this a concerning precedent to set.

Security checks are distinct to traditional ramp checks. 

Please get in touch with us

When we write Ops Alerts to members we have a specific category for costs, as they often come as an unwelcome surprise to operators. We do our best to get the word out to help others. If you come across these in your travels, please reach out to us on team@ops.group so that we can keep the group informed.

Dec 2024 Update:

• The FAA’s Privacy ICAO Address Program (PIA) has been updated. CPDLC services are now available for flights using a PIA. To receive it, pilots must file the PIA ICAO 24-bit address and N-reg in the flight plan.
• Two other important changes – aircraft info held by the FAA and associated with a PIA are exempt from the Freedom of Information Act, and pilots can now request a new PIA every twenty days if they want. You view the updated FAA Privacy page here.

Feb 2024 Update:

• The FAA’s Privacy ICAO Address program has been expanded to include some new oceanic and Gulf of Mexico routes.
• Check below for exactly which routes this program now applies to, and our Opsicle with steps on how to register.

If you’re not familiar with this program, it prevents users’ aircraft registration from being tracked by third parties using ADS-B output during US domestic flights. We wrote about it before here. But to explain what this program is and how it works in two sentences:

All Mode S equipped aircraft are assigned a unique ICAO 24-bit address – this is uniquely identifiable to your aircraft’s registration. The FAA’s PIA program assigns you another one to use that renders you secret-squirrel.

To participate, you must tick all three of these boxes:

1. Operating an US-registered aircraft which is ADS-B equipped
2. Using a third-party call sign
3. Flying in US territorial airspace (the mainland, Alaska, Hawaii, and other US territories). Additionally, the PIA has been expanded to include US oceanic FIRs too – those more than 12nm from shore.

After news broke the program had been improved, we struggled to find a summary of the changes and got in touch with the FAA directly.

They advised while there is no ‘master list’ of the newly included routes, they have updated their website to include some valid examples including:

• NYC to LA
• Miami to Houston (via the Gulf of Mexico)
• LA to Hawaii
• Boston to Miami (with offshore routes more than 12nm from shore).

If you have an enquiry about a specific route, you can reach them on adsbprivacyicao@faa.gov. Chances are, as long as you stay within US jurisdiction, your route will be valid.

How to apply?

So, you want in? We’ve put together this little Opsicle with steps on how to register.

Click to open PDF.

More questions?

The FAA has quite a good FAQ section on the PIA which you can access here.

There’s been a lot of noise lately from the NAT, especially as we all come to grips with the removal of oceanic clearances.

But it’s important not to forget about the SAT – or South Atlantic. And it seems a CPDLC issue has been regularly occurring in the Abidjan Area Control Center – a large chunk of airspace found south of Africa’s Ivory Coast.

The issue arises from the fact that while the Abidjan ACC is geographically constrained by the much larger Dakar FIR, it is responsible for its own control.

It seems that pilots have been incorrectly logging onto GOOO/Dakar rather than DIII/Abidjan when transiting this airspace. ATC are concerned, and so a new SAT Ops Bulletin has been published. Here’s a closer look at what it contains, and how to mitigate this error on your next crossing.

The Airspace Picture

Part of the problem may be that pilots crossing the SAT are far less familiar with the airspace picture than they are of its big brother, the NAT. So, he’s a quick crash course.

Over the South Atlantic lies the ‘Atlantic Ocean Random Routing Area’, or AORRA.

This is essentially a volume of airspace between FL290 – FL410 within the Atlantico, Accra, Comodoro Rivadavia, Dakar, Dakar Oceanic, Ezeiza, Johannesburg Oceanic, Luanda and Montevideo FIRs.

This article is concerned with the Eastern Side of the AORRA – specifically the DIII/Abidjan ACC (Ivory Coast) which is contained within the much larger GOOO/Dakar FIR and where the confusion is occurring. Aircraft on routes that transit between South America and Sub-Saharan Africa will likely overfly this airspace.

The folk at the South Atlantic Steering Group (SAT SG for short) have reported more and more instances of transiting aircraft incorrectly logging onto GOOO when they should be logging onto DIII while in Abidjan’s airspace.

