

Yemen: Airstrike on Sanaa Airport

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On December 20, an airstrike was carried out on Yemen's major airport, **OYSN/Sanaa** by Saudi-led coalition forces.

It follows months of persistent drone attacks launched by Houthi Rebels on targets in Southern Saudi Arabia – the latest being on December 19.

At the time of writing, it isn't clear how badly the airport was damaged. However, no reports have emerged yet of any significant disruptions to civil traffic.

But does this attack represent an increase in risk to civil aviation inside the **OYSC/Sanaa FIR**? Let's take a closer look.

The situation.

Yemen is an active conflict zone and has been since 2014. Houthi rebels in Yemen are at war both at home and with Saudi Arabia – who lead a coalition of countries from North Africa and West Asia. If you'd like to read a little more about the background of the conflict, a good starting point would be [here](#).

The war itself is in stalemate and so while the attack on OYSN was unexpected, it is not the first time it has happened.

In fact, the airport was also attacked and badly damaged in similar coalition airstrikes back in 2017 and 2018.

So why now?

The Houthi's primary means of attacking Saudi Arabia continues to be through the use of **weaponised drones**. The attacks have been happening on an almost daily basis recently and are a persistent threat to Saudi Arabia.

The weapons they are using are becoming increasingly sophisticated and are supplied to the Houthi from

other political interests in the region.



Weaponised drones are persistently used to target Southern Saudi Arabia.

Despite having sophisticated air defence systems, the challenge for Saudi Arabia is to work out how to stop these attacks.

Drone launches from Sana'a Airport


The Houthi have control over a large section of Western Yemen which includes the capital, Sanaa (and its airport). Recent intelligence has shown that the Houthi are using sites at the airport to store and launch these drones. It is these sites that were targeted in the December 20 airstrike.



The Dec 20 airstrike was targeting military sites at the airport believed to be for for storing and launching drones.

Changes to Risk

In terms of *overflights* of the **OYSC/Sanaa FIR**, the December 20 airstrike hasn't changed anything – Yemeni airspace was, and still is, **extremely dangerous**. Several states (including the US) ban operators from entering it due to the risk of anti-aircraft fire from militant groups at all levels. The only exceptions are airways well off the coast – primarily UT702 and M999.



US operators are banned from the OYSC/Sanaa FIR apart from airways M999 and UT702 which are both well off the coast.

But when it comes to operations in and out of OYSN airport itself, these events may indicate a renewed threat. Of particular concern is that the Houthi seem to have been carrying out cross-border military offensives in **very close proximity to civil aviation**.

The risk of this is two-fold:

- The airport may continue to be **targeted by coalition airstrikes** which can occur without warning and with little regard for civilian traffic.
- The Houthi may have a renewed intent on protecting the airport using **anti-aircraft weaponry** which puts civil aircraft at risk from being misidentified or mis-targeted while operating over or near the airport.

What type of air defence systems do the Houthi have?

In recent years there has been credible evidence that the Houthi have been supplied with advanced anti-aircraft weaponry by proxy, along with aircraft tracking systems that could pose a threat to aircraft at all levels.

There have also been several unverified claims made by the Houthi during the conflict that they successfully shot down numerous military aircraft – although these are sometimes known to be false.

Either way, the December 20 airstrike may serve to encourage their intent to **protect their airspace**.

Want to know more?

Safeairspace.net is our conflict zone and risk database. Head over there for a full briefing on the OYSC/Sana'a FIR, along with a summary of major state warnings for Yemeni airspace.

You can also add your email to our Airspace Risk Update that is issued once a fortnight – only what you need to know, and zero spam. [Click here for that.](#)

Monday Briefing: Russian overflights of Ukraine now prohibited, EUR: TCAS 7.1 Compulsary

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All Russian overflights of Ukraine now prohibited 29NOV In a development of the dispute between Russia and Ukraine regarding traffic between the two countries, Ukraine has extended the original ban (which affected specific Russian Airline only) to all Russian registered Aircraft Operators. Notam 2604/15 issued last Wednesday has the specifics.

