{"id":12097,"date":"2021-03-03T06:42:20","date_gmt":"2021-03-03T11:42:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/?p=12097"},"modified":"2021-03-05T18:28:24","modified_gmt":"2021-03-05T23:28:24","slug":"unstable-why-arent-we-going-around","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ops.group\/blog\/unstable-why-arent-we-going-around\/","title":{"rendered":"Unstable Approaches: Why Aren’t We Going Around?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Late last year, IATA put out a bulletin<\/a> noting that the number of unstable approaches in 2020 was a lot higher than in previous years.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Look a little further back and you\u2019ll see this has been a trend for some time now.<\/p>\n

Fly the line and it\u2019s not hard to see\u00a0why\u00a0<\/em>we are getting unstable \u2013 there are a bunch of reasons including weather, other traffic, challenging clearances, complex airspace, fatigue and even currency given the state of the industry, to name only a few.<\/p>\n

So what’s the big deal?<\/h4>\n

IATA also know that in most cases,\u00a0we\u2019re not going around<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

The numbers don\u2019t lie, and they\u2019re scary. Get this – a recent study<\/a> estimated that 97% of unstable approaches flown in IMC didn\u2019t fly a missed approach.<\/strong> That\u2019s huge.<\/p>\n

The leading cause of aviation accidents worldwide are runway excursions. The Flight Safety Foundation<\/a> looked into all of them over a fourteen-year period and found that 83% of them could have been prevented by a go-around. That\u2019s over half of all accidents recorded.<\/strong> It\u2019s a big deal.<\/p>\n

What do we actually mean by \u2018unstable\u2019?<\/h4>\n

In a nutshell it is any approach that doesn\u2019t meet the stable approach criteria in your SOPs by a certain height<\/strong> \u2013 usually 1,000 feet off the deck. And it\u2019s not just the ones that have gone badly wrong either – the criteria are usually pretty tight…<\/p>\n

\"\"

Example of typical stabilised approach criteria to be met by 1,000 feet off the ground.<\/p><\/div>\n

Like the picture, the decision appears to be black and white: If you don\u2019t meet the criteria, you have to go-around.<\/strong><\/p>\n

So why aren\u2019t we doing it?<\/h4>\n

Good question. There are a bunch of factors but the most important is pilot psychology<\/strong>. Either consciously or sub-consciously we are making a decision to not go-around. Here are some suggestions about what may be happening inside our heads.<\/p>\n

1. We’re pilots<\/strong><\/p>\n

Which means we’re mission-orientated.\u00a0We want to get in and we don\u2019t like conceding defeat.<\/strong> Nor do we enjoy being reminded that we have reached the limit of our ability to fix whatever has gone wrong.<\/p>\n

Experience also tells us that if we persist a little longer we can re-stabilise. After all a little speed brake, a little more sink rate you\u2019ll have the thing back on rails long before the runway out the window is too close for comfort.<\/p>\n

The problem is we\u2019re fixating on completing the mission.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Studies have shown this behaviour is insidious. It creeps up on you and you begin to normalize the risk<\/strong>. Just like a speeding driver arriving home unscathed, the danger becomes typical. But it gives you far less capacity and room to deal with anything unexpected.<\/p>\n

2. Training<\/strong><\/p>\n

A go-around is a normal procedure, but boy do things happen quickly. It\u2019s okay when you know it\u2019s coming. But it\u2019s when you\u2019re off the script that they get especially challenging. Especially after something stressful has already happened.<\/p>\n

Studies show that pilots are more reluctant to go-around in scenarios they haven\u2019t practiced<\/strong>. This includes when the aircraft is only partially configured or is very low to ground (such as a bounced landing or botched flare). Complicated airspace and procedures can also be major deterrents to hitting those TOGA switches.<\/p>\n

3. What the other guy\/gal thinks<\/strong><\/p>\n

Everyone\u2019s personality is different, and we don\u2019t always get along<\/strong>. You might like a good book, while your offsider might prefer a good base jump. When it begins to matter is when it affects safety.<\/p>\n

We react differently depending on the dynamic with the other pilot. This can include embarrassment at going around, a lack of support for the decision or disagreement with whether the approach can be safely salvaged. But if you begin to see a go-around as a reflection of your abilities, you are already on a slippery slope.<\/strong> Add an offsider who might judge you for going around and you\u2019re in for a dangerous ride together.<\/p>\n

Cockpit<\/strong> gradient<\/strong> is another contentious issue. Too steep and it can turn a multi-crew aircraft into a single pilot one. Age, experience, rank or culture can all contribute. Take this animation of a visual approach on a calm sunny day in San Francisco a few years back. Watch the animation and decide when you would have said something. There were two Captains and a First Officer on the flight deck.<\/p>\n