This then creates communication issues for ATC.

Panic Slowly

While this is cause for concern, SAT SG are quick to explain that in most cases this can be managed safely but vastly increases workload for controllers who must manually resolve the mis-connection.

But occasionally the loss of comms has led to the activation of something called INCERFA – a top-secret ICAO catchphrase for where uncertainty exists as to the safety of an aircraft or its occupants. This alert phase carries its own protocols for ATC.

And so, the key message from the bulletin is this:

‘While Abdijan Airspace is geographically included within the Dakar FIR, it is essential that it is treated as a separate sector for CPDLC logon purposes…’

Simple!

What to do

None of us like unexpected paperwork. So, the SAT SG has also provided us with flight crew procedures to prevent communication problems when overflying Abidjan airspace. Check the SAT Ops Bulletin for these in full, but here’s the lowdown:

Before Entering: Check logged onto Abidjan ACC using correct code (DIII). Confirm logon active by checking uplink message response. Don’t log onto Dakar (GOOO) by mistake.

Failed Logon: Manually log on to DIII if auto fails. Notify Abidjan by voice ASAP if unable to establish CPDLC connection. If practical, trouble shoot before entering.

Transition between Dakar and Abidjan: Monitor handoff carefully. Ensure CPDLC switches before crossing the boundary. Verify correct CPDLC connection is active, especially entering Abidjan airspace.

Have more questions about the SAT?

You can reach the ICAO EUR/NAT office directly via icaoeurnat@icao.int.

For ops in the region, you might also be interested in this little guide on the South Atlantic Corridor we wrote before. OPSGROUP members cash download it from the Dashboard here.

Click to download hi-res PDF.

Update November 2024:

Over two years have passed since we first published this article on EMAS.

A recent report identified that runway excursions are still one the leading causes of business aviation accidents in the US – which has put this valuable technology back on our radar.

It’s pleasing to see that the adoption of these life-saving blocks of crushable energy absorption has steadily continued to increase across the world including recent news that it is coming to Australasia for the first time.

The FAA now reports that EMAS is installed at 121 runway ends at seventy-one US airports and growing.

To date it has safely stopped twenty-two overrunning aircraft carrying 432 pax and crew – the latest, a Hawker 900XP at KTEX/Telluride back in July.

Outside of the US, a number of aviation authorities have introduced or are planning to install EMAS beds to current US FAA standards at airports in countries including the UK, Canada, France, Spain, China and Taiwan.

The adoption of EMAS at airports around the world is beginning to grow.

A first for Australasia

Two promising pieces of news recently emerged from down under in recent months.

New Zealand is installing EMAS at two of its most challenging airports characterized by windshear, short runways and RESAs geographically constrained to the minimum 90 meters (295’). Both receive high volumes of jet traffic.

NZQN/Queenstown is currently in the process of installing EMAS at both runway ends. Work is happening at night and is expected to be completed soon.

Just last week, NZWN/Wellington announced it would follow suit, with major runway safety upgrades. It hopes to have EMAS in action by the end of March.

Wellington – one of two airports in airport soon to receive a EMAS arrestor beds.

A familiar problem remains

If there is any doubt as to the effectiveness of EMAS, consider this. A typical EMAS installation in a 90m (295’) RESA effectively increases its stopping power to the equivalent of 240m (787’) – that’s nearly three-fold.

And yet pilot awareness remains limited. There are no ICAO SARPs for EMAS. And the FAA’s guidance is limited – the only advice for an imminent EMAS encounter is to maintain the extended runway centreline. And once stopped, don’t try and taxi the aircraft.

The reality is that 90m from 70kts looks darn short – and vacant space on either side of the runway makes for an attractive option in the heat of the moment.

Pilots may simply not know it’s there (how often do we brief EMAS?) or act out of instinct. Which means incidents are still occurring where we’re swerving to avoid it.

More on that in our original article below.

Original Article:

Across the US alone, over one hundred runways at 71 airports have a safety critical system fitted to help prevent a major cause of aviation accidents – runway overruns.