EUR: TCAS 7.1 Compulsary 01DEC The EASA Mandate for compulsory carriage of TCAS version 7.1 (with changes to “Adjust Vertical Speed” RA and resolution of “Reversal RA” problems) is 01DEC. All operators must have 7.1 on board. Note that this applies also to EU Territories abroad, eg. New Caledonia, Tahiti.

OYSC/Sanaa FIR We’ve received input from a number of US Airlines that although Yemeni landmass airspace is prohibited, operations through the OYSC/Sanaa FIR Oceanic portion are available in accordance with FDC5/5575.

NZAA/Auckland is closed every Monday morning 0130-0430LT for runway maintenance. However, Robin Leach at Air Centre One notes that several aircraft have departed for Auckland with an arrival time during this period resulting in airborne holding. Part of the issue is that a NOTAM is only issued if the work is cancelled; otherwise the (hard to spot) AIP/IFG notes for Auckland apply.

ZBAA/Beijing Chinese Authorities have issued an 'orange level' alert for smog on Sunday, with reports that visibility in places is down to a few hundred feet. This alert requires industrial plants to reduce or shut down production. With the current temperatures, Freezing Fog is affecting operations at Beijing Airports.

North Atlantic First day with the new NAT Tracks structure will be 01DEC per advice from NATS and Nav Canada, reporting that previous IT issues with the new tracks have been resolved.

Spain The National AFTN COM Centre is out of action for a few hours on Monday night (after 2100Z), meaning that FPL filing and other AFTN based messaging will be affected for Airports in Spain and the Canary Islands.

Bermuda Transatlantic Operators should note in addition to the new track structure on 01DEC, that Bermuda will be without radar coverage for the afternoon (1200Z-1600Z), and the National Authority there is recommending to avoid Bermuda airspace. A limited non-radar service will be provided, and only airways L459, 461, and 462 are useable if you do overfly. Refer to KZWY A0461/15 for more.

EINN/Shannon is again closed for maintenance this Monday night 01DEC, 2145Z-0500Z; use alternate diversion alternates!

EGLL/London Heathrow has a high risk of regulation for Mon, Nov 30th from 0540-2200Z due to strong winds. Please plan fuel accordingly for possible airborne delays.

HLLL/Libya FIR Due to the recent escalation of the Libyan Crisis all Italian aircraft operators have been prohibited from flying through HLLL FIR. Prior Permission to operate into HL available aerodromes also requires Prior Permission by the Libyan CAA. REF NOTAM A8382/15 which replaced A5637/15.

LFRR/Brest FIR Training and stepped implementation of the ERATO paperless strip system in Brest FIR commenced on 24NOV and will last until 18DEC with significant capacity reductions. A transition period with capacity reductions will follow from 19DEC; this may potentially extend into Summer 2016. Moderate and (in some case) high delays may be expected daily, depending on the sector configuration provided.

LTxx/Turkey In response to the downing of a Russian Fighter Jet, Russia will be suspending the Visa-Free Travel program between the countries effective 01JAN2016.

VICG/Changigarh The new Chandigarh international airport which was originally scheduled to close for runway resurfacing which was estimated to take approx a year will in fact now remain open during the construction. Work to resurface the runway will take place without disturbing the flight operations there.

EIDW/Dublin The DAA and IAA are currently exploring a further reduction in SID separation to 75 seconds (following aircraft given take-off clearance when preceding aircraft reaches 1NM past DER). Ongoing AIM is to reduce further to 60 seconds if possible.

MKJS/Montego Bay The operator of Sangster International Airport, MBJ Airports Limited, Announced that, effective 24NOV, electronic boarding passes will be accepted as part of the security screening process.

DNxx/Nigeria The Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority, NCAA, suspended some oil marketers from supplying Jet A1 to airlines due to a lack of depot facilities. The affected marketing companies include Jushad Oil and Gas Limited, Lubcon Limited, Ascon Oil Company Limited, Acon Petroleum Limited and Star Orient Aviation Limited.

FQNC/Nacala, Mozambique Mozambique's airport management company AdM stated on 24 November 2015 that Nacala Airport is expected to receive the proper certification to service international flights by December 2015. International airlines can begin using the facility by March or April 2016. Nacala Airport was a former military airbase and it opened as a civilian facility in December 2014. However, to date, the airport has only been permitted to service domestic flights.

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