{"id":26900,"date":"2025-02-05T07:12:18","date_gmt":"2025-02-05T12:12:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/?p=26900"},"modified":"2025-02-05T07:12:36","modified_gmt":"2025-02-05T12:12:36","slug":"why-easa-has-withdrawn-airspace-warnings-for-iran-and-israel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/why-easa-has-withdrawn-airspace-warnings-for-iran-and-israel\/","title":{"rendered":"Why EASA has Withdrawn Airspace Warnings for Iran and Israel"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>On January 31, EASA <a href=\"https:\/\/www.easa.europa.eu\/en\/domains\/air-operations\/czibs\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">withdrew<\/a> its CZIBs for both <strong>Israel<\/strong> and <strong>Iran<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<p>But the question remains \u2013 what does that actually <em>mean<\/em> for the safety of civil aviation there?<\/p>\n<h4>A word on EASA CZIBs.<\/h4>\n<p>A little context here helps.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>CZIB stands for \u2018Conflict Zone Information Bulletin\u2019 which EASA puts out when required using a combination of <strong>publications issued by worldwide states, and risk assessments performed by their own team<\/strong> called the <em>Integrated EU Aviation Security Group.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>EASA shares information on conflict zones to help operators and member states make an informed decision <strong>whether to enter risky airspace or not.<\/strong><\/li>\n<li>Unlike some state-issued airspace warnings, <strong>CZIBs are not legally binding.<\/strong> They are just recommendations. You can find a list of them <a href=\"https:\/\/www.easa.europa.eu\/en\/domains\/air-operations\/czibs\">here<\/a>.<\/li>\n<li>On January 31, EASA made some changes to this list \u2013 namely, they <strong>cancelled the CZIBs for both Israel and Iran.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h4>Why the change?<\/h4>\n<p>EASA has published a brief explanation <a href=\"https:\/\/www.easa.europa.eu\/en\/newsroom-and-events\/news\/updated-conflict-zone-advisories-middle-east-region\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">here<\/a>, but it doesn\u2019t give much away.<\/p>\n<p>Ultimately, they cite an <strong>improving risk environment<\/strong> <strong>due to ceasefire agreements<\/strong> between Israel, Hamas and Hezbollah along with a reduction in short-term regional tensions.<\/p>\n<p>The CZIBs were originally published in November 2024 in response to unprecedented regional hostilities. It now seems EASA believes the situation has sufficiently come back off the boil.<\/p>\n<h4>Those in the know<\/h4>\n<p>While quick to re-affirm that some risks to aviation in the region are still present, <strong>the CZIBs have been replaced by Information Notes<\/strong> distributed to those on a<strong> \u2018need-to-know\u2019<\/strong> basis \u2013 their words, not ours.<\/p>\n<h4>Existing State Warnings<\/h4>\n<p>EASA CZIBs (and their removal) have <strong>no direct effect<\/strong> <strong>on existing state-issued airspace warnings.<\/strong> This falls into the hands of policy makers who may wish to follow their advice.<\/p>\n<p>With that in mind, you can find a full list of current state-issued airspace warnings still in effect for <strong>Iran<\/strong> <a href=\"https:\/\/safeairspace.net\/iran\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">here<\/a>, and <strong>Israel<\/strong> <a href=\"https:\/\/safeairspace.net\/israel\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">here<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h4>We still think Iran is potentially risky<\/h4>\n<p>Five years have passed since PS752 was misidentified and <strong>shot down by an air defense system near OIIE\/Tehran airport.<\/strong> The country still possesses the same arsenal of advanced anti-aircraft weaponry today.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The sudden closure of the entire OIIX\/Tehran FIR last year<\/strong> is proof of how quickly the risk picture can change for overflights.<\/p>\n<p>While there may not be an intent to target civil aviation itself, agencies such as the US FAA <a href=\"https:\/\/www.faa.gov\/air_traffic\/publications\/us_restrictions\/doc\/Special-Federal-Aviation-Regulation-SFAR-117.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">continue to warn<\/a> of the danger posed by unannounced military activity and mistaken identity \u2013 so much so that its existing <strong>airspace prohibition<\/strong> (by SFAR) has been extended all the way to 2027.<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_10097\" style=\"width: 1034px\" class=\"wp-caption alignnone\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-10097\" class=\"wp-image-10097 size-large\" src=\"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/07\/ukraine-crash-1024x683.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1024\" height=\"683\" srcset=\"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/07\/ukraine-crash-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/07\/ukraine-crash-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/07\/ukraine-crash-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/07\/ukraine-crash-1536x1025.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/07\/ukraine-crash-900x600.jpg 900w, https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/07\/ukraine-crash.jpg 2000w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><p id=\"caption-attachment-10097\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Five years have passed since the shootdown of PS752 over Tehran.<\/p><\/div>\n<h4>Operate to Israel with caution<\/h4>\n<p>In line with EASA\u2019s advice, we have seen improving airspace safety in the<strong> LLLL\/Tel Aviv FIR.