It’s called EMAS, or ‘Engineered Materials Arresting System’, which is a technical of way of using drag to safely stop an airplane when all else fails. And better yet, it has your back in all runway conditions – water, snow, ice, you name it. It’s a proven life saver.

But the problem is there are still accidents happening where pilots have actively avoided it, instead choosing to veer off the runway.

Why?

IFALPA recently put out a new position paper which may provide some solid clues. And along with work that others have done, the reasons seem to fit into one of two camps:

• Knowledge about what EMAS is and does.
• In the heat of the moment, pilots just didn’t know it was there.

For such an effective safety system that protects crew, passengers and even those on the ground, is it possible that we’re just not giving it the attention it deserves?

Let’s tackle both camps.

EMAS 101

Dip into the regs and you’ll see that the US FAA requires all airports to have runway safety areas. They are typically 500 feet wide and extend 1000’ past the runway end, and are clear of obstacles in case an aircraft either overruns, or undershoots. Sounds safe, right?

But what if there isn’t enough space? Take KMDV/Chicago Midway for example. It’s not always practical. That’s where EMAS comes into it. It achieves a similar level of safety, only using a lot less room.

In a squeeze – Chicago Midway where EMAS is installed. Courtesy: Chris Bungo

It is essentially a concrete bed (or ‘arrestor pad’) of increasing depth which contains thousands of blocks of crushable material that are designed to quickly slow down an aircraft with little or no damage – likely your nose wheel, and that’s about it.

And it works really well too. In fact, it’s so effective it can stop an aircraft travelling as fast as 70kts – which is a good thing as 90% of all overruns happen below this speed.

It’s not even a big deal to replace it – it’s modular. Only the blocks that have been damaged need to be changed out.

EMAS Arrestor Pad in action. Courtesy: Runway Safe

Grass and dirt

Some EMAS pads are only 150’ long. When faced with obstacles like trees, buildings, and roads it’s no wonder that the instinct is to avoid ploughing straight ahead.

Instead, the grass and dirt off the side of the runway begins to look like a very appealing option to slow an airplane down. And as the FAA itself once phrased it, ‘there’s a myth that if you take the dirt, you won’t be on the news…’

But the reality is that EMAS will do a far better job and with a safer outcome and less damage.

What about approach lights?

Lights on an EMAS arrestor pad are designed to break away and do very little damage to your ride.

You may not know it’s even there

This is where IFALPA get really stuck in. Some crew actively steered away from EMAS simply because they didn’t know, or forgot, that it was there.

Knowledge is one thing, but you can’t brief what you can’t see.

Yellow chevrons indicate an EMAS arrestor pad, but there is no standardised signage in place for it. Take a look a look again at the list of US airports with it installed – if you operate in and out of any of them, how often are you thinking about EMAS?

If you hadn’t briefed it, would you know it was there?

And the story doesn’t end with signage either. What about approach and airport charts? Leading chart manufacturers indicate where EMAS is present on ground charts only. But not on approach charts – the argument is that it won’t fit.

IFALPA has suggested how EMAS might be shown on an approach chart Couresty: IFALPA.

It seems as though the work hasn’t been finished just yet. EMAS is really effective, but as an aircraft departs the runway, there just isn’t enough time to figure out it’s there or not. And that all starts with crew awareness with the tools available when ops are normal.

Regulators in the US and abroad need to be doing more to illuminate this valuable piece of safety tech. At least five hundred lives have already likely been saved because of it.

Knowledge is power

Which is certainly the case with EMAS. Combine both camps, and pilots (myself included) can understand how valuable an obscure sign that says ‘EMAS’ may be, and also know when it is available before you need it the most.

Only then will it live up to its full potential.

Navigating the airspace of the Middle East has become a major headache for international operators.

In recent times, risk to civil aviation in the region has changed at a pace we have never seen before.

Transits are now faced with a common conundrum: it no longer seems to be a simple question of ‘is this route safe?’ but instead, of one’s own appetite for known risks.

There simply is no ‘risk-zero’ route available.

Therefore, a common question that bizav operators are asking OPSGROUP is ‘what are the major airlines doing?’ A snapshot of flight tracking right now shows that Middle Eastern transits are managing risk through the use of three distinct routes:

• South via Saudi Arabia and Egypt
• Central via Eastern Iraq and Turkey.
• North via the Stans and the Caspian Sea.

