Key Points

• The last two weeks has seen a significant increase in Russian military activity near NATO borders, including several confirmed airspace violations involving both drones and aircraft.
• This has been reported in Poland, Romania and Estonia. While these kinds of airspace incidents are not new, the recent spike in frequency and intensity is cause for concern.
• NATO has responded in the region by scrambling jets, enhancing surveillance, and deploying additional defensive resources along its eastern borders.
• These events may have increased risks for civil aviation, including collision hazards, potential for escalation, activation of air defence systems and GPS interference.

Major Incidents

September 9-10: Poland (EPWW/Warsaw FIR)

During a Russian missile and drone attack on Ukraine, multiple Russian drones violated Polish airspace.

They were detected across eastern, central and northern Poland with some reportedly entering via Belarus.

Polish and NATO fighters were scrambled, and several drones were shot down.

Poland described the event as a major provocation. It invoked Article 4 of the NATO treaty – a move that triggers emergency consultations with other member states.

This was an important political response. While Article 4 does not commit NATO to collective defence, it does require formal discussions when a member state feels its security is under direct threat.

September 13: Romania (LRBB/Bucharest FIR)

A single Russian drone breached Romanian airspace  near the Danube River during strikes on nearby Ukrainian targets.

It reportedly loitered for around 50 minutes before exiting back towards Ukraine.

Romanian and NATO fighters responded, but no weapons were fired due to concerns about collateral damage in populated areas below.

September 19: Estonia (EETT/Tallinn FIR)

Three Russian MiG-31s allegedly entered Estonian airspace for about 12 minutes without authorization near Vaindloo Island in the Gulf of Finland, close to the boundary with Russian-controlled airspace.

The jets flew without flight plans, transponders or ATC contact for approx 12 minutes. NATO jets were dispatched to intercept them, before the Russian jets exited the area.

Estonia invoked Article 4 following the incursion.

NATO Response – Operation Eastern Sentry

On Sep 12, NATO launched Operation Eastern Sentry to bolster its posture along the eastern flank.

This mission involves ongoing fighter patrols, improved radar surveillance, and reinforced air defence systems along NATO’s eastern border.

The specifics of this deployment aren’t available, but the operation’s purpose is to detect and respond rapidly to any further violations.

Why Russia might be doing this

Analysts suggest there may be several possible motives:

• Testing NATO’s response – violations can be used to gather intel on detection and reaction times, radar coverage and interception procedures.
• Posturing – signalling strength and willingness to challenge NATO in a show of force.
• Distraction – Diverting NATO resources away from other interests (such as the conflict in Ukraine).
• Deniability – Maintaining ambiguity by blaming navigation errors, or claiming operations only occurred in neutral airspace.

What’s the bigger picture?

Tensions have risen along NATO’s eastern boundaries in recent weeks, raising safety and operational concerns for civil aviation. Even if an outright conflict is still unlikely, these violations complicate de-escalation and increase the frequency of spill-over risks.

Flight operations in this region need to monitor the situation closely for changes – history has shown that just because airspace is open, doesn’t mean it is safe.

Key risks for operators

Collision hazards – Military aircraft operating without transponders in high-density airspace can create serious risks for civil flights – especially in Baltic states and Poland where major routes between Western Europe and Scandinavia exist.

Airspace disruption – When interceptions occur, ATC may need to rapidly clear surrounding airspace causing re-routes and unexpected fuel burn to enroute aircraft.

Sudden Escalation – A full confrontation between NATO and Russia is unlikely in the near term. However, recent lessons in the Middle East have shown us that sudden closures of FIRs can be a realistic consequence of a deteriorating political situation. This can occur in hours, not days.

GPS Interference – Russian-origin jamming is frequently reported in the region, often traced to areas like Kaliningrad and St Petersburg. The team at SKAI Data Services kindly provided us with the following data map of recent jamming and spoofing recorded in the area -a special thanks to their team.

Stay Informed

We continually monitor global airspace for changes to risk and security at safeairspace.net. There, you can find up-to-date state-issued warnings for areas bordering Russian and Ukrainian FIRs. You can also reach the team directly via blog@ops.group.

France are worried about “the deterioration of the international context”. Basically, they are worried about the state of the world. So, they have decided to run a fairly major crisis management readiness, preparedness sort of a thing over a 3 year period.

As they put it, it will “consider the hypothesis of a major engagement of high intensity as possible” and help the armed forces prepare for it by practicing a whole bunch of exercise.

Or as we put it – “a great big load of military mayhem in French airspace to look out for”.

Sounds big?

It will be. The biggest in 30 years in fact, involving a whole load of NATO members. But the main impact is going to be within French airspace.

Orion is the first of the 3 exercises which are planned over the next 3 years. It consists of 4 phases, expected to take place on the following dates:

• Phase 1 & 3 (computer assisted exercises, so no impact to ops)
• Phase 2: from 21 Feb to 10 March (taking place in the southern part of France)
• Phase 4: from 17 April to 5 May (taking place in the north-eastern part of France)

What does that mean for flight ops?

We heard someone say it will have a “huge impact on the network” with numerous flights impacted through re-routes, delays and probably cancellations because of airspace capacity reductions.

So, what do we need to worry about?

Phases 1 and 3 are computer assisted, but phase 2 involves real people and real military stuff including real military airplanes in real bits of airspace we normally really like to fly in.

The ramp up for this will start on Feb 16 so you can expect disruption from them, through to March 10 when the phase finishes.

The maps aren’t the best quality but you can view them in the document here. We have recreated the two main upper level ones for you below.

Because there are various different areas scattered across the region, flights may be disrupted in the areas between resulting in significant re-routes for overflights, with the impact felt across France and into UK airspace with NATS managing the routings that end.

A summary of possible threats:

• Re-routes and inflight delays
• Congested airspace resulting in slots and disruption, possibly cancellations
• Reduced diversion options in France during exercises
• Military traffic to watch out for
• Complex danger and prohibited areas across multiple levels and regions to be aware of

There will be more information though right?

Yes, plenty hopefully:

• AIP SUP is due out imminently.
• Eurocontrol are expected to run some conferences on this which will be announced by their Network Operations Portal here.
• The specific danger and prohibited areas will have notams issued closer to the dates.

You can find a calendar of NATO planned exercises here to give a heads-up on future plans (and AIPs and Notams to look out for).

So, watch this space and be prepared for some frustrating planning and routing disruptions through Feb and March, and again in April.