<\/strong> Just recently we reduced our <a href=\"http:\/\/SafeAirspace.net\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">SafeAirspace.net<\/a> risk rating for Israel from \u2018Do Not Fly\u2019 to \u2018Danger Exists.\u2019<\/p>\n<p>This was in response to the same ceasefire agreements and a proven track record of maintaining airspace safety in close proximity to active conflict zones. This also reflected the decision of several major carriers to resume scheduled flights there.<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_26915\" style=\"width: 986px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-26915\" class=\"size-full wp-image-26915\" src=\"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/Luft.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"976\" height=\"372\" srcset=\"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/Luft.png 976w, https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/Luft-300x114.png 300w, https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/Luft-768x293.png 768w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 976px) 100vw, 976px\" \/><p id=\"caption-attachment-26915\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">The return of major carriers to Israeli airspace reflects improving airspace safety.<\/p><\/div>\n<p>However, the long-term outcome of these agreements remains unpredictable \u2013 along with <strong>potential for rapid escalation in risk<\/strong> to previous levels should the agreements fail. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/c98ly11k9rwo\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Recent events<\/a> have proven they remain fragile.<\/p>\n<p>For that reason, we advise operators to heed existing warnings and prepare for short notice airspace closures or reroutes in Israeli airspace.<\/p>\n<h4>What about Lebanon?<\/h4>\n<p>There was another change to EASA\u2019s list of CZIBs that was easily overlooked.<\/p>\n<p>Rather than withdraw it, EASA has <strong>extended its existing guidance for the<\/strong> <strong>OLBB\/Beirut FIR<\/strong> until end of March 2025.<\/p>\n<p>EASA explains that the country has <strong>not sufficiently proven capability to address existing risks<\/strong> \u2013 including the potential for renewed escalation between Hezbollah and Israel.<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_26916\" style=\"width: 1034px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-26916\" class=\"size-large wp-image-26916\" src=\"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/hez-1024x683.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1024\" height=\"683\" srcset=\"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/hez-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/hez-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/hez-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/hez-1536x1024.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/hez-2048x1365.jpg 2048w, https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/hez-900x600.jpg 900w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><p id=\"caption-attachment-26916\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">EASA doesn&#8217;t believe Lebanon has sufficient procedures in place to mitigate airspace risk in event of another major escalation between Israel and Hezbollah.<\/p><\/div>\n<p>Without appropriate mitigating procedures to fall back on, the airspace should still be considered dangerous. Interestingly, EASA expressed <a href=\"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/russia-aircraft-shot-down-new-easa-airspace-warning\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">similar concerns<\/a> in its recent airspace warning for <strong>Western Russia<\/strong> following the downing of Azerbaijan Airlines 8243 on approach in Grozny.<\/p>\n<p>As such, EASA continues to advise aircraft <strong>not to enter<\/strong> <strong>Lebanese airspace at all levels<\/strong>. Over at <a href=\"https:\/\/safeairspace.net\/lebanon\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">SafeAirspace.net<\/a>, we also maintain a \u2018Do Not Fly\u2019 warning for the same skies.<\/p>\n<h4>Need more info?<\/h4>\n<p>We maintain a full database of state issued airspace warnings at <a href=\"https:\/\/safeairspace.net\/lebanon\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">SafeAirspace.net<\/a>, where a full global briefing is available with a single click. You can also reach us on <a href=\"mailto:team@ops.group\">team@ops.group<\/a> around the clock.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>On January 31, EASA withdrew its CZIBs for both Israel and Iran. But the question&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":49,"featured_media":26937,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[1988,64,34,451],"class_list":{"0":"post-26900","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-briefings","8":"tag-czib","9":"tag-easa","10":"tag-iran","11":"tag-israel"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/26900","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/49"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=26900"}],"version-history":[{"count":16,"href":"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/26900\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":26938,"href":"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/26900\/revisions\/26938"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/26937"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=26900"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=26900"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=26900"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}