This article provides a brief risk profile for each of these routes to help operators carry out their own risk assessments when choosing a route to fly.

A Note About Risk

OPSGROUP also runs safeairspace.net – a database of all state-issued airspace warnings, along with risk briefings for each country in plain simple English.

We take into account both official advisories, recent and past events, advice from other specialists and potential for emerging risk when making a risk assessment.

To keep things simple we have three levels:

• Level 1 Do Not Fly (Red)
• Level 2 Danger Exists (Orange)
• Level 3 Caution (Yellow).

None of the three routes above enter any country’s airspace we have classified as ‘Do Not Fly.’

For the rest, you’ll see the map below is color coded according to the same risk profile.

The Southern Route

This route begins with a lengthy crossing of Saudi Arabia, steering clear of Israeli and Lebanese airspace to the north before crossing the Red Sea into Egypt.

It’s considered advantageous because it keeps tracks miles down (compared to the Northern Route) and avoids the potential for a sudden escalation of hostilities between Israel and Iran.

From a contingency perspective, it also provides safer diversion options than a transit of Iraq.

But now for the more-risky stuff.

The Houthi Campaign:

There is currently heightened risks to civil aviation in this area.

Houthi Rebels in Yemen are currently engaged in a long-term campaign to use missiles and drones to target Israel (therefore infringing the Jeddah FIR) along with shipping channels in the Red Sea.

The military response to these activities is the use of air defence systems to destroy them.

The latest incident occurred on Nov 3, where a crew witnessed the interception of a missile at a similar level in open airspace near Jeddah. OPSGROUP members can access a special briefing on this latest event here.

Of particular concern to aircraft at altitude is the use of ballistic missiles which originate from Western Yemen and are destroyed by defensive intercepts while on descent toward their target – which puts the airspace of Northern Saudi Arabia at heightened risk given its proximity to Israel and Gaza.

This essentially creates three risks to overflying aircraft – a direct hit by a missile (extremely unlikely), debris fields from inflight break ups or successful interceptions, and misidentification.

For the latter, many well-known incidents affecting civil aviation have come from mistaken identity. Malaysia 17, Ukraine 752 and Iran Air 652 were all due to misidentification.

Egypt ATC Congestion:

 OPSGROUP has received several recent member reports of severe frequency congestion in the Cairo FIR apparently due to ATC overload.

One crew even reported that during an entire portion between the North Coast of Egypt to the Red Sea (MMA – M872 – SILKA) that they were unable to talk to ATC.

The corridor is much busier than usual which may present latent threats. Good airmanship at this time would be to keep a close eye on TCAS, ensure all anti-collision lights are on and consider the use of a PAN call if a deviation becomes necessary without a clearance.

We have approached both the Egyptian CAA and ANSP for feedback and have yet to receive a response.  If you have experienced this yourself in the HECC/Cairo FIR, please get in touch with us at team@ops.group.

The Central Route

This more conventional route tracks northwards along the Persian Gulf before an extended transit of Eastern Iraq using the UM860 and UM688 airways which run parallel to Iranian airspace before crossing Turkey and a southern portion of the Black Sea.

The overriding question from this route is “is it safe to overfly Iraq?”

In our opinion, yes but with some disclaimers.

UM860/UM688 Airways:

The UM860/UM688 have been considered safe for a long time. And prior to 2021, remained the only option available for US operators to enter the Baghdad FIR at all.

They continue to see heavy traffic by major carriers and can be considered a viable option.

When using them, an important consideration is their proximity to Iranian airspace. Due to the recent escalation in hostilities between Israel and Iran, many states prohibit operators from entering the Tehran FIR due the risk of anti-aircraft fire at all levels.

Extensive GPS interference (including spoofing) can be expected in Northern Iraq and on at least one occasion has led an aircraft to almost inadvertently enter Iranian airspace without a clearance.

Extra vigilance for the early signs of GPS interference is essential for the safety of this route, along with early notification to air traffic control if it is suspected. Radar vectors remain your best fail safe.

Also beware of the potential for sudden closures of the ORBB/Baghdad FIR should further fighting occur between Israel and Iran. It closed completely during recent Israeli airstrikes and remains geographically sandwiched between the two, along with Jordan and Syria.

Free Routing:

In 2021, the FAA changed the rules. A new SFAR was issued that allowed N-reg overflights anywhere in Iraqi airspace, provided they’re conducted at or above FL320, which has opened-up new options for free routing.

Great for fuel, but arguably not safety. We continue to advise against flights away from the above airways due to well publicized risks of militant and terrorist activity which may target civil aircraft with anti-aircraft weaponry.

They may also be misidentified by air defense systems targeting drones which are frequently used to conduct attacks in Northern Iraq that originate from Turkey and Iran.

Crew and passenger safety is also an important concern should an emergency landing be required.

Turkey (beware of GPS interference):

We maintain a low-risk rating of caution for Turkey. As two of the three routes in this article include a lengthy overflight of the country, it is worth touching upon why any risk rating has been applied at all.

There is minor risk to overflights from misidentification by local militia who infrequently target Turkish military aircraft with anti-aircraft weaponry. This risk is predominantly near the border with Syria and Iraq where a higher level of airborne military traffic and UAS is present.

Far more prevalent is GPS interference – there have been frequent reports of both jamming and spoofing by aircraft well inside Turkish airspace. It appears to be common throughout the LTAA/Ankara FIR, especially anywhere near the border with Iran or Iraq. PIREPs also extend to Turkish airspace over the Black Sea. Reports share very similar symptoms: Un-commanded turns, position errors, and multiple GPWS warnings. The spoofed locations tend to center on Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula – a difference of between 120-250nm from the actual aircraft position. OPSGROUP members can access a special briefing on this hazard here.

The Northern Route

This is the route being favored between destinations in Europe and India/South East Asia.

It begins with a transit of Pakistan, before an uncontrolled crossing of Afghanistan and into Turkmenistan. A westerly turn is then made cross the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey before rejoining the central route over the Black Sea.

While a fairly conservative option, it is the longest in terms of track miles.

Afghanistan:

For all intents and purposes, airspace safety in the Kabul FIR has not changed since the Taliban re-assumed control of the country in late September 2021.

The entire FIR remains uncontrolled and there is no guarantee of crew or passenger safety if you need to land. In that sense it remains the most important consideration in the selection of this route.

With that said, adjacent FIRs are managing the entry and exit of traffic and separating them with miles-in-trail and level restrictions.

Once inside, fairly robust contingency procedures (including the use of TIBA) appear to be working, with major carriers the likes of Lufthansa and KLM making safe crossings every day.

Aside from potential insurance complications of extended flight in uncontrolled airspace, it seems the predominant risk for overflights is what happens if you have an emergency and need to divert.

The overriding consensus (along with common sense) is don’t land in Afghanistan. In our recent article we explained it would be wise to consider it akin to ditching i.e. a last resort. Careful consideration of critical fuel scenarios to clear the Kabul FIR in event of de-pressurization, engine failure or both is essential to moderate this risk.

Azerbaijan and Armenia:

We maintain a level of caution for overflights of these countries given their history of conflict, but for now the risk to overflights remains low.

A ceasefire agreement is in place, and most states have lifted their airspace warnings for the YDDD/Yerevan and UBBA/Baku FIRs.

When sporadic fighting has occurred, it has been confined to border regions. A contingency to keep to mind is the use of northerly waypoints BARAD, DISKA and ADEKI to avoid the area and transit from Azerbaijan through Georgia instead.

Stay Informed

The situation in the Middle East has recently proven that airspace risk can change quickly and without warning.

Overflights need to stay informed and have good contingencies in place to manage unexpected re-routes and airspace closures, along with suitable diversion airports.

OPSGROUP issues Ops Alerts for members on a daily basis, but our risk and security alerts are also available for free on safeairspace.net which our team keeps updated around the clock.

If you have more questions, you can get in touch with us on team@ops.group. We’d love to hear from you.

Key Points

• ADS-B became mandatory in Canadian Class A airspace in Aug 2023 (above FL180). It then became mandatory in Class B airspace (above FL125) in May 2024. Mandates in any Class C, D and E airspace will be determined no sooner than 2028.
• You need an antenna able to broadcast to ADS-B receivers both on the ground and in space, and you need to include some extra stuff on your flight plan.
• If you don’t have ADS-B, you have to apply for an exemption online from NavCanada.

What equipment do I need?

• A transponder with ADS-B out capability that meet the minimum performance standards (or better) found in this fancy document. This needs to be attached to an antenna that can broadcast to ADS-B receivers both on the ground, and in space.
• You can also find more on this in section 551.103 of the Canadian Aviation Regulations.

Extra Flight Planning Requirements

• If you plan on entering airspace where the ADS-B mandate applies, there is some extra stuff you need to include in item 10b of your ICAO flight plan (assuming you have all the right gear on board).
• Use the code B1 if you have ADS-B Out only, or B2 if you have ADS-B In and Out.
• You’ll also need to include SUR/CANMANDATE in item 18.
• One other gotcha – make sure the flight identification (flight number or aircraft reg) broadcast by your ADS-B equipment exactly matches the one used in item 7 of your flight plan. Lest there be trouble down the track!

My ride doesn’t have this fanciness. What are my options?

• NavCanada will do their best to accommodate aircraft who don’t have the right gear on board, in the same way they’ll work to fit non-transponder equipped aircraft into transponder mandatory airspace.
• They’ll assess each application on a first-come, first-served basis. It takes time to figure out behind the scenes, and so you’ll need to ask at least three business days before your flight.
• There may also be suggested re-routes to make your request possible, along with special comments to include in Item 18 of your flight plan.
• You can apply for an exemption online, here. If you have a number of flights to operate, you can also submit a blanket request via service@navcanada.ca.

To enter mandated airspace without ADS-B, you’ll need prior approval. Click the image above for that.

More Info

You can find that in the Canadian AIP (ENR 1.6.3), or even better – this page from NavCanada dedicated to the ADS-B Mandate. This includes a fairly extensive FAQ section at the bottom.

All your Canada ADS-B questions answered!

UPDATE 30 Oct 2024:

• Turkey has reportedly started allowing bizav overflights heading to/from Armenia.
• This issue stretches back to May 2023, but Turkey dropped the restriction in Sep 2024.
• So if you’re heading to Armenia (UDYZ/Yerevan, for example), you can now overfly Turkey – you no longer have to route around the country or make a stop somewhere like UGTB/Tbilisi in Georgia.

Turkish Ban

Back in May 2023, Armenian airline FlyOne operating a Paris-Yerevan flight had to make an emergency landing in Chisinau after being denied entry to Turkish airspace.

Turkey reportedly applied this last-minute ban in response to a monument erected in Yerevan the previous week, which they were unhappy about.

Pretty soon after, FlyOne evidently managed to resume Turkey overflights, but it seems that this restriction was still informally applied to bizav overflight requests.

30 Oct 2023: FlyOne from Chisinau to Yerevan merrily overflying Turkish airspace again.

OPSGROUP Member Reports

There was no Notam published on this issue, nor anything mentioned in the Turkish AIP. But some operators made tech-stops in Georgia to fix the problem. In Oct 2023, two Airport Spy reports were received from OPSGROUP members, where they required a tech-stop at UGTB/Tibilisi (Georgia) before continuing on to UDYZ/Yerevan (Armenia) in order to overfly Turkish airspace:

Spy Reports

If you have managed to get a Turkey overflight permit for a flight heading to/from Armenia, please let us know! You can also reach us directly on news@ops.group, or file an Airport Spy report.

OPSGROUP members can access the full Airport Spy database via the members dashboard here.

Turkey or Türkiye?

Just a final note on this… In June 2022, the United Nations agreed to a formal request to recognise Turkey as “Türkiye”, as part of a rebranding campaign launched by the Turkish president.

However, no major media outlets have changed their spelling so far. So for now at least, Turkey remains Turkey.

** Final Update Oct 11, 0500z.

Hurricane Milton has now weakened into a tropical storm and is headed away from Florida into the Atlantic. It will pass south of Bermuda on Oct 12 but with little to no impact expected at TXKF/Bermuda. Damage assessments at airports are still underway.

Here is a summary of the current situation as at 0500z Oct 11 – unless things change, this will be our last update on Milton.

Mexico

The Northern Yucatan Peninsula is no longer under any active storm warning or advisory.

The only aviation impact was to MMMD/Mérida which re-opened on Oct 8 – no significant damage was reported.

Gulf Routes

Gulf route closures as a direct result of Hurricane Milton have now finished.

Florida

The worst is now over for Florida – Milton is tracking eastwards away from land and into the Atlantic. Most airports are planning to reopen today (Oct 11), however damage assessments are still ongoing so Notam timings may change or be extended.

Airport Closures

KTPA/Tampa                                          Re-opening Oct 11, 1200z (est.)

 KPIE/St.Pete-Clearwater               Re-opening  Oct 11, 2000z (est.)

KSPG/St.Petersburg                          Re-opening Oct 12 1600z (est).

 KSRQ/Bradenton                                Re-opening Oct 12 1000z (est.)

 KMCO/Orlando                                     Open *Fuel limited, check availability.

 KMLB/Melbourne Orlando              Re-opening Oct 11 1300z (est.)

The FAA has now finished its telcon briefings for Milton.

Stay Informed

For live operational updates, keep an eye on the FAA NASS website which will be updated constantly as Milton passes.

The National Hurricane Center will provide accurate forecasts and tracking info here.

Have we missed something? If you have an update to share regarding airport or airspace status, please reach out to us via news@ops.group.

Originally published 2021, Updated 2024

• Changed SLOP requirement in GOTA: now only in the Oceanic portion
• More to read! NAT Conundrums Vol II, NAT Conundrums Vol III (GOTA),  NAT Conundrums Vol IV (Contingencies)

It’s no surprise to most that the North Atlantic is the busiest oceanic airspace in the world. To keep things running smoothly there are a bunch of procedures to follow. We write about them a lot, especially when they change. From time to time questions continue to pop up that make us scratch our heads. And so we thought this might be a good chance to share a few of those with you – naughty NAT conundrums if you will.

To SLOP or not to SLOP?

Chances are if you fly in oceanic airspace you already heard of Strategic Lateral Offset Procedures (SLOP). They’re pretty straightforward – you’re supposed to offset up to 2nm right of track without needing a clearance.

We do this because humans are fallible and mistakes can be made. Ironically the extreme accuracy of modern navigation systems mean that in the case of gross navigational errors, level busts or incorrect clearances, these systems actually increase the chance of a collision. So we pull over to the side of the road a little more, just in case.

Do we have to SLOP?

If you’re in the NAT HLA and your aircraft is capable then yes, it’s ‘required’ (as per ICAO NAT Doc 007). The only time you shouldn’t is if your aircraft’s FMS cannot automatically maintain an offset i.e. it doesn’t have that function. In that case you ‘must’ stay straight up the middle.

Remember, your SLOP can be in increments of 0.1nm and “0 nm” SLOP is also a thing!

You SLOP from the ENTRY point only, and need to have stopped the SLOP by the EXIT point.

• Don’t go ‘direct to’ the EXIT, this will put you on a different track. Cancel the SLOP to return to ‘centreline’
• Only SLOP from the ENTRY to the EXIT
• If you are routing from a NAR into the NAT, the last point is your entry into the NAT and you can SLOP from here

Can we SLOP in the Oceanic Transition Areas?

Or in other words in NOTA, SOTA, BOTA or GOTA? Good question.

NOTA and SOTA: The short answer is no. The slightly longer one is that the both NOTA and SOTA are under radar control with domestic separation from Shannon Radar. You should only apply SLOP between your oceanic entry and exit points.

BOTA: It’s a similar story. BOTA radar control services are provided by Brest Control in France – essentially domestic rules still apply. So no SLOP-age.

NOTA, SOTA and BOTA on the European side.

GOTA: This is the odd one out. GOTA (the Gander Oceanic Transition Area) is off the coast of North-eastern Canada. You should SLOP only once you have passed the Oceanic Entry Point (OEP) eastbound and within Oceanic Airspace “proper”, and vice versa westbound – sto SLOP at the Oceanic Exit Point (for example NIFTY on the chart below).

Are there any other ‘gotchas’?

Yes – three main ones:

1. The ENOB/Bodo and BIRD/Reykjavik FIRs. Look out for these. Buried in the NAT Doc 007 it says that you are only allowed to SLOP above FL285. So don’t get caught out in the lower levels.
2. Tango Routes T9 and T290. These lie just outside of BOTA airspace. According to the UK AIP ENR 3.5, SLOP does not apply here.
3. And whatever you do – never SLOP left!

What’s the difference between the NAT Region and the NAT HLA?

The NAT Region is virtually all of the non-domestic airspace over the Atlantic – from around 20 degrees north all the way up to the pole (excluding New York Oceanic West). It contains seven Oceanic Control Areas – BGGL/Nuuk, BIRD/Reykjavik, ENOB/Bodo Oceanic, CZQX/Gander, EGGX/Shanwick, KZWY/New York Oceanic East and LPPO/Santa Maria.

Within the NAT region (and occupying a large amount of it) is the NAT HLA, which stands for High Level Airspace. It only exists from FL285 to FL420.

Because the NAT HLA is some of the busiest airspace in the world, there are a number of stringent navigation and communication requirements that you must meet to enter it. This includes being either RNP 4 or RNP 10 capable, having two independent long range navigation systems and in most cases, datalink. Operators also need state approval.

If you don’t meant those requirements you can still fly through the NAT Region, but you’ll have to fly below or above the NAT HLA. Blue Spruce routes are the exception, which allow aircraft with only one long range navigation system or limited comms equipment to enter.

Nat HLA Airspace (Flight Level 285 – 420)

Can I fly across the North Atlantic without Datalink?

Yes, but it’s gonna be tricky.

The North Atlantic Datalink Mandate (NAT DLM) means aircraft need to have CPDLC and ADS-C to operate between FL290-FL410 throughout the NAT Region.

There are a few exceptions where the NAT DLM does not apply:
– Everything north of 80°North.
– New York Oceanic East FIR.
– Tango Routes T9 and T290. The other Tango Routes (T213, T13, T16) all require datalink.
– ATS Surveillance airspace, where surveillance service is provided by means of radar and/or ADS-B, coupled with VHF.

That last one about “ATS Surveillance airspace” is essentially just a section of airspace over Greenland and Iceland, which looks like this:

The blue shaded area shows the datalink exempt “ATS surveillance” airspace.

So if you’re on a NAT crossing and you don’t have datalink, you technically have to stay below FL290 until you hit the blue shaded area. It’s worth noting that aircraft without datalink can request to climb/descend through datalink mandated airspace, but will only be considered on a “tactical basis” by ATC.

Further south, there is another section of “ATS Surveillance Airspace” in the area connecting the LPPC/Lisboa FIR (i.e. mainland Portugal) to Madeira and the Azores, which is also exempt from the NAT DLM:

So in theory, an Atlantic crossing without datalink would also be possible here – within the LPPO/Santa Maria FIR you would just have to ensure that you stay below FL290 or above FL410 outside of the bubbles until you reach the KZWY/New York FIR (where the NAT DLM does not apply).

Even further south, in the TTZP/Piarco and GVSC/Sal FIRs, CPDLC is the primary means of communication, but it’s still not mandatory.

So down south, the bottom line is that as long as you stay out of the LPPO/Santa Maria FIR between FL290-410 where the NAT DLM applies… except for the ATS Surveillance Airspace bubbles where it doesn’t apply… then you’ll be ok with just HF. Got it? 😊

For more info on the NAT Datalink Mandate, check out our previous article.

So, what’s your conundrum?

We’d love to hear it. Chances are if you don’t know the answer, many other people won’t either, so it’s always great to share.

Get in touch with us at team@ops.group with your question, and we’ll include it in the next article on Naughty Nat Conundrums.

And if you want to download a PDF of our North Atlantic Plotting Chart, check how to get a copy here.